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Abstract 
 
The development strategies being promoted in the EU – Europe 2020 and the 2014-2020 
Cohesion Policy – aim to supersede the presumed incompatibility between efficiency and equity 
through a policy approach tailoring interventions to the key specificities of all territories, 
including the most disadvantaged. In this view, the socio-economic progress of lagging regions 
would help keeping under control any increase in inequalities potentially associated with the 
economic development process. However, the idea of promoting spatially-targeted interventions 
in economically backward areas has been conceptually questioned, and the effectiveness of the 
Cohesion Policy programme in poorer regions is yet to be convincingly proven. 
In the policy framework underpinning EU strategies, a key role is assigned to the quality of 
regional and local government institutions. Public institutions are conceived as instrumental for 
identifying and solving the bottlenecks inhibiting economic growth and perpetuating social 
exclusion in poorer places. Nevertheless, local governments may also be responsible for wastes 
and misallocations of financial resources. While theoretical contributions on the importance of 
government institutions for regional and local development abound, empirical evidence on their 
functioning is scarce. Through which mechanisms they influence the design and outcomes of 
public policies is unclear.  
Drawing from cross-country investigations and case-studies in the European context, the four 
quantitative studies composing this Thesis contribute to shed light on these related issues. 
Focusing on the United Kingdom, the first paper evaluates the economic and labour market impact 
of EU Cohesion Policy. Counterfactual analyses demonstrate that EU regional policies may have 
a beneficial impact on the labour market and growth path of peripheral regions. The study warns 
over possible negative repercussions of a discontinuation of EU financial support to poorer areas, 
a result of obvious relevance for the country after ‘Brexit’. 
By exploiting panel samples of EU regions, the second and third papers shed light on the role of 
government institutions for the returns of regional investments and for labour market and social 
conditions in Europe. The second paper examines the link between institutional quality, transport 
infrastructure investments, and economic growth. It shows that improvements in secondary 
(local) roads are conducive to a better economic performance only in presence of sound regional 
governments. The third paper investigates the extent to which the factors at the centre of European 
growth strategies – institutions, innovation, human capital and transport infrastructure – 
contribute to the generation of employment and to social inclusion in EU regions. The evidence 
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produced suggests that regional government institutions have been essential to mitigate social 
exclusion issues in EU regions.  
The fourth paper focuses on Southern Italy to examine how public finances are distorted by ‘local 
governments captures’ operated by organised crime. Collusions between mafia and local politics 
have a significant impact on the selection of investments and on the collection of fiscal revenues. 
The local policy agenda is modified to the advantage of the interests of organised crime. 
Overall, the evidence emerging from this Thesis suggests that policy interventions have the 
potential to boost the economic and labour market performance of the less developed EU regions. 
However, any favourable policy outcome (both in terms of efficiency and equity) is conditioned 
by the competence and the goodwill of government institutions responsible for defining 
development targets and enforcing investment plans. When politicians are conditioned by illegal 
pressures from criminal groups, investment decisions follow special interests rather than general 
welfare goals. In turn, inadequate governance harms the economic impact of selected 
interventions. The results are particularly relevant for the lively debate, within economic 
geography, on the pre-conditions and policy measures enabling ‘smart and inclusive’ 
development at the sub-national level.  
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Introduction 
 
The role of public and investment policies has long been disputed among scholars. Government 
intervention on behalf of the whole society is seen as necessary in the interests of both economic 
competitiveness (efficiency) and equality of opportunities (equity) (Musgrave, 1959; Okun, 1975; 
Just et al., 1985). Yet, the appropriate measures to achieve these two goals and the extent to which 
redistribution works at the expense of efficient resource allocation remain arguments of intense 
discussion (van Dijk et al., 2009). In this respect, the last decade has been characterised by a lively 
intellectual debate among regional scientists and economic geographers, with scholars divided in 
two contrasting schools of thought. On the one hand, proponents of a ‘people-centred’ approach 
considering the formation of agglomeration economies as catalysers of economic growth (inter 
alia, World Bank, 2009; Gill, 2010; 2011); on the other hand, advocates of a ‘place-based’ (or 
‘place-sensitive’) perspective favouring context-specific interventions, in the belief that all areas 
display some development potential (inter alia, Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009; 2012a; McCann & 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; Iammarino et al., 2017). As such, the latter approach rejects any trade-off 
between efficiency and equity, assuming that interregional inequality reduction can go hand in 
hand with enhanced economic capabilities (Barca et al., 2012).  
In Europe, a key role in the promotion of development policies is played by the European Union 
(EU). These years, the EU is spending a vast amount of resources to generate ‘smart and inclusive’ 
growth in the continent (European Commission, 2012). The extent to which this effort will 
revamp the European economy and its labour market, both still severely affected by the economic 
crisis, will crucially depend on the effectiveness of the policy design. Stimulated by the scholarly 
debate, the EU is embracing the ‘place-based’ approach as a rationale behind the design of its 
regional investment programmes.  
This policy paradigm fits well with the EU’s commitment towards increased economic and social 
cohesion. To this aim, EU regional policy – or Cohesion Policy – has invested a large amount of 
resources for growth (e.g. infrastructural) and social (e.g. tackling long-term unemployment) 
projects in the less developed areas of the continent. Nonetheless, whether this effort has produced 
the expected outcomes is still an open question in the literature (Pienkovski & Berkovitz, 2015). 
According to the ‘place-based’ logic, fundamental condition for the success of spatial policies 
aiming to be simultaneously growth-conducive and socially inclusive is the presence of adequate 
regional and local institutions (Barca et al., 2012; European Commission, 2014). The outcome of 
public policies is seen as dependent on the quality of the governments in charge of designing and 
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implementing them. In this view, a recurrent problem of failing policies in EU regions is the lack 
of capacity and/or willingness of local governments to act primarily in the interests of the citizens 
(Farole et al., 2011). That is, a non-transparent selection or inadequate implementation may lie at 
the root of the policy’s ineffectiveness. 
The importance of effective public institutions for socio-economic development, in general, and 
for the effectiveness of investment policies, in particular, is by no means a new concept. Their 
role, however, has mainly been explored at the national level (inter alia, North, 1990; Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 1997; Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004), overlooking the 
high degree of heterogeneity in institutional quality within countries (Charron et al., 2014).  
While theoretical contributions on the importance of institutions for regional and local 
development policies abound (e.g. Putnam, 1993; Amin, 1999; Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, 2006; 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), empirical evidence on their functioning is extremely scarce. It is still 
unclear which kind of institutions matter in which context, or which mechanisms are at play 
influencing the development path of regions and cities. Similarly, the extent to which the 
generation of smart and inclusive growth depends on the quality of regional governments remains 
unproven empirically.  
This Thesis contributes to unpack the ‘black box’ of public institutions by delving into their 
relationship with economic growth, employment, and social inclusion in Europe, as well as by 
empirically analysing their conditioning role for investment policies. The focus lies on the study 
of the regional and local dimension of government quality and government failures. A regional, 
macroeconomic approach accounts for the diversity of institutional structures across space. A 
local focus, instead, allows to scrutinise phenomena in greater detail by exploring specific micro-
institutional mechanisms triggering governments’ decisions. 
In the following sections, this introductory chapter will outline the theoretical and conceptual 
strands within which the Thesis is set, present the structure of the Thesis and the objectives of the 
four papers composing it, discuss the key research themes and summarise the papers belonging 
to each theme. The chapter ends by drawing the overall conclusions and policy implications.  
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Conceptual framework 
 
This Thesis touches upon a number of related issues and areas of research. First, the research 
broadly relates to the longstanding debate on the rationale and impact of government intervention 
in the economy. Second, it links with the ongoing scholarly discussion regarding the optimal 
targets for sub-national development strategies and the role of government institutions within the 
framework inspiring EU regional policies. Third, it connects with the literature examining the 
relationship between the quality of government institutions and the design and outcomes of public 
policies. In the present section, these themes are introduced in turn, linked with each other and 
with the specific research topics to which the Thesis seeks to make a contribution. 
Traditionally, the general role of the public sector has been conceived as a regulator of the market 
and facilitator of development, through efficiency-type of policies, and as responsible for an equal 
distribution of opportunities and income, via equity-type of policies1 (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). 
At the sub-national level, public policy intervention is motivated by the fact that persistent 
disparities in living standards within countries – bearing harmful economic and social 
consequences – are not self-adjusting (Armstrong & Taylor, 2000). 
As regards public intervention aiming at economic growth and development, for decades physical 
capital accumulation (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956), particularly transport infrastructure (Aschauer, 
1989), was seen as the centrepiece of expenditures stimulating the economy. This view was 
challenged by theories recommending investment policies centred on technological development, 
innovation, and human capital promotion (e.g. Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Lundvall, 1988; Cooke 
et al., 1997). Following, different contributions have identified the quality of (formal and 
informal) institutions as the driving factor behind the economic progress of countries and regions 
(e.g. North, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Storper, 1997; Morgan, 1997; Amin, 1999; Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2000). All these different growth-enhancing factors have been incorporated into the 
policy strategies funded by the European Union, an institution adopting a clear ‘interventionist’ 
approach to economic development promotion (Armstrong, 2011; Barca et al., 2012).  
                                                          
1 The extensiveness of the role of the government may vary, according to different theoretical perspectives. Different 
schools of thought have proposed diverse views. On the one extreme, the classic (and neo-classic) economics approach, 
arguing for a minimalist presence of the public sector acting exclusively as ‘market adjuster’. The opposite extreme is 
the interventionist conception of Keynesian (and neo-keynesian) economics, proposing an active fiscal policy to 
achieve (full) employment and promote economic development (Keynes, 1936). Others (e.g. Musgrave, 1959) have 
attempted to synthesise the different views. 
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In regards to government initiatives favouring equality and better social conditions, labour market 
policies, redistributive fiscal arrangements, measures fostering education are considered effective 
(OECD, 2012b), but key economic factors and growth policies can contribute as well (Hoeller et 
al., 2012). However, incentives to increase economic outputs may also give rise to conditions that 
end up injuring the level of inclusion in the society.  
Balancing the trade-off between efficiency and equity goals has long been viewed as the main 
policy task of the public sector (Musgrave, 1959; Okun, 1975). Yet, the very existence of the 
trade-off has been put into question. First, in the 90s, when economic theories argued that more 
equal societies tend to have faster rates of human capital acquisition and economic growth 
(Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Osberg, 1995). And again, more recently, when the debate on which 
areas should be targeted by territorial policies has divided economic geographers. Strategies 
fostering the concentration of economic activity, prioritising expenditures in the core at the 
expenses of lagging regions, have been criticised for exacerbating aggregate economic and social 
disparities (OECD, 2011; Iammarino et al., 2017). To this view, the ‘place-based’/ ‘place-
sensitive’ perspective opposes the maximisation of collective returns, by arguing that individual 
policies should be promoted not just in the most dynamic places, but also in geographically 
dispersed and disadvantaged regions. Such policy formula, it is claimed, allows to mobilise the 
untapped assets of otherwise marginalised places, keeping under control any social cost associated 
with the economic development process (Barca, 2009; Camagni & Capello, 2015; Iammarino et 
al., 2017).  
Following this approach, the modern development strategies adopted by the EU – Europe 2020 
and the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy – aim to supersede the presumed incompatibility between 
economic effectiveness (efficiency) and social cohesion (equity) through a policy framework that 
tailors interventions to the key specificities and assets of each territory2 (Barca et al., 2012; 
European Commission, 2014; Capello & Camagni, 2015). The intended outcome of these 
investment strategies is the generation of inclusive economic growth with “a strong emphasis on 
job creation and poverty reduction” (European Commission, 2010). Whether EU investment 
policies are actually capable of delivering socio-economic development in the periphery of 
                                                          
2 In fact, the extent to which the rationale and objectives of Europe 2020 and Cohesion Policy strategies are coherently 
coordinated has been questioned. While the European Commission argues that the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy is “fully 
aligned with the Europe 2020 strategy and its headline targets” (European Commission, 2014: xvii), it has been argued 
that the existence of expenditure quotas for specific policy goals of the Europe 2020 strategy is in contrast with the 
place-based logic at the basis of the new Cohesion Policy, because ‘place-based’ policies should reject any form of 
one-size-fits-all approach (Mendez, 2013). 
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Europe is a hotly debated question which will be taken for examination in the empirical works of 
the Thesis. 
According to the ‘place-based’ policy framework, a key role is played by institutional quality. As 
compared to theoretical perspectives advising for institutions as centralised structures (replicable 
elsewhere) administering the implementation of top-down policy schemes (e.g. World Bank, 
2009), the logic underpinning EU strategies conceives the function of institutions in a different 
way. Any local context is seen as characterised by idiosyncratic (non-replicable) institutional 
elements, both formal and informal, regulating the interplay among economic agents and shaping 
the evolution of each territory. Local institutions are regarded as instrumental for understanding 
the development bottlenecks inhibiting economic growth and perpetuating social exclusion in 
poorer places (Barca et al., 2012). They are functional to the ‘process of discovery’ of key assets 
of a region and, in their interaction with institutions at higher levels (national, supra-national), 
they contribute to the definition of policy priorities and the implementation of effective measures 
(Camagni & Capello, 2015). The presence of sound institutions, and in particular of effective 
local and regional governments, is regarded as pivotal for promoting ‘smart and inclusive’ growth 
in Europe (Bachtler et al., 2017). This Thesis complements the large strand of theoretical literature 
discussing institutions as drivers of social and economic progress at sub-national level by 
empirically assessing how this function is exercised. 
Local institutions may be determinant for devising programmes truly tailored to the specific needs 
of a given place, but they may also be responsible for wastes and misuses of financial resources. 
Indeed, overlooking the role of local institutional factors means ignoring a potential source of 
failure of public investment programmes (Farole et al., 2011; Iammarino et al., 2017). At the 
centre of the new EU policy paradigm lies the conviction that one of the main motives for policy 
failures in the past was the presence of local political elites not just unable, but also unwilling to 
implement interventions correctly.  
The consequences of ‘bad governance’ for public interventions have been studied extensively in 
the economic literature. For scholars, analysing the connection between governments and policy 
effectiveness represents one way to understand the role of institutions as underlying drivers of 
socio-economic progress. To describe the economic inefficiencies directly determined by the 
action of public institutions, political economists have introduced the concept of ‘government 
failure’. This is related to the idea that policy-makers may be promoting sub-optimal policies 
rather than acting as benevolent social welfare maximisers (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; 
LeGrand, 1991). Government failures occur if the public sector intervening in the economy does 
not have the omniscient knowledge necessary to avoid policy mistakes (lack of government 
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capacity), or when public authorities do not have the adequate incentives to act in the interests of 
the general public. This can occur if government officials are fuelled by personal motives, such 
as desire of re-election, or if they are plied by organised groups lobbying for policy benefits 
towards them (Krueger, 1990; Besley, 2006). In the latter case, at the root of the sub-optimal 
policies there is an unequal distribution of power in the society. Power asymmetries may imply 
that some actors are capable of influencing the agenda-setting of policy-makers (Persson & 
Tabellini, 2000), perpetrating illegal activities such as corruption, political collusion, and rent-
seeking.  
Political ‘capturing’, i.e. the attempt to direct public policy priorities away from collective 
interests in order to extract rents (Carpenter & Moss, 2014), may occur through multiple channels 
and with different objectives. Public officials, either elected or unelected, can be influenced by 
powerful members of the private sector (lobbyists, business owners/managers, criminal 
organisations) through illegal payments (bribes), manipulated information, or, in the most 
extreme case, through threats (e.g. smear campaigns, physical violence) (Dal Bo’ & Di Tella, 
2003; Dal Bo’ et al., 2006). Due to the large variety of means through which government 
capturing may occur, the phenomenon cannot be treated homogeneously. Consequently, in 
examining its consequences for political decision-making, this Thesis focuses on one very specific 
source of government failure, unexplored in the applied economics literature – the collusion 
between public officials and criminal organisations.  
Policy capturing leads to misallocations of public resources and distortions in the provision of 
public goods and services (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Bandiera et al., 2009) with harmful effects 
for economic development (Besley & Coate, 1997; Mauro, 1995; Easterly & Levine, 1997), either 
because of budgetary losses derived by inflated prices, lower product/service quality, or simply 
because of expenditures in less growth-conducive sectors (Mauro, 1998).  
In light of the significant role, resources and responsibilities assigned to regional and local 
governments within the multi-level-governance framework of the European Union, a key task for 
research is therefore to understand how local governments’ capacity may condition the design 
and the returns of public policies. Shedding light on these issues is important particularly for the 
most peripheral and underprivileged EU territories, recipient of a large portion of EU financial 
resources, where the quality of local governments is often below par.   
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Themes of research 
 
Three main themes for research can be derived from this conceptual framework.  
(1) The first relates to the study of territorial policies focusing on lagging areas. The idea of 
sustaining the aggregate level of development in Europe through interventions in the most 
economically disadvantaged territories has been conceptually questioned, and the effectiveness 
of the Cohesion Policy programme in poorer regions is yet to be convincingly proven.  
(2) Second, a vast body of literature has demonstrated that public investments aiming at growth, 
employment, and social inclusion are not occurring in a vacuum, but rather they are deeply 
entrenched into the surrounding socio-economic environment and pre-existing institutional 
conditions. The problem of government failures threatens the ambitious spending effort 
undertaken in Europe by the EU and its Member States, aiming to achieve higher aggregate 
economic competitiveness in combination with strengthened social cohesion. However, whether 
the adequate conditions are in place in EU regions – and whether the most effective policies are 
being promoted – allowing to improve economic performance while simultaneously reducing 
social exclusion remains an open question.  
(3) Third, in spite of the burgeoning literature on the mechanisms through which political 
decision-making can be manipulated by powerful interest groups, the capturing of policy choices 
can take multiple different forms, some of which (with their implications) are yet to be empirically 
explored.  
This Thesis contributes to shed light on these related issues, drawing from cross-country 
investigations and case-studies in the European context. 
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Structure and objectives of the Thesis 
 
The Thesis focuses on each of the macro-themes for research introduced in the conceptual 
framework, addressing very specific questions and topics. There are three main research blocs in 
which the Thesis can be sub-divided. 
 
1. The first building bloc links with the debate on the effectiveness of development policies 
targeting lagging areas. This bloc comprises one paper, focusing on the impact of the regional 
investment policies of the European Union. It aims to investigate whether EU Cohesion Policy 
has produced its intended outcomes, which areas have most benefitted from the policy 
support, and what impact the development programmes have had in the medium/long-term. 
The paper looks at the case of the United Kingdom. This context is particularly interesting 
due to the UK’s decision to withdraw from the European Union, with the subsequent loss of 
eligibility for EU financial support. Britain’s choice calls for a thorough impact assessment 
of EU development strategies, examining the potential effects of being deprived of EU 
funding.  
 
Paper 1. The impact of EU funds on regional development: Evidence from the UK and the 
prospect of Brexit. 
 
(published in the Journal of Regional Science) 
 
2. The second building bloc connects with the scholarly discussion over the importance of 
regional institutions for achieving ‘smart and inclusive’ development. The bloc is composed 
of two papers, studying the role of regional government institutions for the promotion of 
socio-economic development in the EU regions. More specifically, the first paper focuses on 
transport infrastructure investment and tests the extent to which the economic returns of the 
investments are mediated by the quality of regional governments. The analysis aims to 
identify the places and the type of transport improvements for which higher-quality 
institutions help translating the investment into faster economic growth. This research is 
complemented by the following paper, assessing the determinants of employment generation 
and social inclusion in Europe. The objective of this work is to verify whether regional 
government institutions and other key factors behind EU development strategies – transport 
infrastructure, innovation and human capital – are associated to the promotion of employment 
and labour market inclusion.  
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Paper 2. Government quality and the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment 
in European regions. 
 
(published in the Journal of Regional Science) 
 
Paper 3. Drivers of employment and social inclusion in the regions of the European Union. 
 
(published in Regional Studies) 
 
3. The third building bloc relates to the growing literature analysing the presence of distortions 
in the selection of public investments. The broad theme investigated by the last paper is the 
conditioning role of government ‘captures’ for the allocation of public resources and the 
management of public finances. The paper focuses on a very specific type of institutional 
failure, that is, the collusion between local politicians and criminal organisations. The 
analysis, focusing on Southern Italy, presents extensive evidence on the way in which local 
public finances – government expenditures and revenues collection – are distorted when 
members of local governments collude with organised crime groups, i.e. when criminal 
organisation ‘infiltrate’ municipal governments.   
 
Paper 4. Organised crime, captured politicians, and the allocation of public resources. 
 
Overall, the evidence emerging from the four, non-sequential papers composing this Thesis 
suggests that public policies have a vital role to play in the development of European regions and 
cities. Public capital investment has the potential to boost regional economies and revitalise labour 
markets, contributing to the progress of the less developed areas of the continent. Whether policy 
initiatives are effective, however, crucially depends on the quality of public institutions. 
Government institutions condition the returns of some specific investment strategies, and they are 
relevant especially for the development of peripheral regions. The active presence of criminal 
groups in lagging areas can capture government choices and direct investment decisions towards 
economic sectors of their preference. In turn, institutional failures may harm both the economic 
and the social impact of interventions.   
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1. The impact of EU regional policies in the UK  
 
The Cohesion Policy of the European Union: functioning, 
rationale, empirical evidence 
 
The Cohesion Policy is a programme through which the EU intends to promote economic and 
social cohesion in Europe. Since its introduction in 1970, the size of EU regional policy has 
greatly increased3, up to the point of representing the most important public investment arm in 
several recipient Member States (European Commission, 2014; Bubbico & Catalina Rubianes, 
2015).  
The policy has not only evolved in size, but also in its approach to development promotion. In its 
origin, the rationale for the intervention was based on the presumed need to foster economic 
convergence by counterbalancing market integration and agglomeration forces (Boldrin & 
Canova, 2001; Armstrong, 2011; Fernandez, 2011). This type of redistributive policies have been 
criticised for being inefficient (Boldrin & Canova, 2001; Dall’erba & Le Gallo, 2008) distortive 
(Midelfart-Knarvik & Overman, 2002; Puga, 2002) and inadequately targeted (Rodríguez-Pose 
& Fratesi, 2004). 
Nowadays, EU regional investment programmes are justified and designed differently. The policy 
has moved away from assistentialist logics, towards a design that recognises the development 
potential of all places (Barca, 2009). From the 2014-2020 period, each region is encouraged to 
design ‘smart specialisation’ strategies, engaging local stakeholders in the identification of 
regional competitive advantages and combining different sources of funding to reach 
encompassing development targets4 (Bachtler et al., 2017).  
Whether EU subsidies have contributed to improve the performance of the less developed regions 
– which the EU defines as those with a GDP per capita below the 75% of the EU average – has 
                                                          
3 EU regional policy corresponded to 3% of the EU budget in 1970, increasing up to 34 % for the 2007-2013 period – 
equal to €347 billion (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015). And in spite of a debate dominated by fiscal consolidation and 
austerity in the years following the financial crisis, for the 2014-2020 period it was further increased to €352 billion, 
32.5% of the total EU budget (European Commission, 2014). 
4 Several instruments have been created for the 2014-2020 programming period in order to help combining different 
priority objectives and to involve a larger number of actors. Integrated Territorial Investments (ITIs), Community-Led 
Local Development (CLLD) and Joint Action Plans (JAPs) allow EU regions to define integrated local strategies 
streamlining ERDF and ESF together (European Commission, 2012). 
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been hotly debated in the applied economics literature. The first evaluations of Cohesion Policy 
reported highly contrasting results. Some authors were sceptical over the potential of the 
programme to generate growth and convergence (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Boldrin & Canova, 
2001), while others were more positive (e.g. Ederveen et al., 2003; Cappelen et al., 2003).  
In view of these mixed results, more recent research has considered issues previously unaccounted 
for that may be at the root of the initial unclear empirical evidence. In particular, a consensus has 
emerged in the literature in identifying the quality of national (de Freitas et al., 2003; Beugelsdijk 
& Eijffinger, 2005; Ederveen et al., 2006) and regional governments (Becker et al., 2013; 
Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015) as the conditioning factor behind the capacity of regions to 
make good use of EU Structural Funds.  
Significant progress has been made in the literature also in terms of the methodology adopted to 
assess EU policies. Due to the high degree of heterogeneity of EU regions, one common empirical 
difficulty lays in making sure that the estimated effect is not confounded by any of the dimension 
on which EU regions differ. To avoid that, more and more frequently the impact of Cohesion 
Policy is identified by making regions receiving the largest portions of Structural Funds (treated) 
as comparable as possible to low-funded regions (controls). This ‘experimental turn’ in the 
evaluation of EU regional policy has allowed to uncover more convincing evidence in favour of 
a positive effect of interventions (Becker et al., 2010; 2013; 2016; Pellegrini et al., 2013).  
The adoption of ‘counterfactual’ estimation strategies of this kind has also highlighted that the 
funds’ impact may differ in each national context (Giua, 2017; Crescenzi & Giua, 2017).  
 
EU Cohesion Policy in the United Kingdom and the prospect 
of Brexit 
 
The present Thesis evaluates the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy by focusing on one single 
country. Specifically, it analyses the case of the United Kingdom. 
The UK case is interesting for many reasons. First, the UK government has recently embarked in 
the process of withdrawing from the European Union, a decision with enormous consequences 
for both the European and the British side. Although many aspects of the future relationship 
between the two negotiating parts are not yet clear5, Britain will surely lose eligibility for EU 
                                                          
5 The official negotiations between the UK and EU have started on 19th June 2017 and are expected to be completed 
by April 2019. 
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Structural Funding as a result of ‘Brexit’6. Hence, the UK regions currently receiving the most 
EU funds may be affected by this transition. The total amount available for the UK for the 2014-
2020 EU programming period rounds up to €16.5 billion7, of which around 25% have been 
allocated to Cornwall and West Wales, the two regions with a GDP per capita below the 75% of 
the EU average.  
How these and other regions will react to the loss of eligibility for Cohesion Policy is unclear. 
Much will depend on what EU policies have accomplished in the UK, and what a discontinuation 
of funds entails. The existing scholarly research cannot help to draw future scenarios, as the 
evaluation of Cohesion Policy in the UK has attracted very limited attention in the literature. 
Policy impact assessments either leave the role of EU funds at the margins (Criscuolo et al., 2016), 
or look at specific EU projects with no attempts to identify the overall effect of Cohesion 
interventions (Armstrong & Wells, 2006; Munday & Williams, 2009). The paper in the first bloc 
of this Thesis aim to fill this gap and empirically test the impact of EU funds in UK regions.  
Considering that the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget, Brexit may also imply saving 
national public resources – the difference between payment to and receipts from the EU has been 
of around €10 billion per year during 2009-2015 (HM Treasury, 2015) – which could then be 
used to replace the programmes currently funded through EU funds8. How urgent is a replacement 
of EU funds with new development policy tools? A thorough assessment of Cohesion Policy in 
the UK aims at providing key insights on the extent to which the ‘repatriated’ resources should 
be adopted to devise new spatially-targeted policies. 
 
                                                          
6 Depending on the terms of the future UK-EU relationship, some alternative sources of EU funding may become 
available to the UK. As an example, members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contributing to the EU 
Framework Programme budget, such as Norway, Israel and Switzerland, can apply for EU research funding and take 
part in Horizon 2020 projects. However, these funds do not classify as part of Cohesion Policy programmes, only 
available to EU Member States. The UK will also have to renounce to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) support.  
7 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/countries/UK 
8 Indeed, the UK government formed in the aftermath of the 2016 Referendum had guaranteed EU funding for projects 
stretching into 2020 will be honoured by the Treasury, provided that they (1) are good value for money and (2) are in 
line with domestic strategic priorities (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/further-certainty-on-eu-funding-for-
hundreds-of-british-projects). However, no clarity has been made on regional funding in the UK for the period after 
2020 (https://www.ft.com/content/aaecb834-6092-11e6-b38c-7b39cbb1138a?mhq5j=e3).  
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Paper 1. The impact of EU funds on regional development: Evidence 
from the UK and the prospect of Brexit 
 
The high support received by Brexit in some of the UK regions most financed by the European 
Union may suggest that Cohesion Policy has failed in triggering greater development in these 
areas. But has this been the case? And will the loss of EU Structural Funds due to Brexit have any 
the impact in the UK regions? The article tackles these unexplored questions by investigating the 
effect of EU regional policies in the British context.  
The impact of the policy is causally assessed by adopting counterfactual methods – synthetic 
control method and difference-in-differences – in two selected regions, Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire. They were both awarded the ‘Objective 1’ status – the highest form of EU aid, 
available to regions with GDP per capita below the 75% of EU average – for the first time in 
2000. By exploiting the consequent increase in funding resulting from this change in eligibility, 
the analysis investigates the impact of Objective 1 programmes on their labour market and 
economic performance. The results unveil a positive effect of Objective 1 eligibility, leading to a 
significant reduction of unemployment and to a higher growth rate in Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire. When taking part in the Objective 1 programme, both regions managed to decrease 
unemployment and increase GDP per capita significantly more than comparable regions not 
similarly subsidised by the EU. Regression analysis performed on all UK regions complements 
this evidence to show that the positive (short-term) impact of Objective 1 funds does not apply 
just to the two case-studies but is generalisable to other British regions in receipt of the 
programme. 
Unlike Cornwall, which conserved the status of European region ‘in highest need’ after the end 
of the 2000-2006 programming period, South Yorkshire only qualified for Objective 1 funds for 
one EU budget period. In 2007, due to its progress in terms of GDP per capita relative to the EU 
average, the region lost Objective 1 eligibility and the amount of EU funds available reduced 
considerably. The empirical analysis suggests that as this happened, South Yorkshire lost much 
of the labour market and economic gains achieved while in receipt of Objective 1 funds, evidence 
that the funds produced very little permanent/structural effects overall in this region. 
These findings indicate that the loss of Structural Funds – a consequence of Brexit – may have 
significant adverse impacts on the socio-economic development of the UK regions that are 
currently most subsidised by the EU.  
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2. The role of regional government institutions for the 
promotion of socio-economic development in the 
EU 
 
Government institutions and development 
 
Since the surge of the ‘new institutional economics’ in the 90s, institutions have been re-
discovered9 as a key element in shaping the development path of all places (North, 1990; Ostrom, 
1990). The essential role played by institutions for social and economic outcomes is now widely 
recognised by economists and geographers (North, 1994; Storper, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose & 
Storper, 2006; Rodrik, 2007; Tabellini, 2008; Lakshmanan & Button, 2009). Having 
acknowledged that, scholars aim to understand which institutions matter, how, and when.  
One type of institutions attracting considerable attention has been the quality of government 
(QoG). This is a multifaceted concept, encompassing all elements conditioning the government 
capacity/will to provide public goods and services, including the level of corruption, the 
enforcement of the rule of law, and the efficiency and accountability of the public administration. 
Among the many definitions of government institutions in the literature, one of the most often 
referred to is provided by the World Bank, according to which ‘governance’ is made of “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kauffman et al., 2009: 
5). Rothstein & Teorell (2008) summarise the QoG concept into “the impartiality of institutions 
that exercise government authority and apply public policies”10. 
A strong connection between government quality and both efficiency- and equity-related 
development outcomes is now a well-established theoretical and empirical proposition. The 
quality of governance can influence efficiency by affecting the degree of risk for opportunistic 
                                                          
9 Institutions were seen as influencing economic behaviour already in the thinking of Mill (1857) and Tonnies (1887), 
and later in the work of Marshall (1920).  
10 The definition of the quality of government institutions remains debated. For a review of conceptualisations see 
Gisselquist (2012). 
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behaviours, the incentives for investments and for cooperation among investors, the level of 
market competition, the costs of economic transactions, and the distribution of resources among 
economic agents (Olson Jr et al., 2000; Rothstein and Tannenberg, 2015; World Bank, 2017). The 
way in which public resources are distributed is of obvious relevance for equity as well. The 
effectiveness of investments intended to equalise opportunities and the government capacity to 
provide goods and services to all categories of citizens both contribute to the equality of societies 
(World Bank, 2005; 2017). 
Abundant empirical evidence confirms the importance of good government institutions for 
economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Olson Jr et al., 
2000; Kauffman & Kraay, 2002), employment (Knack, 1999), poverty reduction and social 
welfare (Chong & Calderon, 2000; Grindle, 2004; Rothstein et al., 2012; Charron, 2013a), 
subjective wellbeing (Helliwell, 2006), and life expectancy (Holmberg et al., 2009).  
 
Quality of government in the EU regions 
 
The above-mentioned literature analyses the concept of government institutions and their role for 
development operationalises governance by exploiting country-level data, relying on the implicit 
assumption that intra-national variation in institutions is either insignificant or non-existent.  
This approach overlooks the fact that some aspects of governance may be significantly more 
pronounced at the sub-national level than at the national level. Fewer obstacles for corruption may 
exist locally, as politicians and bureaucrats may be subject of more pressing demands from interest 
and pressure groups due to their weight in local elections (Preud’homme, 1995). Additionally, the 
lower visibility to the press and the public at the local level corresponds to a lower transparency 
(OECD, 2015). In absence of adequate systems of legal control and punishment, local elites may 
be able to reap most of the benefits of economic development (Chong & Calderon, 2000).  
Furthermore, ignoring differences in QoG within countries fails to account for the high degree of 
administrative autonomy of many regions and cities. Today, in the majority of OECD countries, 
regional and local spending accounts for more than 50% of the total public investments made 
(OECD, 2015). In the EU, public and investment policies are more and more defined through a 
complex process of multilevel agreements, involving negotiations at the sub-national, national and 
supranational levels. Through the principle of subsidiarity, many of the EU interventions are 
implemented by regional governments who, furthermore, have a significant say in the design of 
the intervention (Farole et al., 2011). In presence of multilevel and decentralised political systems, 
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idiosyncratic features of regional and local government institutions may have an impact on the 
success or failure of these policies. 
Until recently, empirical analyses accounting for the sub-national dimension of government 
institutions were constrained by data availability. However, research carried out at the Quality of 
Government Institute of Gothenburg in the past few years has allowed to produce the first 
homogeneous QoG index for European regions11 (Charron et al., 2011). This indicator has shown 
a large degree of within-country variability in government institutions in many EU countries. 
Further work by Charron et al. (2014) has integrated the index with the Wold Bank Governance 
Indicators (Kauffman et al., 2009), extending the regional QoG index across a longer time period 
and obtaining a sub-division into four pillars of governance, namely (1) effectiveness of regional 
government and bureaucracy, (2) rule of law, (3) accountability of the regional administration and 
strength of democracy, (4) level of corruption.  
Geared with this new set of indicators, researchers have demonstrated the prominent role of 
regional government quality for innovation, growth, and the economic efficiency of Cohesion 
Policy strategies (Becker et al., 2013; Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose & 
Garcilazo, 2016; Ketterer & Rodríguez-Pose, 2016).  
However, while these studies assign a key role of government quality in conditioning the returns 
of investment strategies in European regions, they provide little evidence on the mechanisms 
through which these effects are at play and on the type of investments most conditioned by the 
quality of regional governments. In addition, whether governance affect labour markets and the 
social development of regions is yet to be tested empirically. This Thesis contributes to the 
literature by focusing on these unexplored research questions. 
 
Paper 2. Government quality and the economic returns of transport 
infrastructure investment in European regions 
 
A key element of growth-promoting strategies in European regions is investment in transport 
infrastructure. The construction of large-scale infrastructure projects have been at the centre of 
development programmes in the periphery of Europe over the last years. Yet, recent studies have 
                                                          
11 The index was obtained from a survey with 34,000 respondents from the then 27 EU countries. Questions were 
centred on the quality of public services, the impartiality of public services provision, and the level of corruption. 
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underlined that the economic returns of transport infrastructure investment made in the EU have 
been limited if not absent. Why have these efforts not delivered the expected economic results? 
One possible explanation, explored in this article, is that when a minimum endowment of 
infrastructure is in place, the returns of expenditures for additional transports depend on the quality 
of government institutions co-responsible for the selection, design, and realisation of infrastructure 
projects.  
The transport sector is particularly vulnerable to governance problems such as political 
interference, corruption, and collusion. While the literature acknowledges that the characteristics 
of the governance system play an important role in determining future efficiency gains (or the lack 
thereof) of transport infrastructure spending, the relationship between government quality, 
transport investment, and growth has seldom been proven empirically. No study has ever focused 
on European regions. 
The article tests whether the quality of regional governments shapes the growth effects of 
investment in transport infrastructure in the EU regions. It does so by considering different 
typologies of investment: improvements in motorways and in secondary roads. This distinction 
aims to reflect a structural difference in the underlying investment decisions. Motorways represent 
large-scale projects whose selection may have been conditioned by political and individual 
interests rather than economic and collective ones. Motorways are more visible, costly to build, 
and normally connect major urban centres across different regions. The development of local 
roads, instead, is much less glamourous from an electoral point of view, but less likely to give rise 
to the same ‘hub-and-spoke’ effects as motorways.  
Growth regressions interacting the two proxies for transport investment with the regional Quality 
of Government (QoG) index provide little evidence of a positive correlation between regional 
investments in motorways and economic growth, even if associated with better regional 
government institutions. By contrast, variations in the endowment of secondary roads display a 
robust connection with regional economic performance, but only in regions with higher quality 
regional governments. The role of government quality as mediator of the economic returns to local 
road investment appears to be stronger in the less developed regions, those for which good 
institutions emerge as essential drivers of growth. 
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Paper 3. Drivers of employment and social inclusion in the regions of 
the European Union 
 
The Europe 2020 development strategy of the European Union puts “a strong emphasis on job 
creation and poverty reduction”. However, concerns remain about the capacity of investments 
associated to this strategy to stimulate employment and favour the creation of more inclusive 
labour markets. Key economic factors on which the EU aims to invest in the next years include 
the stock of human capital, research and technological development, the endowment of 
infrastructure, and the quality of institutions. To what extent are these factors contributing to foster 
employment and address issues of labour market exclusion in European regions? There is little or 
no evidence in the literature to answer this question. 
The aim of the article is to investigate the relationship between the four elements behind EU 
development strategies – human capital, innovation, infrastructure, and government institutions – 
and labour market and social dynamics in European regions. The article studies the extent to which 
each of these factors has been associated to employment generation and social inclusion in EU 
regions, distinguishing employment by skill level and sub-dividing regions by level of economic 
development. The aim is to identify the conditions that exacerbate or reduce labour market 
disparities in different economic contexts.  
The findings indicate that the economic factors behind employment growth are not always the 
same as those conditioning the evolution of social exclusion. While the generation of employment 
in Europe has been facilitated by the presence of larger shares of highly-educated population and 
higher innovative capacity, no direct relationship with jobs creation is found for transport 
infrastructure. The key result of the analysis is that the quality of government institutions affects 
the dynamics of labour market inclusion. Regional government quality makes a difference for the 
promotion of low-skilled employment – and hence of labour market inclusion – particularly in the 
poorer areas of Europe. Moreover, EU regions with better governance have significantly reduced 
the share of people excluded from the labour market. These findings suggest that the presence of 
adequate government institutions is a prerequisite for the success of any social inclusion policy in 
Europe.  
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3. The impact of local government captures on public 
policies and finances 
 
Government captures and public policies 
 
Policy captures result from secretive illegal agreements between public officials and third parties, 
whereby political power is misused for private gains (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). As such, they distort 
the functioning of administrative systems by compromising the efficient and equitable provision 
of goods and services to citizens. Public capital expenditures, more than current expenditures, are 
vulnerable to the influence of corruptive and collusive practices, due to the higher discretion of 
government authorities in capital projects (Haque & Kneller, 2008).  
These phenomena pervert the activity of governments in many ways (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; 
Bandiera et al., 2009; Ohashi, 2009; OECD, 2010). For instance, they may condition the fair 
competition for public procurement tenders. The price paid by governments for given projects may 
rise considerably if procurers are bribed to design tenders that favour undeserving firms. Collusive 
accords ensuring that given companies obtain government contracts reduce the incentives for firms 
to enter the market for bids, further compromising competition and encouraging the reproduction 
of illegal mechanisms (Soreide, 2002). These distortions imply that the allocation of contracts for 
public investment projects is modified to the advantage of powerful pressure groups (OECD, 
2017). 
Extensive empirical research has shown that the composition of government expenditure is 
influenced when politicians are captured by interest groups. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Haque 
and Kneller (2015) posit that both the typology and the amount of investments are conditioned in 
these cases. They argue that political corruption is likely to increase the number of infrastructure 
investment projects undertaken by governments, enlarging their size and complexity. Along 
similar lines, Ohashi (2009) argues that absence of transparency in government procurements 
significantly inflates the cost of public works. Mauro (1997) and Gupta et al. (2005) demonstrate 
that corrupt politicians can channel government expenditures away from investment areas which 
are not sufficiently lucrative in the short term. 
This evidence leaves little doubt that public investments are prone to undue influence of interest 
groups. Yet, in studying the distortions they introduce to the composition of public spending, the 
literature treats pressure groups homogeneously, assuming they all behave in the same way when 
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interfering with political choices. This approach fails to account for the fact that different kinds of 
collusion modes exist. The links between pressure groups and political power may be so deep that, 
in the most extreme case, the political representatives are a direct emanation of such groups. When 
this happens, bribing politicians with the purpose of distorting investment choices may be 
superfluous, as public authorities already have incentives to act in accordance with the interests of 
those to which they owe their political career. This type of link with politics is common for 
organised crime (Cantone, 2010).  
 
Organised crime’s collusion with local politics and the 
appropriation of public investments 
 
The development of strong ties with the political sphere is a fundamental link in the chain of power 
of organised crime groups (Schelling, 1971; Gambetta, 1993). In Southern Italy, since the 90s, the 
mafia relies on a model of collusion based on positioning their trustees within political institutions. 
Mafia-related politicians are often white collars with no direct kinship with organised crime or 
criminal records. Their political career begins at the local level, where the control of the central 
State is weaker and the power of mafia clans is stronger (Cantone, 2010). Their compliance with 
the will of criminal organisations is guaranteed. 
Therefore, unlike ‘traditional’ pressure groups, criminal organisations can find themselves in the 
privileged position to be able to contaminate and leverage policy decisions from the inside, by 
relying on referents and affiliates with a primary role in the decision-making system of 
government structures. This so-called ‘infiltration’ facilitates the capturing of public procurement 
contracts. Acquiring public work contracts, in turn, enables criminal groups to provide business 
opportunities to the firms they control and launder in legal sectors of the economy the liquidity 
generated from illicit activities, further increasing economic profits (Gambetta & Reuter, 1995; 
Leonardi, 1995; Lavezzi, 2008; Sciarrone, 2011).  
The involvement of the mafia in the legal economy through public investments often occurs where 
their control of the territory is stronger, i.e. the areas in which mafias are most deeply rooted 
(Sciarrone, 2011; Transcrime, 2015).  
While extensive qualitative, judiciary, and anecdotal evidence has been produced to analyse the 
consequences of this extreme form of collusion, empirical evidence in the applied economics 
literature is nearly absent. This Thesis contributes to investigate the largely unexplored 
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phenomenon of mafia-politics collusions by performing a comprehensive study of their impact 
on the composition of local government finances. 
 
Paper 4. Organised crime, captured politicians, and the allocation of 
public resources 
 
As part of their strategy to dominate local economic activities, organised crime groups aim to take 
control of local policy-making systems. When they manage to do it – i.e. when they ‘infiltrate’ 
local governments – they find themselves in the position to condition the legislative process and 
distort the selection mechanisms of public policies to their advantage. In which way does this 
unwanted influence over local government activity affect the public finances of municipalities? 
The article investigates this question by focusing on the regions of Campania, Calabria and Sicily 
in Italy, home of some of the most developed criminal organisations in Europe.  
According to the existing studies on Italian mafias, criminal groups exploit infiltrations as a mean 
to get their hands on public investment projects. The article empirically assesses the impact of 
mafia-politics collusions on the finances of municipal governments. Detailed data on the 
composition of municipal balance sheets – disaggregated both in terms of current/capital 
expenditure chapters and in terms of financial revenues – are combined with precise information 
on which local governments have been infiltrated by the mafia. A difference-in-difference model 
compares the public spending and revenues collection of infiltrated governments with non-
infiltrated governments between 1998 and 2013. 
The results of the analysis shed light on the strategy adopted by organised crime groups when 
manipulating government decisions. Politicians captured by the mafia do not appear to modify 
the total level of public spending of municipalities. Instead, mafia interferences are found to 
determine selected variations in key local expenditure sectors. In particular, as compared to non-
infiltrated governments, infiltrated municipalities invest higher shares of public funds for 
construction and waste management, and invest less for municipal police. Moreover, they are less 
efficient in collecting waste and garbage taxes. Considering the deep interests of organised crime 
in the construction and waste collection sectors, these findings seem to suggest that infiltrations 
are strategically exploited by the mafia in order to protect their businesses and further increase 
their profits.  
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Finally, the analysis investigates the connection of organised crime with local politics by studying 
the link between political characteristics of municipal elections and infiltrations. This exercise 
uncovers a set of interesting relationships, among which the most robust – further confirmed with 
an RDD model – is a preference of mafia groups for infiltrations within right-wing governments. 
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Conclusions 
 
Empirical findings and policy implications 
 
The four papers composing this Thesis explore different issues related to the public policies and 
investments of European regions, the determinants of socio-economic and labour market 
performance in the EU, and the role of dysfunctional government institutions for the selection and 
the returns of investment policies. The results of the empirical investigations can be interpreted 
both in relation to the specific framework within which each research paper is set, and to the 
broader framework within which the Thesis is constructed. 
Evaluating the labour market and economic impact of EU Cohesion Policy in the UK regions, the 
first paper demonstrates that EU funds for the most economically disadvantaged British regions 
(Objective 1 funds) have been effective, at least in the short-term. The poorest regions of the 
country have witnessed higher economic growth and faster unemployment reduction than other 
areas when in receipt of Objective 1 policies. However, the results warn over possible negative 
repercussions of a discontinuation of EU aid, one of the consequences of Brexit. A drastic 
interruption of development funds to poorer regions may undermine any improvement obtained 
under EU financial support.  
These findings have strong implications for the future of the UK. They suggest that Cohesion 
Policy has been a significant stimulus to regional (and national) growth in the UK and, due to its 
focus on economically backward regions, a significant force for regional convergence in the 
country. The prospective withdrawal of the UK from the EU and the loss of eligibility for 
Cohesion Policy funding will deprive the UK’s regional economies from an important source of 
investment funds, without which the areas currently most subsidised may struggle to keep up with 
the rest of the country. It follows from the analysis that filling the policy vacuum that will be left 
by the loss of EU subsidies would be an effort worth making – despite all difficulties this would 
involve (Bachtler & Begg, 2017) –, given that if the UK government is unwilling to replace EU 
funds the poorest regions may suffer a negative economic shock.  
More broadly, the results also contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of public investment 
policies, in general, and EU Cohesion Policy, in particular. The analysis provides evidence 
showing a beneficial role of EU spatially-targeted development programmes focusing mainly on 
disadvantaged territories. Hence, the key takeout of the paper is that EU investment policies can 
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be successful, even in a causal sense, in the areas presumably most in need of support. However, 
when putting in place development projects, EU regions should think carefully about the legacy 
of the measures they implement, in order to avoid seeing all achievements vanish when the 
financial resources will be cut down.  
An important question is whether the observed positive effect of Objective 1 funds in the UK is 
due to economic activity being shifted around (from richer to poorer areas) or if, instead, the 
policies are actually optimising the aggregate economic performance. In support of the latter 
hypothesis, the results do not appear to be driven by cross-regional spillovers. In addition, the 
positive economic effects of Cohesion Policy, while being stronger in less developed areas, seem 
to unfold across all UK regions.  
Considering the mixed evidence in the literature regarding the effect of Cohesion Policy in 
European regions, one might wander what factors have contributed to the good use of EU funds 
of UK regions particularly. The presence, in the UK, of well-functioning administrative structures 
may have favoured the success of the projects, even though, at least in the case of South Yorkshire, 
public authorities managing the programmes could not cope just as well with the drastic reduction 
in EU funding. The empirical analysis, however, does not directly attempt to identify the factors 
at the root of the investments’ impact.  
The link between the quality of regional governments and the effects of public capital 
expenditures is instead explored by the second paper of the Thesis. The findings of the empirical 
study highlight the strong conditioning role played by government institutions for the economic 
returns of investments. The analysis, focusing on EU regions, reveals that good governance helps 
translating improvements in transport infrastructure into economic growth. However, the 
presence of credible, competent and transparent regional governments is a necessary, yet not a 
sufficient, condition for guaranteeing positive returns of public investments. The selection of 
appropriate interventions is crucial too. It emerges from the analysis that while a better network 
of secondary road is associated with stronger economic performance – but only in combination 
with sound governments – no relationship with growth exists for investment on motorways roads.  
The latter result is particularly relevant for the less developed European regions, given that large-
scale infrastructural projects such as motorways have been at the centre of many development 
strategies in peripheral places in Europe. The creation, through motorways, of long-distance 
transport infrastructure corridors connecting peripheral with core areas does not appear to be the 
most effective measure to facilitate the development of poorer areas (Puga, 2002). In contrast, the 
findings of the analysis support the idea that in economically backward places the priority should 
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be to strengthen regional and local roads, which would favour the creation of linkages between 
local economic actors. 
As mentioned, the key finding of the paper is that even this type of investment (i.e. the 
improvements of secondary roads) is unlikely to be economically productive if promoted by 
corrupt and self-interested governments. Important implications for European development 
strategies can be derived from this result. The large transport infrastructure expenditure effort 
ongoing in Europe may produce limited economic effects if funds are ‘unconditionally’ disbursed 
to regional and local authorities. Growth-promoting financial resources should be made 
conditional to policy reforms aimed at solving key institutional failures, e.g. by ensuring a more 
transparent allocation of resources, and improving the monitoring and evaluation processes of 
investment projects. 
Finally, the results of the paper show that alongside transport infrastructure and government 
institutions, key drivers of regional economic performance in Europe are the stock of human 
capital and the capacity to produce innovation. These four elements – infrastructures, institutions, 
human capital and innovation – are indeed among those identified by European development 
programmes as a target for the generation of economic growth in the continent. Europe 2020, the 
strategy expected to bring the EU permanently out of the crisis and revive the European economy, 
includes specific objectives related to each of these elements. The ambitious goal of Europe 2020 
and of Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 is to promote inclusive growth, i.e. to improve economic 
efficiency while simultaneously creating employment for all (European Commission, 2014). In 
relation to this, the third paper of the Thesis investigates the extent to which these four growth-
conducive factors are able to improve not just economic, but also labour market and social 
conditions in EU regions. 
The analysis of the third paper reveals that only some of the pillars underpinning growth strategies 
in Europe contribute to the generation of employment and to social inclusion. Over the past 15 
years, the less developed EU regions that have managed to create more jobs are those with larger 
human capital bases and stronger innovative potential, while among the European core regions 
those witnessing higher employment increases have been the most innovative areas. Additionally, 
the findings indicate that having a higher share of highly-educated individuals has been associated 
with high-skilled employment creation, whereas low-skilled employment has increased in regions 
with higher quality of government institutions. Low-skilled employment is closely associated to 
the degree of social inclusion in a region. The results show that government quality helps 
generating low-skilled jobs (and hence fostering labour market inclusion) particularly in the poorer 
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areas of Europe. Consistent with that, labour market exclusion is found to have been reduced more 
in regions with better governance conditions. 
Therefore, as in the second paper, the key takeout of the analysis concerns the benefits – 
particularly for poorer regions – associated to having a more transparent, accountable, effective 
and free of corruption regional government. In this case, good governance structures appear to 
guarantee a better capacity to reduce labour market marginalisation and offer employment 
opportunities for the low-skilled, i.e. they help achieving equity-related goals. 
Hence, in order to aim at ‘smart and inclusive’ growth with an emphasis on jobs promotion, the 
objective of the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU should be aware that employment and social 
inclusion in disadvantaged regions are conditional on adequate government institutions 
implementing successful labour market policies. It follows that, together with initiatives 
promoting education and the upskilling of the most underprivileged and marginalised workers, the 
poorer EU regions should introduce institutional reforms to make sure that any expenditure 
intended to improve labour conditions is not mistargeted or misappropriated. 
The second and third papers of the Thesis, therefore, present extensive evidence on the role played 
by public institutions in the most economically disadvantaged regions of Europe. The studies 
unveil important insights on how regional government quality influences economic 
competitiveness and the success of investment policies, and reveal that the framework of local 
institutions is crucial also for the generation of inclusive economic development in the European 
periphery. 
The two empirical studies, however, do not shed light on the phenomena leading to governments’ 
misallocation of resources and wrongly-targeted investments in the poorer regions of the 
continent. The fourth and final paper of the Thesis takes on this task, by focusing on three lagging 
regions of Europe (Campania, Calabria and Sicily), and on a specific type of institutional 
distortion, that is, the ‘infiltration’ of organised crime within municipal governments. 
The results of the study suggest that the capturing of local governments by criminal organisations 
leads to a manipulation of public expenditure choices to the advantage of organised crime. During 
infiltrations, the overall spending of Southern Italian municipalities remains essentially unaltered. 
Instead, the selection of investment objectives changes significantly. Capital spending for public 
construction works increases, while investment for law enforcement is reduced. Municipal 
governments are also less efficient in collecting taxes for waste and garbage. Construction and 
waste collection are known to be two sectors in which the mafia holds great interests and makes 
large profits. In addition, fewer resources for law enforcement facilitate its illegal traffics. Hence, 
it appears from these findings that organised crime exploits the control of local governments to 
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protect its interests, but in a subtle way, making a detection of infiltrations more complicated for 
judicial authorities. 
As a consequence, in local territories where the presence of the mafia is more pervasive, efforts to 
‘clean up’ legal institutions from politicians linked to criminal organisations must be considerable. 
Laws such as the one through which the Italian State can dissolve infiltrated local administrations 
have allowed to discover and put an end to hundreds of collusion cases, but the relative frequency 
of repeated dissolutions in the same municipality (sometimes after just a few years) demonstrates 
that more powerful legislative tools are needed to completely eradicate the phenomenon of 
political infiltrations. A strengthening of the law allowing mafia-related government dissolutions, 
under discussion in these years (Cantone, 2010), may prove helpful. However, this reform could 
be insufficient if not coupled with measures preventing any potential distortions to democratic 
competition at local elections. Equally important to limit the local power of mafia clans would be 
to guarantee a fair provision of public services and employment opportunities in the small towns 
and urban neighbourhoods where organised crime currently has the upper hand. 
Given the diffusion of mafia groups in Europe (Transcrime, 2015), the empirical results may have 
implications for other contexts besides those chosen for the analysis. Although imperfect and 
improvable, the Italian legislation in matters of organised crime remains one of the most advanced 
in the world. In countries representing easy targets for money laundering from criminal 
organisations due to the absence of such legislation, the public finances of local governments may 
withstand enduring distortions in presence of links between criminal organisations and the political 
power. 
The fourth paper’s findings demonstrate how (specific types of) government dysfunctions work in 
practice and can affect local governments’ choices. Combining these results with the evidence 
emerging from all other papers, implications can be drawn regarding the definition and 
effectiveness of public policies aiming at social and economic progress in Europe. 
This Thesis has shown that development interventions have the potential to successfully spur 
economic and labour market performance in EU regions. The first paper demonstrates that 
investment policies may have a beneficial effect on the development trajectory of regions. 
However, as illustrated by the second and third paper, any favourable outcome (both in terms of 
efficiency and equity) is determined by the competence and the goodwill of government 
institutions responsible for selecting policy priorities and enforcing investment plans. The fourth 
paper reveals that, when politicians are conditioned by lobbying and illegal pressures from 
criminal groups, public investment decisions follow special interests rather than general welfare 
goals.  
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A lesson can be drawn from these findings for the programme of investments currently being 
promoted in the EU as part of Europe 2020 and the reformed Cohesion Policy. The modern 
regional policy of the EU considers economic competitiveness and social cohesion as non-
mutually exclusive targets. On the basis of that, it promotes development strategies expected to 
harness the untapped potential of all regions. This Thesis suggests that, in the European periphery, 
a disbursement of funds to local public authorities is unlikely to bear fruits if politicians 
discretionally use resources without having the interests of the public community in mind. Given 
that the ‘place-based’ orientation of the investment policies tends to be associated with a ‘bottom-
up’ and localistic focus (Crescenzi & Giua, 2016; Bachtler et al., 2017), it seems essential to make 
sure that the assignment of more responsibilities to local governments in the definition and 
implementation of investments is combined with mechanisms monitoring whether the devolved 
power and resources are transparently used. The risk of ‘local government failures’ should be a 
serious concern for the EU, that could be avoided by reinforcing the systems of ex ante 
conditionality that links the earmarking of financial resources to specific pre-existing institutional 
standards or to administrative reforms. Prioritising this type of issues would help ensuring that the 
ongoing public investment effort undertaken by the EU and by the single Member States leads to 
the much-needed employment and economic boosts, as well as to processes of social inclusion, 
rather than to ‘strategies of waste’.  
 
Avenues for future research 
 
The four papers of the Thesis cover specific questions from the research blocs within which they 
are set. As such, they offer several areas for future explorations.  
First, the evidence of a causal impact of EU Cohesion Policy documented in the first paper is 
limited to the UK context. Further research is required to test whether, in other countries, the 
responses to EU regional policies replicate the dynamics observed in the case-studies chosen for 
the analysis. In order to produce credible inferences of external validity, the findings must be 
complemented with evidence on the key channels (e.g. facilitating conditions, strategies adopted) 
driving the estimated labour market and economic effects. Additionally, more research is needed 
in order to fully discard the possibility that the observed effect of EU funds in the UK is (at least 
partially) due to displacement effects.  
The second paper, aiming to shed light on the role of governance for regional investments in EU 
regions, certifies positive growth effects of specific types transport investments in presence of 
adequate institutions. However, this work only focuses on two transport modes (highways and 
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secondary roads). Future quantitative research intended to estimate the role of institutions for the 
effectiveness of investment strategies may extend the analysis by looking at other forms of 
infrastructure investment, or at other productivity-enhancing sectors. Furthermore, issues in data 
availability currently do not allow to produce precise monetary estimates of the transport 
expenditures made, while government quality is measured on the basis of citizens’ perceptions 
rather than from more objective standards (e.g. norms, laws, traditions as in La Porta et al., 1999).  
The third paper uncovers a number of associations between economic factors and labour market 
dynamics in EU regions. In order to provide additional insights on the inclusiveness of EU growth 
strategies, future research may adopt more advanced proxy variables for key economic factors and 
for the evolution of social exclusion patterns, and/or assess the employment effects of different 
combinations of growth factors rather than analysing each of them separately.  
Taken together, the second and third papers describe the importance of regional institutions for 
socio-economic development in Europe. Yet, the use in both studies of cross-country panel 
datasets limits the possibility to illuminate the underlying mechanisms explaining the link between 
the functioning of governments and the effects of public policies. Adopting data at a more fine-
grained spatial scale would allow for a more detailed examination of the factors linking institutions 
to the economic impact of public investments and to social or labour market outcomes. Uncovering 
the relevant channels explaining the findings obtained in the two articles is an important task for 
future research. 
Drawing on micro-level aggregations (Italian municipalities), the fourth paper examines the effect 
of organised crime’s local governments captures on the composition of expenditures and the 
management of public revenues. While the study provides a detailed assessment of the bias to the 
local balance sheets introduced by mafia infiltrations, it leaves a major gap involving the welfare 
impacts of such distortions. An extension to this research would therefore investigate whether and 
how political infiltrations, and the misallocation of resources they entail, are detrimental to the 
local economy and society. Moreover, the legislative setting adopted for the analysis inevitably 
narrows the spatial scale of the investigation to three regions of Italy. Future research may explore 
whether undue influences of government activity from criminal organisations take the same form 
in other contexts.  
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The impact of EU funds on regional development: 
Evidence from the UK and the prospect of Brexit 
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Abstract 
Brexit means that regions of the United Kingdom will lose access to EU Cohesion Policy. Have 
EU funds been effective, and what might be the consequences of an interruption of EU financial 
support? This paper studies how EU structural funds have affected the labour market and 
economic performance of UK regions. The analysis is performed with counterfactual 
methodologies on two specific regions, Cornwall and South Yorkshire, in order to capture the 
causal impact of Cohesion Policy interventions in the medium-long term. Fixed effects models 
complement this evidence to test the effects of EU funds in all UK regions. The results provide 
evidence of a positive impact of ‘Objective 1’ funding – the highest form of EU aid available to 
the poorest European regions – on labour market and economic performance of UK regions. 
However, the counterfactual analysis looking at South Yorkshire suggests that when the region 
lost Objective 1 eligibility – massively reducing its share of EU funds – it was unable to sustain 
the gains obtained in previous years. This suggests that while Structural Funds may be effectively 
improving socio-economic conditions of poorer regions, the performance of subsidised areas 
could be deeply affected by a reduction (or worse, an interruption) of EU aid.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. ‘Brexit’ received high 
support from some of the UK regions that have been among the largest beneficiaries of EU 
Structural Funds. This reflects discontent with the EU and the way in which EU financial 
resources have been spent, and would seem to imply that EU Cohesion Policy has not succeeded 
in triggering greater development in these regions. But has this really been the case? When the 
UK will leave the EU, these areas will no longer be eligible to receive EU funds, and the shift 
from a status of high subsidisation to one in which no more European funds are available may 
bring about a number of unexpected consequences. Might the loss of EU funding have any adverse 
impacts on future employment levels and economic performance of currently subsidised regions?    
In order to answer these questions, this study assesses the labour market and economic impact of 
EU policies in the UK. It looks in particular at two UK regions, Cornwall and South Yorkshire, 
which voted to leave the EU in the referendum on Brexit12 despite being among the highest 
recipients of EU funds in the country. Cornwall has been and continues to be eligible for 
‘Objective 1’ funding, the most significant form of EU financial help. The region was first 
classified as Objective 1 in 2000 and has continued to receive funding since then. Therefore, the 
flow of EU funds will be interrupted when the UK leaves the European Union. Conversely, South 
Yorkshire was heavily supported in the past but lost its eligibility for this stream of funding in 
2006. The particular evolution of this region’s eligibility status allows us to investigate how the 
loss of Objective 1 funding affected its economy, gleaning relevant lessons on the potential impact 
a similar loss could have in Cornwall and in other highly funded regions.  
The effects of EU Objective 1 funds in these two regions are studied by using counterfactual 
methods.  Moreover, an empirical model covering all UK regions tests the extent to which EU 
policies have been successful across the country. Regression methods analyse the relationship 
between EU funding (and Objective 1 funds in particular) and regional labour market and 
economic conditions.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we produce a thorough empirical investigation 
showing how EU regional policies have contributed to UK regional development. Second, we 
provide evidence on the causal impacts of Objective 1 programmes in UK regions and illustrate 
how the policy effects evolve over time. Third, following an increasingly common approach in 
place-based policy evaluations (see Neumark & Simpson, 2015), we analyse the impact of policy 
                                                          
12 56% of Cornwall’s and 61% of South Yorkshire’s voting population favoured leaving the European Union in the 
referendum on Brexit, held on 23rd June 2016.  
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interventions taking into account both the period in which the implementation takes place and the 
period following the programme’s completion.  
The few works evaluating the impact of EU Cohesion Policy with counterfactual techniques have 
documented the potential for EU funds transfers to foster growth, spur investments, and generate 
jobs (Becker et al., 2010; 2013; Pellegrini et al., 2013; Giua, 2017). None of these studies focuses 
on the UK specifically, a context remaining largely unexplored for what concerns the effects of 
EU development policies. In addition, no study has ever investigated the effects of EU 
programmes by considering their full cycle, i.e. from the moment in which a region is awarded 
the Objective 1 status to the period following the loss of Objective 1 funds. By looking at the 
performance of South Yorkshire after Objective 1 eligibility is lost, our analysis examines the 
persistency of the policy’s impacts and investigates its capacity to produce self-sustaining 
regional development paths. 
In the counterfactual study, we compare the trajectory of Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the 
one of ‘synthetic’ control regions, created as the combination of English regions ineligible for 
Objective 1 funds. Our findings provide clear evidence of a significant reduction in 
unemployment in Cornwall, relative to the synthetic control, during the period in which it was 
classified as Objective 1. South Yorkshire also displays a significant decrease in unemployment 
between 2000 and 2006, but the improvements are gradually offset during the following years. 
The empirical estimates suggest that after Objective 1 status is lost, South Yorkshire evolves 
towards the trend of a similar untreated region, indicating that Objective 1 funds produced very 
little permanent/structural effects overall. Difference-in-differences models of local 
unemployment growth estimated at the level of wards confirm this evidence. In addition, 
Cornwall appears to be closing the gap in GDP per capita relative to untreated regions during the 
Objective 1 period, while South Yorkshire’s economic catch-up process loses pace and begins to 
revert when Objective 1 funds are no longer available. 
When extending the analysis to all UK regions, the positive effect of Objective 1 policies on 
unemployment reduction and economic growth is confirmed. Additionally, a clear association is 
found between the proportion of EU funds received and the economic performance of British 
regions. This relationship appears to be strictly linear, i.e., a larger proportion of EU funds have 
led to higher growth rates particularly among the most funded (Objective 1) regions. 
Overall, the results indicate that the poorer areas receiving highest shares of EU funds seem to be 
those having most benefitted from the financial aid. However, any achievement obtained through 
EU policies may not be persistent, and may quickly disappear after the end of the high-intensity 
funding period, even in the presence of transitional programmes that make the reduction of EU 
funds more gradual. Hence, the sudden interruption of Structural Funds to poorer regions that 
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would result from Brexit could have relevant medium-run consequences on the economy and 
labour market of areas currently receiving the highest proportions of EU funds. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of the Objective 1 
programme and reviews the literature on EU Cohesion Policy evaluations; section 3 presents the 
quasi-experimental design; section 4 discusses the data and descriptive statistics; section 5 
presents the empirical results, beginning with the study performed at the regional level using the 
synthetic control method, followed by the difference-in-differences model estimated at the level 
of wards, and concluding with the fixed effect model estimated at the NUTS2 level for all UK 
regions; section 6 concludes by summarising the results and defining some paths for future 
research. 
 
2. Institutional background and overview of the 
literature 
 
Cohesion Policy and the Objective 1 programme  
 
The European Cohesion Policy was established in 1988 as a set of regional investment 
programmes aiming to promote social and economic cohesion in the EU. Starting from the 1994-
1999 EU investment period, Cohesion Policy expenditures represent approximately one third of 
the EU’s total budget. Periodic variations have changed the way in which regions are classified 
for Cohesion Policy purposes. At the beginning of every new programming period, the European 
Commission revises the regional allocation of funds and the list of regions considered ‘in most 
need of support’. The eligibility rule for determining Objective 1 status – i.e. “Regions whose 
development is lagging behind” (European Commission, 2008a) – has always remained the 
same13. Objective 1 regions, receiving the large majority of Structural Funds14, are those whose 
average GDP per head is below 75 percent of the EU average for the last three years of available 
data before the start of a new programming period (Gripaios & Bishop, 2006).  
Under the Objective 1 programme, regions are entitled to be financed through the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European 
                                                          
13 The name ‘Objective 1’ regions was changed into ‘Convergence regions’ for the 2007-2013 period and again into 
‘Less developed regions’ for 2014-2020, but the rule of eligibility has not been modified. 
14 Objective 1 regions received 71.6% of the total 2000-2006 Cohesion Policy budget (€213bn), despite representing 
only 37% of the total EU population (European Commission, 2010). For the 2007-2013 period the proportion of funds 
to ‘Convergence regions’ was increased to 82% (European Commission, 2008b).  
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Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF)15. Among these, the most important sources of funding are the ERDF and the ESF. 
While the development goals to be achieved in each Objective 1 region vary according to specific 
regional plans, there exist a number of broad themes on which the ERDF and the ESF focus. 
Generally, the former fund is used for developing new infrastructure, fostering the 
competitiveness of SMEs, and promoting technological development and innovation, while the 
latter aims to improve employment opportunities, equip the workforce with better skills and better 
job prospects, and help unemployed and inactive people enter work (European Commission, 
2008a).  
The share of available financial resources is established before the beginning of each 
programming period by the European Commission on the basis of development plans jointly 
defined with the regions’ managing authorities. Every managing authority is in charge of 
providing information on the programmes, advertising and selecting projects, and monitoring 
their implementation. Depending on the type of project, the beneficiaries of the funds can be local 
governments, education institutions, other public entities, enterprises, non-governmental 
organisations, or private citizens. 
Regions classified as Objective 1 are expected to implement development programmes which 
would allow them to converge to higher levels of income and eventually lose their status of areas 
in highest need of support. As a consequence, the proportion of EU subsidies to these regions 
would progressively diminish. As the per capita GDP of Objective 1 regions becomes higher than 
75 percent of the EU average, ‘Phasing-in’ or ‘Phasing-out’ transitional programmes are put in 
place, reducing the amount of funds available to former Objective 1 regions16. 
 
  
                                                          
15 A fifth source of funding is the Cohesion Fund, available to Objective 1 regions of Member States with a Gross 
National Income below 90% of the EU average. This rule has made UK regions not eligible to receive these grants. 
16 While the phasing-in programme substantially reduces the share of EU funds for the programming period following 
the one in which a region was classified as Objective 1, the phasing-out programme allows for a more gradual reduction, 
such that in the first non-Objective 1 period a region may be entitled to receive almost as much as it was previously 
obtaining (see Table A1.1: South Yorkshire for a case of phasing-in regions, Northern Ireland for a case of phasing-out 
region). 
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Literature review 
 
The effectiveness of Cohesion Policy has been assessed in a vast number of evaluations performed 
with many different empirical methodologies. The majority of studies draw on samples of EU 
NUTS2 regions and employ cross-sectional or panel data (Cappelen et al., 2003; Ederveen et al., 
2003; Rodríguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2004; Beugelsdijk & Eijffinger, 2005; Ederveen et al., 2006; 
Puigcerver-Peñalver, 2007; Esposti & Bussoletti, 2008). More recent works have attempted to 
address endogeneity issues by using instrumental variable models in combination with spatial 
econometric techniques (Dall’erba & Le Gallo, 2008; Ramajo et al., 2008; Mohl & Hagen, 2010; 
Bouayad-Agha et al., 2013). In spite of the large number of studies produced, this literature has 
not reached a consensus on whether Structural Fund spending is beneficial (Cappelen et al., 2003; 
Bahr, 2008; Esposti & Bussoletti, 2008; Becker et al., 2012), beneficial under certain conditions 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2004; Mohl & Hagen, 2010; Becker et al., 2013; Bouayad-Agha et 
al., 2013; Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015; Crescenzi & Giua, 2016), insignificant (Garcia-
Milá & McGuire, 2001; Dall’erba & Le Gallo, 2008) or even detrimental and unjustified (Boldrin 
& Canova, 2001; Dall’erba et al., 2009). 
In order to provide more conclusive evidence on the effect of EU funds in European regions, a 
new strand of the literature has proposed novel estimation methodologies based on quasi-
experiments and counterfactual comparisons. 
A commonly used counterfactual approach evaluating EU Cohesion Policy exploits the eligibility 
rule for Objective 1 status as a threshold for a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Areas 
classified as Objective 1 (treated) are compared to similar areas with a GDP just above the 75 
percent of the EU average. Becker et al. (2010; 2013) and Pellegrini et al. (2013) use this 
methodology and find a positive and significant effect of Structural Funds on economic growth 
in Objective 1 regions, while Accetturo et al. (2014) uncover a negative impact of the funds on 
the degree of trust and cooperation among citizens. Gagliardi & Percoco (2016) demonstrate that 
the positive effect of EU funds on growth is stronger in rural areas close to urban agglomerates. 
Adopting a spatial RDD methodology that compares areas across the boundaries of Objective 1 
regions, Giua (2017) provides evidence on the beneficial and causal effect of Cohesion Policy in 
the municipalities of Italian Objective 1 regions. In these studies, the effects of EU funds are 
assessed in a static framework, which does not allow for a change over time in the eligibility status 
of the regions. Whether a region is affected by reductions in the flow of funds deriving from the 
loss of Objective 1 status is a question that has been investigated by Barone et al. (2016), finding 
that the growth rate of Abruzzo (Italy) has significantly reduced in the period following the change 
in Objective 1 eligibility. 
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Increasingly, spatially targeted policy interventions are evaluated across their full cycle, 
considering both treatment and post-treatment outcomes (e.g. Kline & Moretti, 2014; Einio & 
Overman, 2016). Yet, no study has ever looked at the impact of the EU Objective 1 programme 
from the moment in which eligibility is obtained by a region to the moment in which it is lost and 
beyond. 
We do so in this paper, by testing the effect of Cohesion Policy on unemployment and economic 
growth. The effectiveness of Cohesion strategies has already been evaluated in the literature by 
using labour market outcomes (Garcia-Milá & McGuire, 2001; Becker et al., 2010; Giua, 2017), 
while economic growth is the most commonly used indicator to measure the success of EU 
development policies (e.g. Becker et al., 2010; 2013). 
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature assessing the impact of EU funds in the UK. 
While extensive research has been carried out to evaluate the effects of regional and local 
development policies promoted by the UK government (e.g. Harris & Robinson, 2004; Devereux 
et al., 2007; Wren & Jones, 2011; Criscuolo et al., 2012; Faggio, 2015; Einio & Overman, 2016), 
very little evidence exists on the impact of European regional policies in the UK context. Studies 
on the UK have either a rather narrow programme-specific focus (Armstrong & Wells, 2006; 
Munday & Williams, 2009) or they look at issues of governance and institutional fit rather than 
at questions of economic performance (Bache, 1999; Gripaios & Bishop, 2006; Gore, 2008). An 
exception is the study by Criscuolo et al. (2016), investigating the role of firm subsidies granted 
by the British Government for stimulating employment in poorer regions, and finding a positive 
correlation between Objective 1 eligibility and changes in firms’ employment. 
The scarcity of research on the effects of Cohesion Policy in the UK is surprising, considering 
that the country’s significant regional disparities (McCann, 2016) made it one of the highest 
absolute recipients of EU funds for a long time17. 
  
                                                          
17 As an example, during the 2000-2006 period the UK received approximately €17 billion. Only Spain, Italy, Germany 
and Greece received more EU Funds during the same years. 
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3. Objective 1 eligibility in the UK and the cases of 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire  
 
EU Structural Funds and Objective 1 eligibility in UK regions 
 
A peculiarity of the UK context is the way in which the geography of regions targeted by EU 
Cohesion Policy has evolved over time. As shown in Figure 1, during the 1994-1999 period the 
UK Objective 1 regions were Merseyside in England, the Highlands and Islands of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. For the 2000-2006 programming period the list of ‘lagging behind regions’ was 
radically modified. Of the aforementioned regions, only Merseyside retained Objective 1 support 
while three new regions were declared eligible: Cornwall and South Yorkshire in England, and 
West Wales and The Valleys in Wales. From 2007 Merseyside and South Yorkshire were no 
longer considered Objective 1, while Cornwall and West Wales conserved the status for the 2007-
2013 and the 2014-2020 periods (Figure 1).  
Table A1.1 in the Appendix summarises the amount of EU funds per inhabitant18 in 1994-1999, 
2000-2006, and 2007-2013 obtained by UK regions. It can be noted that all regions received some 
form of financial support, but the amount of funds awarded to those not eligible for Objective 1 
is far lower than what was obtained by those considered in highest need of help19,20. 
Given the strict and specific criterion adopted to assign the Objective 1 status, variations in 
eligibility like the ones experienced by Cornwall and South Yorkshire in 2000 represent almost 
unique cases in the history of Cohesion Policy. As Objective 1 regions are expected to use 
Structural Funds to improve their economies and converge to the average level of per capita 
income of the EU, it is very unusual for regions to switch to Objective 1 in countries that have 
been part of the EU for a long time. 
                                                          
18 These figures are based on ‘payments’ from the European Commission. Payments refer to the resources paid by the 
European Commission to EU regions and are available to be spent. Although they do not reflect the exact final spending 
of regions, they represent more accurate estimates of actual spending than European Commission’s ‘commitments’, 
often used by Cohesion Policy evaluations as proxies for funds’ expenditures. 
19 Exceptions are phasing-out regions such as Northern Ireland and Highlands and The Islands during the 2000-2006 
period (see also footnote 17). 
20 During 1994-1999, the territory of Cornwall was classified as Objective 5b, i.e. ‘Adapt agricultural structures and 
promote the development of rural areas’, while South Yorkshire was classified as Objective 2, i.e. ‘Reconvert region 
affected by declining industry’. The fact that the two regions were among the top receivers of Structural Funds in 
England before 2000 is accounted for in the empirical analysis. 
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In the following paragraphs, we analyse the historical reasons that have brought Cornwall and 
South Yorkshire to be classified as Objective 1, and the evolution of their Cohesion Policy status 
from that moment until today. 
 
Figure 1  
Objective 1 eligibility in the UK by EU programming period 
1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 2014-2020 
 
 
 
 
 
Cornwall 
 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of per capita GDP purchasing power standard, comparing the trends 
in Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the average of the EU as of 1999 (with 15 Member States).  
Between 1995 and 1999, Cornwall was growing at a slightly lower pace with respect to the EU15 
– the 1995-1999 average growth rate of Cornwall was 4.5 percent, while in the EU15 it was 4.8 
percent. On average, however, the growth rate of the region is comparable to that of the EU, as 
Cornwall’s GDP per capita was €9,900 in 1995, equal to 58.2 percent of the EU15, and €11,800 
in 1999, corresponding to 57.6 percent of the EU15. 
 
  
- 65 -  
 
Figure 2 
GDP PPS per inhabitant (EUR) 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
Despite the fact that Cornwall’s GDP per capita was well below the 75 percent threshold in the 
90s, the European Commission only entitled Cornwall to receive Objective 1 funding from the 
programming period which started in 2000. The reason for this is that until 1998 Cornwall and its 
neighbour Devon were incorporated into a single statistical area with a GDP per capita above 75 
percent of the EU. In 1998 the UK Government introduced a reform revising NUTS regional 
borders, splitting the Cornwall-Devon region into two separate statistical areas. Previously, under 
the ‘Devonwall’ political concept promoted by the UK Conservative Party from the 1970s, 
Cornwall and Devon had been linked together in an economic, political and statistical sense.  
After the 1997 UK general elections and the Conservatives’ defeat, the Liberal Democrats 
withdrew their support to the ‘Devonwall’ project, opening the doors to the statistical separation 
of the two regions and the possibility for Cornwall to be awarded Objective 1 status. Despite the 
existence of a political campaign for Cornwall’s separation from Devon, the change in regional 
borders and in EU funds eligibility was hardly predictable (Willett, 2013). The requests for 
separation were complicated by the presence of political elites and stakeholders in Cornwall 
believing that the unity between Devon and Cornwall was best serving their interests, due to the 
possibility of having a stronger ‘lobbying voice’ by staying together (Stanyer, 1997). In addition, 
the Labour party which won the 1997 national elections was not particularly keen on devolving 
political autonomy to territories it did not control politically21 (Willet & Giovannini, 2014).   
                                                          
21 In the 1997 elections the Labour party obtained the relative majority of votes only in one of five Cornish 
constituencies (the other four were won by the Liberal Democrats), while in the 1992 elections the Labour was the third 
party after Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The 1998 reform was promoted by the Labour-led central 
government. Given the historical political weakness of the Labour in Cornwall, the Devon-Cornwall 1998 separation 
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Importantly, the reasons behind the attainment of the Objective 1 status in Cornwall are 
independent from any circumstance directly affecting the long-term economic trajectory of the 
region. The 1998 reform justified the division of Devon and Cornwall on the basis of “the very 
different economic conditions of the two counties, and Cornwall’s sparsity of population, 
geographical peripherality and distinct cultural and historic factors reflecting a Celtic 
background” (House of Commons, 1998). The economic differences between Cornwall and 
Devon emphasised by the UK Government are evident if the levels of per capita GDP of the two 
regions are compared22. However, when looking at other measures of economic prosperity such 
as the Total Household Income or the Gross Disposable Household Income23, the figures for 
1997-1999 appear very similar for the two regions and in both cases above the 75 percent EU 
threshold (Gripaios and McVittie, 2003). This suggests that Cornwall was “somewhat fortunate 
to be awarded Objective 1 status” (Gripaios & McVittie, 2003: 372), as the principal reason for 
the region’s qualification for financial support was the way borders have been re-drawn (Gripaios 
& McVittie, 2003; Gripaios & Bishop, 2006). 
Therefore, the sudden increase in EU grants can be considered exogenous to the pre-treatment 
economic trend of the region, making it possible to identify the effect of EU-financed programmes 
by looking at the evolution of the regional labour market before and after the attainment of the 
Objective 1 status. The Objective 1 status of Cornwall was confirmed in 2006 for the 2007-2013 
period, and again in 2013 for the 2014-2020 period (Figure 1). This makes Cornwall the region 
that received the largest proportions of EU funds per capita in England from 2000 onwards (for 
details on Cornwall’s investment strategy through EU funds see Appendix A2).  
 
South Yorkshire  
 
With respect to Cornwall, the attainment of Objective 1 eligibility in South Yorkshire occurred in 
a ‘less unexpected’ way. Formerly specialised in manufacturing, South Yorkshire has gone 
through a period of deindustrialisation which brought about the closure of most coal mines in the 
early 1990s. The region’s economic decline was seriously addressed by the central government 
only from 1997 onwards, when the newly-elected Labour government promoted interventions 
                                                          
was not easily foreseeable, due to the fact that it would have meant a political victory for an opposition party, the Lib 
Dem, which had begun to back the separatists’ requests. The separation has been the result of lobbying activities which 
eventually led the national government to include the Cornwall-Devon division in the reform (Willet, 2013). 
22 In 1999, the per capita GDP of Cornwall was €11,800, while Devon’s was around €15,900. 
23 Total Household Income (THI) is calculated as all income received by household residents in a region, while Gross 
Disposable Household Income deducts from THI expenditures on taxes, social security, pension contributions and 
interest payments. 
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tackling the growing unemployment by matching national resources with the EU funds (Kirk et 
al., 2012). From 1994 to 1999, the South Yorkshire territory was classified as Objective 2. The 
proportion of EU funds available to the region increased massively from 2000, when South 
Yorkshire became eligible for Objective 1 support.  
Unlike the case of Cornwall, there has been no border re-definition behind South Yorkshire’s 
change of status. Hence, anticipation effects and externalities may affect our estimates if we 
assume that people and businesses react to the change in eligibility before this has actually 
occurred. However, the fact that South Yorkshire’s per capita GDP was swinging above and 
below the 75 percent threshold just before 2000 – it was 74.2 percent of the EU15 in 1997 and 76 
percent in 199824 – made it more difficult to predict a future Objective 1 eligibility, and therefore 
behave in such a way that could anticipate the inflow of EU funds to the region. 
Moreover, the per capita GDP trend of the region has been almost parallel to the one of the EU15 
in the years preceding the eligibility change (Figure 2). South Yorkshire’s growth rate during the 
1995-1999 period was 5.9 percent, slightly above the EU15’s 4.8 percent. The region continued 
to catch up with the EU average during 2000-2006 period and due to this increase in income and 
to the Eastern Enlargement – an exogenous event which made the 75 percent threshold easier to 
be exceeded– during the 2007-2013 period South Yorkshire lost the status of Objective 1 
becoming a Phasing-in region.  
The Phasing-in status entitled South Yorkshire to receive ‘transitional funding’, that is, more 
resources than any other non-Objective 1 region but less than Cornwall, the only English 
Objective 1 region during the programming period starting in 2007 (Table A1.1). This status was 
confirmed in 2013, when South Yorkshire was defined as a ‘Transition region’ for the 2014-2020 
period, i.e. with an average GDP per capita between 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU average. 
This gives South Yorkshire the possibility to obtain more funds than ‘more developed regions’ 
(GDP per capita above 90 percent of the EU average), but less than ‘less developed regions’ 
(former Objective 1) (more details on South Yorkshire’s investment strategy through EU funds 
can be found in Appendix A2). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 The region was entitled to receive Objective 1 funds despite the fact that its GDP was above 75% of EU average in 
1998 because the EU considers the average GDP of the three years of available data before the beginning of the period 
to classify the regions. Final data for 1998 was presumably not yet available in 1999, when the final decision over 
eligibility was made. 
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Potentially confounding policies 
 
The main policy for employment promotion in the UK besides EU Cohesion Policy25 was the 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) programme (renamed in 2008 as Grant for Business 
Investment (GBI)), financed by the UK national Government and intended to create and safeguard 
employment in the poorest areas of the country (Criscuolo et al., 2016). The RSA schemes are no 
longer in force in England since 2014. 
Through this policy, the National government provided grants to manufacturing firms located in 
UK areas characterised by low GDP per capita and high unemployment. Changes in eligibility 
for RSA occurred in coincidence with the start of new EU programming periods. In the ward-
level analysis we attempt to minimise the potentially confounding effect of this policy, by 
exploiting variations over time in the geography of RSA support schemes. 
 
4. Data  
 
The main outcome variable used to evaluate the effectiveness of EU funds in UK regions is 
unemployment, proxied by the share of people claiming Job-Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
unemployment benefits26. Data are obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Nomis 
database and are available from the year 1992. Although the share of unemployment benefit 
claimants is not an official measure of unemployment, it is a less noisy indicator than the 
unemployment rate27 and the only one available for areas smaller than UK Local Authorities. As 
shown in Appendix A3.1, during the period in which Cornwall and South Yorkshire have received 
Objective 1 funds, the rate of UK unemployment benefit claimants and the unemployment rate 
display similar trajectories.  
                                                          
25 Regional data on expenditures for other national investment policies is not available. However, it must be noted that 
Cohesion Policy expenditures tend to be much more concentrated, geographically and thematically, and targeted on 
more specific development activities than national investments. Hence, particularly in poorer UK regions, EU funds 
represent substantial portions of the total investments made. 
26 Job-Seeker Allowance unemployment benefit is paid by the UK national government to unemployed people who are 
actively seeking work. All citizens of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are equally entitled to apply for 
JSA.  
27 The JSA claimant count is often used as a proxy for unemployment. Due to sampling variability, the estimates of 
unemployment produced by the Labour Force Survey (LFS) are highly volatile. For this reason, JSA benefit claimant 
count is a less distorted and more reliable indicator than the unemployment rate, particularly when focusing on subsets 
of the UK population and on small administrative areas (ONS, 2013). 
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A second outcome variable used in the analysis is per capita GDP, available only at the regional 
level from 1995 onwards. Information on this variable is obtained from OECD statistics. 
Appendix A4 describes the levels and growth of the two outcome variables in English regions 
over the analysed period. 
The empirical study adopts two different spatial dimensions: regions and wards. 
Regions. The analysis performed at the regional level exploits two main sources of data. The first 
is Eurostat Regio, providing data from 1995 until 2014; the second is the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey Local Area Data (LFS LAD), containing information on employment, economic activity 
and related subjects at the level of UK Local Authority Districts from 1992 to 2006. The period 
is collapsed from quarterly to yearly. The final dataset is composed of LFS variables from 1992 
to 2006, Eurostat and OECD variables from 1995 to 2014 and the unemployment proxy available 
from 1992 to 2014.  
NUTS2 regions are characterised by an average population of 1.7 million inhabitants, of which 
2.8 percent claiming unemployment benefits (2000-2014 average). 
Wards. The lowest level of aggregation used in this study is the one of electoral wards. Ward-
level units allow to capture localised unemployment clusters, because most ward boundaries have 
been used by the ONS in 2001 to draw Output Areas (for which data are not available), a 
geographical classification of socially homogeneous areas in terms of household tenure and 
population size. The wards of England have an average population of around 5000 inhabitants 
(with high variance across wards, see descriptive Table in Appendix A5).  
Due to the 1996 revision of frozen ward boundaries, the unemployment variable is only available 
for wards from 1996. Data on other variables at ward level are obtained from the 1991 UK Census. 
The following Censuses cannot be used because they relate to different ward classifications. The 
variable for wards’ residents is given by the number of 1991 residents interpolated between 1996 
and 2014 by assigning the average population growth rate of the region to its constituent wards.  
 
5. Results 
 
Synthetic control method – effect on unemployment 
 
The analysis begins by performing a counterfactual analysis comparing the unemployment trend 
of the two case-studies, Cornwall and South Yorkshire, with appropriate counterfactuals. For that, 
we adopt the synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie 
et al. (2010; 2015). This method allows to assess the effect of policy interventions taking place at 
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an aggregate level, using data for geographical units not exposed to the treatment but comparable 
to the treated region (see the Annex for a more detailed explanation of this methodology). The 
synthetic control regions are constructed on the basis of a number of labour market indicators 
related to the typology of the labour force, the sectorial composition and the level of education 
and training. In addition, we control for the level of GDP per capita28. We also account for the 
fact that Cornwall and South Yorkshire were receiving EU funds during 1994-1999 by controlling 
for the amount of Structural Funds obtained in the pre-treatment period. 
Table A6.1 in the Appendix summarises pre-treatment average values of all variables used to 
construct the synthetic regions, comparing them to the averages for Cornwall, South Yorkshire 
and England. Table A7.1 presents the list of weights on which the synthetic regions are created. 
In the case of Cornwall, Devon provides almost 60 percent of the weights, not surprisingly given 
the strong connection with the Cornish economy as discussed above. The remaining weights are 
from regions being among the highest recipients of Structural Funds during 1994-1999. In the 
case of South Yorkshire, the main weights come from Tees Valley and East Yorkshire, which 
were also obtaining high shares of EU funds before 200029. In both cases, the synthetic regions 
have an average value of per capita Structural Funds in the pre-treatment period that is above the 
English average and close to the figure of the two treated regions. 
Figure 3 plots the unemployment trend for Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the estimated trend 
of the respective synthetic regions between 1992 and 2014. The pre-treatment indicators predict 
well the evolution of unemployment trajectories of the treated regions until 1999, suggesting that 
treatment and control regions are running in parallel before the start of the treatment. 
                                                          
28 By construction, Cornwall and South Yorkshire are the regions with the lowest per capita GDP among all regions in 
the sample (Merseyside is excluded), making it impossible for the synthetic region to perfectly match the treated region 
on this characteristic. Nonetheless, including this control is important in order to minimise convergence effects not 
being determined by Structural Funds support. 
29 As discussed, South Yorkshire kept receiving a large amount of EU funds during the years in which it was classified 
as phasing-in. The synthetic control method constructs the counterfactual region for South Yorkshire mainly using 
Northumberland, Tees Valley and East Yorkshire, the 3 most funded regions after South Yorkshire (€39, €37 and €27 
p/c respectively) during the 2007-2013 period. So the funding period post-Objective 1 in South Yorkshire is largely 
accounted for. 
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Figure 3  
Unemployment trends, treated vs. synthetic regions 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
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Panel A of Figure 3 reports the evolution of unemployment in Cornwall and its synthetic 
counterpart. From 2000 onwards a gap is clearly visible, indicating that Cornwall reduced its 
unemployment more than the synthetic control during the 2000-2006 and the 2007-2013 
programming periods. South Yorkshire and synthetic control are displayed in panel B of Figure 
3. In this case, the two unemployment trends diverge marginally in 1999. Nevertheless, the largest 
gap between the two lines is visible during the period in which South Yorkshire was entitled to 
receive Objective 1 funds, i.e. 2000-2006. South Yorkshire’s lower line suggests that the region 
has reduced the proportion of unemployed people more than a region similar in all other relevant 
characteristics except for not having received Objective 1 aid. South Yorkshire’s gap with the 
synthetic region tends to reduce over time. From the year 2008, treated and control regions report 
increasingly similar levels of unemployment, up to the point that the two lines overlap again in 
2013-2014. This suggests that when South Yorkshire was classified as Phasing-in, unemployment 
has grown faster than in the synthetic region, completely offsetting all labour market 
improvements of the previous seven years. 
In order to test for the significance of the estimated effects we follow Abadie et al. (2010) and run 
a series of placebo studies by iteratively applying the synthetic control method to every other 
untreated English region. Cornwall and South Yorkshire are shifted among the control units and 
the treatment is reassigned to each one of the regions in the sample. The computed gap between 
the two trends for all iterations is then compared to the one estimated for the two treatment 
regions. The results of the placebo test are displayed in Figure 4. 
Panel A provides clear evidence of a significant effect for Cornwall. No other region in the sample 
has witnessed a reduction in unemployment as large as the one experienced by Cornwall. A 
difference in the gap between Cornwall and every other English region is visible from 2002 and 
increases over time, until it stabilises in 2009. This suggests that throughout the Objective 1 period 
Cornwall has reduced the proportion of unemployment benefit claimants more than regions not 
eligible for Objective 1 grants. The difference between Cornwall’s and the synthetic region’s 
unemployment changes is equal to 0.93 percentage points30, corresponding to a percentage of 
unemployment benefit claimants approximately 30 percent lower than the control region. 
  
                                                          
30 This has been calculated as: (U Cornwall 2013 – U Cornwall 1999) – (U synthetic 2013 – U synthetic 1999) = (1.74 - 2.88) - (2.69 - 
2.89) = -0.93. 
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Figure 4  
Unemployment gap in treated regions and placebo gaps 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
  
Note: the black bold line in Panel A represents the gap between Cornwall and the synthetic region; the black bold line in 
Panel B represents the gap between South Yorkshire and the synthetic region; grey lines are placebo gaps. 
 
Panel B of Figure 4 tests the significance of the estimated gap for South Yorkshire. Between 2001 
and 2005, South Yorkshire’s proportion of unemployment benefit claimants was lower than any 
other English region not eligible for Objective 1 policies, indicating a statistically significant 
difference between treatment and control during the period. However, during the following years 
the gap becomes progressively closer to zero. This means that South Yorkshire was capable of 
reducing unemployment more than regions not in receipt of Objective 1 funds, but only 
temporarily. In the long-run, we do not find any significant effect on the unemployment trend of 
the region.  
 
Synthetic control method – robustness tests 
 
One concern with these estimates is the presence of externalities potentially confounding the 
selection of untreated areas. The regions neighbouring Cornwall and South Yorkshire might have 
benefitted from the improved economic and labour market conditions of Objective 1 regions, or 
they might have lost out key assets (in the form of human capital and firms) due to the 
attractiveness of EU projects. In an attempt to minimise spillover effects, the main estimations 
are replicated by excluding from the donor pool of the synthetic controls all regions which share 
a border with Cornwall or South Yorkshire 
In the case of Cornwall, the strong proximity between the Cornish and the Devon economy makes 
Devon the region most likely to be affected by treatment externalities. Similarly, all regions 
neighbouring South Yorkshire (North Yorkshire, East Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire) may be conditioned by the fact that the region was awarded 
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Objective 1 funds. The results of the ‘leave-neighbours-out’ empirical exercise are reported in 
Table A8.1 alongside synthetic controls’ weights. Spillovers do not seem to be a major factor in 
this context as the results of these estimations are not significantly different from the ones 
presented in Figure 331.  
As a second test to assess the credibility of the main synthetic control estimates, we artificially 
anticipate the start of the Objective 1 period. If, as we argue, the reduction in unemployment is 
driven by EU funds, then by anticipating the treatment we should find no significant difference 
in unemployment before 2000.  
This placebo study is performed by using 1992-1996 values of the control variables to construct 
the synthetic regions, and allow for treatment effects to materialise in 1997. The results of the test 
are displayed in Table A8.2. As shown in the two figures, there is no evidence of a significant 
divergence of unemployment trends between treated and synthetic regions before 2000. This is 
reassuring regarding the existence of any anticipation effect. The estimated effect during 
Objective 1 years seems to have little to do with labour market and economic changes occurring 
in expectation of future Objective 1 eligibility. 
 
Ward-level analysis: difference-in-differences 
 
As an additional robustness test of these results, we replicate the analysis using data at the level 
of wards and perform a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation. By taking the 134 wards of 
Cornwall and the 94 wards of South Yorkshire as treatment units, we estimate their mean 
unemployment growth during periods of highest EU financial support.  
For each of the two Objective 1 regions, the comparison groups are obtained from the 8,269 wards 
of all English regions not eligible for Objective 1 funds. Rather than comparing the 134 and 94 
treated wards to all 8,269 wards from untreated regions, the analysis is limited to the wards in the 
control group which are most comparable in terms of their observable characteristics. In order to 
identify the control wards most similar to the treated wards, we resort to the propensity score 
matching (PSM) method. The psmatch2 estimator (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003) is used to match 
wards from either Cornwall or South Yorkshire one-to-one without replacement with a set of 
untreated wards, using the nearest neighbour algorithm. The matching is based on a number of 
key socio-economic characteristics from the 1991 Census and on pre-treatment unemployment32. 
                                                          
31 This way of controlling for externalities is imperfect. However, in absence of data on migration and mobility of firms 
across regions, it is the possible best way to control for the relocation of economic activity towards the treated regions.    
32 Given that almost all covariates are taken from the 1991 Census, they have no time variation. Therefore, the PSM 
has been performed with a collapsed (cross-section) dataset for the pre-treatment period. The selection of control groups 
has been done by matching one-to-one treatment wards with untreated wards on the basis of 1991 covariates and wards’ 
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In such a way, we obtain a set of control wards whose ex ante probability of receiving treatment 
– as predicted by pre-treatment variables – is sufficiently similar to the one of treated units 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Table A9.1 in the Appendix reports the covariates’ balancing tests for wards of Cornwall and 
South Yorkshire. There is no statistical difference between treated and control wards for all 
observable socio-economic characteristics, suggesting that the PSM has produced suitable control 
groups.   
The DiD analysis is performed with panel data from 1996 to 2014. We estimate different versions 
of the following model: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑂𝑏𝑗1 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽 (𝑂𝑏𝑗1 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  ×  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡) + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
Where: 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  is the annual growth rate of unemployment benefit claimants in ward 
i at year t; 𝑂𝑏𝑗1 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a dummy taking value one for wards belonging to treated regions 
(either Cornwall of South Yorkshire) and zero otherwise; 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 is a dummy referring to the 
post-2000 treatment period of reference (either the full period, 2000-2014, or one of the two sub-
periods, 2000-2006 and 2007-2014); 𝜏𝑡 are a full set of year dummies; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic 
error term. Given that eligibility for EU funds is assigned at the regional (NUTS2) level, standard 
errors are clustered at this level throughout the analysis. Our DiD specification, similar to Redding 
and Sturm (2008), allows for unobserved fixed effects in wards, which are differenced out as we 
compute unemployment growth rates. The coefficient of interest of the model, 𝛽, compares the 
unemployment growth of treated wards with the one of respective groups of untreated wards, 
selected through PSM. 
The results of the DiD model are presented in Table 1. 
We begin the discussion of the results with the estimates for Cornwall in columns (1) to (6). First, 
it can be seen that the dummy variable for Cornwall wards is insignificant in all different 
specifications, indicating no difference in unemployment growth between Cornwall and matched 
wards prior to 2000. Hence, the propensity score matching has produced comparable treatment 
and control groups on the basis of pre-treatment labour market conditions. 
                                                          
unemployment averaged between 1996 and 1999. For each treated ward, our matching algorithm finds a control unit 
with similar characteristics. The selection of wards as controls from the cross-section dataset has been used to compute 
DiD estimates. Hence, the sample of wards used for DiD estimates is made of treated wards (Cornwall or South 
Yorkshire) and matched wards. 
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The interaction term between Cornwall wards and the 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 dummy refers to the difference in 
unemployment growth between treated and control wards during Objective 1 periods. According 
to our results, unemployment in Cornwall wards decreased 3.8 percentage points faster than in 
control wards. This is a larger difference with respect to the one obtained from synthetic control 
estimates. The estimated gap between Cornwall and the synthetic control region corresponds to 
an annual average difference in unemployment growth of 2.5 percentage points. The discrepancy 
between the two results is probably due to the fact that the pre-treatment matching in the ward-
level analysis is performed on a lower number of covariates (for example, data on Structural 
Funds’ shares are not available at the ward level) and on a shorter time-span. For these reasons, 
the regional-level point estimates are considered more reliable. 
Column (3) shows that the difference in the rate of decrease of unemployment was higher during 
the first EU programming period, while in the second Objective 1 period it reduced in magnitude 
but remained marginally significant (column (5)). These trends are in line with the results of the 
synthetic control method, reporting a gap between treated and synthetic region developing mainly 
during the 2000-2006 period. 
As discussed in section 3, other policy initiatives for the promotion of employment were 
implemented in Cornwall in coincidence with the Objective 1 programme. In particular, the main 
national policy aiming at the creation of new jobs was the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). 
Before 2000, the large majority of Cornwall’s territory was already considered eligible under 
RSA support schemes, but 48 wards of Cornwall became eligible to receive RSA transfers in 
2000. Hence, one way to partially test whether RSA policies are confounding our estimates is to 
verify whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of these wards. Columns (2), (4) and (6) 
of Table 1 report the estimate results of the model excluding the 48 wards eligible for RSA from 
2000. As compared to full sample estimates, the coefficients are virtually unchanged. Therefore, 
it seems plausible to assume that Cornwall’s change in unemployment can be ascribed to the 
success of employment-promoting programmes funded by Structural Funds rather than to RSA 
policies. 
The results of the model for South Yorkshire are displayed in the three final columns of Table 1. 
In all specifications, the growth rate of unemployment of South Yorkshire wards is not 
significantly different from the one of control wards before 2000, again suggesting that the PSM 
based on pre-treatment covariates has allowed to create comparable treatment and control groups. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between treated wards and treatment periods in column (7) 
reports the difference in unemployment growth between South Yorkshire and control wards. The 
unemployment growth rate of South Yorkshire is not statistically different from the one of 
comparable wards. This confirms the synthetic control results in that EU policies seem to have 
produced no effect in the region over the 2000-2014 period. 
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Table 1  
Difference-in-differences estimates 
Dependent variable:  
Unemployment growth 
 
Treatment period: 
2000-2014 2000-2006 2007-2014 2000-2014 2000-2006 2007-2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Cornwall wards 0.00575 0.00891 0.00574 0.00892 0.00575 0.00892    
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)    
(Cornwall wards) × (period) -0.0381*** -0.0439*** -0.0494*** -0.0561*** -0.0282* -0.0334**    
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0151) (0.0151)    
South Yorkshire wards 
      
-0.00087 -0.00087 -0.00087 
      (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
(South Yorkshire wards) × (period) 
      
-0.0035 -0.0258* 0.0160 
      (0.0113) (0.0134) (0.00974) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations  4,787 3,923 2,659 2,179 2,932 2,385 3,382 1,880 2,065 
R-squared 0.372 0.353 0.091 0.084 0.458 0.440 0.643 0.332 0.694 
Wards 268 220 268 220 268 220 188 188 188 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample of treated and matched wards. Yearly data from 2007 to 2014 excluded from sample in columns (3), 
(4), (8); yearly data from 2000 to 2006 excluded from sample in columns (5), (6), (9). Cornwall’s wards not eligible for RSA in 1993-1999 excluded from sample in specifications (2), (4), (6). 
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When the full period is sub-divided into two sub-periods, the results are again in line with those 
obtained with regional-level data. The negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term 
in column (8) shows that for 2000-2006 the unemployment reduction in South Yorkshire is 
significantly higher than in control wards. Conversely, for 2007-2014 the coefficient comparing 
the unemployment growth rate of South Yorkshire wards to untreated areas of England is positive 
(albeit insignificant), suggesting that unemployment has increased relative to control wards 
(column (9)).  
 
Synthetic control method - effect on per capita GDP 
 
The main intention of Cohesion Policy is to foster the economic development of European 
territories. The effectiveness of EU regional policies is generally evaluated by looking at the 
impact they produce on the economic growth rate of targeted regions. For this reason, in this 
section we perform a synthetic control analysis on the two case-studies by using per capita GDP 
as the outcome variable.  
In order to create comparable counterfactuals, we adopt a number of variables referring to key 
factors generally identified as growth determinants in the literature. The level of private capital 
investment, the stock of infrastructure, and the degree of technological development and 
innovation – regarded as key drivers of long-run regional economic growth (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 
1996; OECD, 2009) – are proxied by: the percentage of gross fixed capital formation, the number 
of kilometres of roads per regional area, the share of human resources in science and technology 
and the number of patent applications per thousand inhabitants, respectively. These variables are 
used to predict the synthetic control regions’ pre-treatment trends of GDP per capita (pre-
treatment averages in Table A6.2 in the Appendix). 
Given that Cornwall and South Yorkshire are the regions in the sample with the lowest income 
per inhabitant, by definition the pre-treatment GDP per capita levels of treated units cannot be 
replicated by the synthetic controls. This implies that the lines of treated and counterfactual 
regions are not overlapping in the pre-treatment’s synthetic control estimates. However, as shown 
in Figure 5, both Cornwall and South Yorkshire’s trajectories run in parallel with the ones of their 
relative synthetic counterparts before 2000, indicating that the growth rates of treatment and 
relative synthetic units are similar prior to the beginning of the Objective 1 period. 
The results of the empirical test indicate that Cornwall has partially closed the income gap with 
the synthetic control region. The bottom-left quadrant of Figure 5 illustrates that the distance 
between Cornwall and the control region is progressively reducing over time. The fastest catch-
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up of Cornwall is visible during the first treatment years. Hence, we can infer that Objective 1 
funds have had a positive impact on the economic growth rate of the region. 
South Yorkshire has grown faster than its synthetic region over the analysed period. The top-right 
quadrant of Figure 5 indicates that the treated region has experienced high growth rates while 
receiving Objective 1 funds, overcoming the control region in terms of GDP per capita in 2005. 
This tendency is interrupted and reverted from 2008, when South Yorkshire’s worse growth 
performance widens the income gap between treatment and control region (bottom-right quadrant, 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5  
Per capita GDP trends, treated vs. synthetic regions 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
 
 
   
 
These results should be taken with caution, due to the imperfect method of calculating the 
synthetic controls, and to the relatively short number of pre-treatment years. Having taken these 
caveats into consideration, the findings are generally in line with the ones obtained using 
unemployment as outcome variable. Objective 1 funds seem to be effective in both regions, but 
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South Yorkshire’s conditions deteriorate – relative to a similar untreated region – when the region 
loses the Objective 1 status. 
 
Unemployment and economic growth in all UK regions  
 
The above results show how Objective 1 eligibility has had strong, positive, and causal effects 
on the labour market and economic performance of the two selected UK regions, and warn 
over the possible negative consequences of losing Objective 1 funds. However, they do not 
reveal what has been the effect of EU funding in the rest of the country. In this section, we 
complement the previous evidence by testing for a relationship between EU funds and the two 
outcome variables of interest – unemployment and GDP per capita – in all British regions. We 
estimate a fixed effects model using yearly data from 1994 to 2013 and NUTS2 UK regions 
as sample. The model is as follows: 
 
∆ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + β EU𝑖,𝑡 + ϑ X𝑖,𝑡 + φ𝑖 + τ𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡  
Where:  
 is the first-differencing operator, i and t index regions and year, respectively; 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is either 
the percentage of unemployment benefit claimants, or the natural log of GDP per capita; EU𝑖,𝑡 
is the measure relating to EU funds, which can either be a continuous variable reflecting the 
proportion of EU funds paid to UK regions per inhabitant, or a dummy variable taking value 
1 for each region with Objective 1 status in any particular year; X𝑖,𝑡 is a set of regional control 
variables including key determinants of labour market and economic conditions: the share of 
tertiary education degree holders in the regional workforce, the share of agricultural 
employment, the share of employed people in manufacturing, the stock of total motor-roads 
per inhabitant, and a measure of innovation capacity (patent applications per 10000 
inhabitants); φ𝑖 and τ𝑡 are vectors of region-specific and time dummies capturing permanent 
differences in growth rates across regions and national business-cycle effects, respectively; 
and ε𝑖,𝑡 are residuals. Standard errors are clustered at the NUTS2 level. 
The model is estimated for all 37 UK regions and for a restricted sample made of the 30 English 
regions. The results for all UK regions are presented in Table 2, while the results for the 
restricted sample are in Table A10.1 in the Appendix. 
The first three columns of the two Tables report results with the annual change in the 
percentage of unemployment benefit claimants as dependent variable. The coefficient of EU 
funds per capita is negative but insignificant in columns (1), while the Objective 1 dummy in 
columns (2) returns a strongly significant and negative coefficient in both Tables. This 
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suggests that, ceteris paribus, unemployment has decreased faster in UK (and English) regions 
receiving Objective 1 funds during the analysed period. In column (3), we remove Cornwall 
and South Yorkshire from the sample, to test if the significant unemployment reduction is 
driven by the two case-studies or it is generalisable to the whole of the UK. The coefficient 
remains significant, indicating that the beneficial treatment effects of Objective 1 policies on 
unemployment apply to the UK at large. 
Turning to the economic growth effects of EU funds (columns (4)-(7) of Tables 2 and A10.1), 
we find clear evidence of a positive relationship between EU grants and regional growth. The 
estimated coefficient of EU funds per capita shows a rather sizeable effect. A similarly large, 
positive and statistically significant effect is obtained also in columns (5), where we examine 
the growth effect of assignment into Objective 1 status. Our results show that UK regions 
obtaining Objective 1 funds grew on average by 0.8 percentage points faster than other regions, 
annually, during the 1994-2013 period. The coefficient reduces marginally in magnitude to 
0.5 when the sample is restricted to English regions33, and in both cases it remains significant 
when Cornwall and South Yorkshire are excluded from samples (columns (6)).  
The interesting result of a positive significant growth effect of EU funds in UK/English regions 
brings us to perform one additional test and verify which type of regions (Objective 1 or non-
Objective 1) have displayed the fastest growth rates. In columns (7), the EU funds variable is 
interacted with the Objective 1 dummy. The positive and significant coefficient of the 
interaction term shows that, even among the highly-funded Objective 1 regions, those 
receiving more funds have grown faster. This suggests that Structural Funds have non-
exhaustive effects on growth in UK regions, that is, a higher share of EU transfers keeps 
improving economic performance34.  
All in all, these findings provide evidence that the effectiveness of Objective 1 policies has not 
been limited to Cornwall and South Yorkshire. Although the interpretation of estimated 
relationships requires some caution, due to potential issues of endogeneity, the analysis 
indicates that the highest form of EU funding has been successful in stimulating the economic 
performance and improving the labour market conditions across the whole UK territory. 
                                                          
33 Note that, in both Tables, the inclusion of the Objective 1 dummy changes little the obtained beta-convergence 
coefficient of lagged GDP per capita in columns (3). Therefore, the estimated effect of Objective 1 status cannot be 
seen as capturing an inverse income-selection effect, i.e., that poorer regions become assigned to Objective 1 status and 
at the same time grow faster due to neoclassical convergence. 
34 Consistent with that, when testing for a non-linear effect of EU funding by including the quadratic term of EU funds 
per capita in the model, the squared term returns an insignificant coefficient while the linear term remains statistically 
significant (regression results available upon request). This finding contrasts with empirical studies claiming that 
Cohesion expenditures display decreasing returns in EU regions (Becker et al., 2012; Pellegrini & Cerqua, 2017). 
However, Pellegrini & Cerqua’s (2017) estimates show that only an intensity of EU transfers above €340 per capita 
diminishes the returns of EU funding, a threshold which is not overcome by any of the regions in our sample. 
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Table 2  
EU funds, unemployment, and economic growth in UK regions 
 Dep. Variable: Δ Unemployment bc Δ ln GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged unemployment  -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.149***    
 
 (0.0170) (0.0151) (0.0146)     
Lagged ln GDP per capita    -0.307*** -0.297*** -0.240*** -0.303*** 
 
   (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0413) (0.0364) 
EU funds per capita -0.000188   0.000114**   0.000132* 
 
(0.000359)  (4.49e-05)  (6.96e-05) 
Objective 1 regions  -0.100*** -0.0533*  0.00857* 0.00683* 0.00885* 
  (0.0348) (0.0339)  (0.00437) (0.00387) (0.00516) 
(Obj1 regions) x (EU funds per capita)         0.000082** 
         
(3.27e-05) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 646 646 610 613 613 579 613 
R-squared 0.914 0.915 0.913 0.778 0.776 0.759 0.778 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 35 37 37 35 37 
Note: Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls are: the share of tertiary education 
degree holders in the regional workforce, the share of agricultural employment, the share of employed people in manufacturing, the stock of 
total motor-roads per inhabitant, and a measure of innovation capacity (patent applications per 1000 inhabitants). Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire excluded from sample in specifications (3) and (6). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will leave poorer UK regions without 
access to EU Structural Funds. This paper has tested whether EU financial support has been 
successful in Britain, and the extent to which a reduction of EU subsidies may affect the 
development trajectories of UK regions.  
A counterfactual analysis has been performed on two regions, Cornwall and South Yorkshire, 
which have been compared to synthetic control regions similar to them but not eligible for 
Objective 1 policies. The results indicate that EU development policies in Cornwall have helped 
to lower the proportion of people claiming unemployment benefits and reduce the income gap 
with richer regions. South Yorkshire received Objective 1 funds for one single programming 
period, during which significant improvements were visible. As compared to regions not eligible 
for Objective 1 support, South Yorkshire has grown faster and has seen unemployment diminish. 
Additional regression results confirm that Objective 1 policies have had positive effects all across 
the UK, not just in Cornwall and South Yorkshire. Hence, the EU programme dedicated to poorer 
regions seems to have accomplished substantial results in the UK context.  
However, the case of South Yorkshire also demonstrates that the gains obtained during the period 
of highest funding (Objective 1) may not lead to a self-sustainable development path. When 
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Objective 1 funding was lost, South Yorkshire displayed one of the worst performances among 
English regions, despite still being subsidised by the EU as part of the phasing-in programme.  
These findings should foster a careful reflection over the future of poorer UK regions in the event 
of an imminent exit of the country from the EU. The loss of eligibility for Cohesion Policy funding 
will deprive the UK’s regional economies from a key source of investment funds. Given the 
success of Objective 1 policies in the country, the prospective withdrawal from the EU may leave 
the UK without a mechanism through which economic disparities in the country have been 
reduced. In addition, losing the possibility to access EU Structural Funds is likely to expose the 
economy of less developed UK regions to potential adverse effects.  
A region like Cornwall, which has benefitted from Objective 1 policies for a long period of time, 
faces the highest risks. In this sense, the experience of South Yorkshire may represent a valuable 
lesson; losing Objective 1 funds can produce a short-term shock, and the labour market and 
economy can continue to struggle in the medium-term. Cornwall is not necessarily bound to 
follow the same destiny of South Yorkshire as the two regions differ in many respects, including 
the investment strategies adopted during Objective 1 periods. These differences, however, may 
not be sufficient for Cornwall to take a different post-policy development path. Unlike EU regions 
shifting from a status of ‘Objective 1’ to ‘Phasing-out’ or ‘Phasing-in’, Cornwall will not have 
the possibility to obtain EU transitional funding. Hence, the loss of EU subsidies may be more 
likely to produce negative consequences on its economy if the UK national Government does not 
put in place any compensatory policy supporting its transition in funding environment. If new 
regional policies are to be devised in the UK, much attention should be paid to make sure that 
such policy initiatives produce structural (i.e. permanent), not temporary, improvements in the 
local socio-economic conditions.  
Even if substitute regional policies were to be introduced, agreeing their contours would be far 
from simple and regions currently most funded might temporarily be left without external support 
should the negotiations last too long (Bachtler & Begg, 2017). These potential negative 
repercussions apply in particular to UK economically disadvantaged regions dependent on EU 
aid, such as Cornwall and West Wales and The Valleys, the two Objective 1 regions at the time 
of the Brexit vote.  
More generally, the results of the analysis contribute to the current debate on the effectiveness of 
EU Cohesion Policy. The analysis on Cornwall has shown that Objective 1 funding may be 
successful, even in a causal sense. However, the effects produced by these policies may not be 
long-lasting, rather they may disappear when the funding period has ended. Hence, when 
designing and implementing development projects, EU Objective 1 regions should think carefully 
about what the legacy of the interventions will be. EU funds should be used to prepare the less 
advantaged territories for the moment when, inevitably, the resources will be cut down. Not doing 
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so may imply that any improvement obtained during the Objective 1 period will vanish in the 
long term.  
The present work is the first in the literature to empirically study the impact of a sudden increase 
and decrease in the availability of Structural Funds on the performance of less developed regions. 
The results of the analysis can be extended and improved in several ways. An important task for 
future contributions is to test the validity of our findings in other contexts, assessing whether 
regions evolve similarly to the two case-studies analysed in this paper. In addition, the data at our 
disposal do not allow us to provide clear answers regarding the key mechanisms producing the 
observed effects. Future research may attempt to identify the factors conditioning the long-term 
impacts of EU policies using different identification strategies.  
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Annex 
 
Synthetic control method 
 
The synthetic control method for comparative case studies (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie 
et al., 2010; 2015) allows to assess the effect of policy interventions taking place at an aggregate 
level, using data for geographical units not exposed to the treatment but comparable to the treated 
region. The sample is made of  𝐽 + 1 units (NUTS2 regions), with 𝑗 = 1 being the case of interest 
and 𝑗 = 2 to 𝑗 = 𝐽 + 1 being potential comparisons. To construct the synthetic control we 
consider all English NUTS2 regions not receiving Objective 1 funds during 2000-2013, using 
data from pre-intervention years. The control unit is obtained from a (𝐽 × 1) vector 𝑾 =
(𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝐽+1)′  made of nonnegative weights all summing up to one. Each value of 𝑾 represents 
a weighted average of values obtained from control regions, that is, a potential synthetic control. 
Let 𝑿𝟏 be a (𝑘 × 1) vector of pre-treatment characteristics that can be used as predictors of labour 
market outcomes, and 𝑽 a (𝑘 × 𝑘) diagonal matrix whose values indicate the relative importance 
of each predictor. We look for a vector 𝑾∗ that minimises (𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾)′𝑽(𝑿𝟏 − 𝑿𝟎𝑾), subject 
to 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 (𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽)  and 𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽+1 = 1. 𝑽 is chosen such that the treated regions’ 
trajectory in the pre-treatment period is best reproduced by the synthetic region.  
Let 𝑌𝑗𝑡 be the outcome of region 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝒀𝟏 a (𝑇1 × 1) vector collecting post-intervention 
values of the outcome variable and 𝒀𝟎 a (𝑇1 × 𝐽) matrix containing post-intervention values of 
the outcome for the control region. The synthetic control estimator of the treatment effect on the 
treated region is given by the comparison of the different outcomes of the two regions from the 
beginning of the Objective 1 programme until the end of the period. The synthetic control 
estimator is obtained as: 𝒀𝟏𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝐽+1
𝑗=2 𝑌𝑗𝑡.  
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Appendix 
 
A1 Structural Funds per inhabitant in UK regions by EU 
programming period 
Table A1.1 
Annual euros of Structural Funds per capita in UK regions, 1994-1999, 2000-2006, 2007-2013 
Region 1994-1999 Region 2000-2006 Region 2007-2013 
Northern Ireland* 110.5 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly* 138.0 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly* 162.7 
Highlands & The Islands* 91.1 Merseyside* 137.3 West Wales & The Valley* 159.5 
Merseyside*  61.9 South Yorkshire* 126.8 Merseyside 73.4 
Tees Valley & Durham 32.1 West Wales & The Valley* 97.3 Northern Ireland 68.3 
Greater Manchester 28.7 Northern Ireland 94.2 Highlands & The Islands 60.8 
West Wales & The Valley 28.6 Highlands & The Islands 81.9 South Yorkshire 54.3 
South Yorkshire 27.5 Tees Valley & Durham 54.2 Tees Valley & Durham 39.3 
Northumberland & Tyne & 
Wear 
27.0 
Northumberland & Tyne & 
Wear 
52.3 
Northumberland & Tyne & 
Wear 
37.3 
Cornwall & Isles of Scilly 26.8 West Midlands 45.4 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
27.6 
West Midlands 26.5 Greater Manchester 44.0 South Western Scotland 26.3 
Cumbria 24.3 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
40.5 East Wales 24.2 
East Yorkshire & Northern 
Lincolnshire 
23.5 Cumbria 36.3 Greater Manchester 23.9 
South Western Scotland 22.5 Devon 36.3 Cumbria 23.2 
Eastern Scotland 20.3 Lincolnshire 35.5 West Yorkshire 23.1 
East Wales 18.6 Shropshire & Staffordshire 32.3 Lincolnshire 22.4 
Derbyshire & 
Nottinghamshire 
17.1 Lancashire 31.0 Eastern Scotland 21.7 
Devon 16.1 West Yorkshire 30.9 North Yorkshire 21.5 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 14.5 
Derbyshire & 
Nottinghamshire 
30.0 
Derbyshire & 
Nottinghamshire 
21.3 
West Yorkshire 10.1 South Western Scotland 27.3 West Midlands 21.2 
Lancashire 9.1 North Yorkshire 26.4 Devon 20.8 
North Yorkshire 8.6 Est Wales 25.1 Lancashire 20.3 
Lincolnshire 7.7 Inner London 22.2 North Eastern Scotland 20.2 
Herefordshire, 
Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire  
7.1 East Anglia 21.1 Cheshire 17.6 
Inner London 5.3 Eastern Scotland 21.0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
15.6 
North Eastern Scotland 4.1 North Eastern Scotland 20.6 East Anglia 14.6 
Kent 3.8 
Herefordshire, 
Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire 
20.5 Essex 13.7 
East Anglia 3.5 Cheshire 18.3 Dorset & Somerset 13.4 
Cheshire  3.3 Kent 17.6 Inner London 13.2 
Outer London 1.9 Outer London 16.6 Kent 12.7 
Essex 1.5 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 16.4 Outer London 12.4 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire 
& Bristol/Bath area 
1.4 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
16.0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire 
& Bristol/Bath area 
12.2 
Dorset & Somerset 1.4 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & 
Bristol/Bath area 
15.5 
Bedfordshire & 
Hertfordshire 
11.7 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 1.3 Essex 15.3 Shropshire & Staffordshire 11.4 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
1.2 Dorset & Somerset 15.0 
Herefordshire, 
Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire 
11.3 
Bedfordshire & 
Hertfordshire 
1.1 Surrey, East & West Sussex 14.4 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 11.3 
Surrey, East & West 
Sussex 
0.9 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 13.9 
Surrey, East & West 
Sussex 
10.7 
Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
0.8 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 
& Oxfordshire 
13.6 
Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire & 
Oxfordshire 
9.3 
Note: values are calculated as Structural Funds’ payments from the European Commission divided by regional 
population. * Objective 1 regions. Source: DG Regional Policy.  
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A2 EU investment strategies in Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire 
 
Data from the European Commission allow to reconstruct the development strategies of Cornwall 
and South Yorkshire and the proportion of allocated funds during 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. In 
such a way, it is possible to observe how Objective 1 and Phasing-in programmes have been 
designed prior to their implementation.  
The statistics on committed EU funds by the European Commission are displayed in Table A2.1. 
The total amounts of funds per capita are sub-divided by different fields of intervention. It can be 
noted that both Cornwall and South Yorkshire’s 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes have 
allocated a great deal of resources to direct measures for employment promotion and training – 
mainly through the European Social Fund (ESF). These initiatives were included within the 
strategic goal ‘Developing people’ of the Single Programming Document (SPD) for Cornwall 
(South West Observatory Skills and Learning, 2008), and the priority theme ‘Building a learning 
region which promotes equity, employment and social inclusion’ of the SPD for South Yorkshire 
(Government Office for Yorkshire and The Humber, 2008). Cornwall had planned to spend up to 
€28.7 per person every year during 2000-2006 in these themes, while South Yorkshire had 
earmarked up to €37.7 per inhabitant. The total ESF allocations for 2000-2006 were €101m for 
Cornwall (total EU funds in the region: €520m), and €365m for South Yorkshire (total EU funds 
in the region: €1,212m). 
ESF-financed policies were not the only measures potentially contributing to reduce the number 
of people claiming unemployment benefits in the two regions. Projects focusing on development 
goals related to infrastructure, R&D and innovation, human capital, business development, and 
other investment areas, may have also produced significant employment boosts. Most 
interventions in these fields were mainly intended to promote economic growth.  
In the 2007-2013 programming period, the total funds to South Yorkshire’s operational 
programme decreased by almost 70 percent. This reduction involved all investment pillars, 
including the proportion of resources directly promoting employment – calculated as the sum of 
‘lifelong learning, training, entrepreneurship’, ‘services for employment and training’, ‘social 
inclusion’, and ‘access to employment and sustainability’ – which went down to €20.2 per person, 
i.e. almost halved with respect to the previous period. In contrast, Cornwall’s effort to create new 
jobs and reduce labour market exclusion increased to €55 per person annually. 
  
- 93 -  
 
Table A2.1 
Committed EU funds by field of intervention in Cornwall and South Yorkshire, 2000-2006 & 2007-2013 
Field of Intervention 
Annual euros per capita 
Field of Intervention 
Annual euros per capita 
Cornwall 
South 
Yorkshire 
Cornwall 
South 
Yorkshire 
2000-2006 
    
2007-2013    
1. Transport Infrastructure 7.2 9.6 1. Transport infrastructure 8.7 2.1 
2. Telecommunication, energy & environment infrastructure 21.5 8.8 2. Telecommunication, energy & environment infrastructure 34.6 7.2 
3. Social Infrastructure 1.1 2.1 3. Social infrastructure 0.1 - 
4. Research, technological development & innovation 10.0 5.6 4. Research, technological development & innovation 37.8 11.4 
5. Tourism & culture 6.3 - 5. Tourism & culture 2.0 0.1 
6. Planning & rehabilitation 6.4 34.5 6. Urban & rural regeneration 3.8 5.4 
7. Large business organisations 19.3 3.4 7. Investment in firms 15.1 6.5 
8. SMEs & the craft sector 13.8 25.4 8. Lifelong learning, training & entrepreneurship 18.7 7.7 
9. Workforce flexibility & entrepreneurial activity 13.8 10.3 9. Services for employment & training 2.3 0.4 
10. Social inclusion 4.9 5.1 10. Social inclusion 14.9 4.5 
11. Labour market policy & labour market actions for women 5.9 10.9 11. Access to employment & sustainability 20.8 6.7 
12. Educational & vocational training 4.2 11.3 12. Human capital 1.7 0.6 
13. Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, development of rural areas 24.0 - 13. Institutional capacity 0.1 0.1 
Total 138.3 127.0 Total 160.4 52.5 
Note: values are calculated from European Commission’s committed allocations of EU funds by axis, divided by regional population. Source: DG Regional Policy. 
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A3 UK rates of unemployment and unemployment benefit 
claimants 
 
 
Figure A3.1 
UK rates of unemployment and unemployment benefit claimants 
 
 
Source: Nomis. 
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A4 Unemployment and GDP per capita in English regions 
 
Figures A4.1 and A4.2 describe the level and growth of unemployment and per capita GDP of 
English NUTS2 regions during the period considered in the empirical analysis. Figure A4.1 
illustrates the percentage of unemployment benefit claimants and the level of income before 2000. 
The two case-studies for the counterfactual analysis, Cornwall and South Yorkshire, were among 
the regions with the highest percentage of unemployed people, and among the poorest regions in 
the country. Figure A4.2 suggests that during the 2000-2013 period Cornwall has been one of the 
top performing regions in England both in terms of unemployment reduction – a decrease by over 
3 percent – and in terms of economic growth – an increase by over 2.8 percent. Conversely, South 
Yorkshire’s variation of unemployment and per capita GDP during the same period has been 
similar to that of most English regions. South Yorkshire experienced one of the largest 
unemployment reductions and fastest GDP pc growth during the 2000-2006 period; however, the 
following years have been characterised by growing unemployment – over 9 percent increase – 
and an economic recession – over 1.2 percent reduction in GDP per capita.   
 
Figure A4.1 
Unemployment and GDP per capita levels, English regions 
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Figure A4.2 
Unemployment and GDP per capita growth, English regions 
  
Source: own elaboration with Nomis and OECD data. 
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A5 Descriptive statistics – wards 
 
Table A5.1 
Descriptive statistics, ward variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Ward residents in 1991 8519 5267 3779 
Unemployment (1996-2014) 161,240 1.871 1.555 
Unemployment growth (1996-2014) 152,260 0.0056 0.401 
Unemployment growth (1996-1999) 25,537 -0.177 0.204 
Unemployment growth (2000-2014) 126,723 0.0424 0.420 
Unemployment growth (2000-2006) 59,095 -0.0181 0.329 
Unemployment growth (2007-2014) 67,628 0.0954 0.480 
Variables used for PSM:     
Unemployment (1996-1999 average)a 8518 2.689 1.857 
1991 Census:    
Employed people in agriculture, forestry and fishinga 8519 3.357 2.822 
Employed people in mininga 8519 2.478 1.422 
Employed people in manufacturinga  8519 15.50 3.663 
Employed people in constructiona 8519 6.817 1.455 
Employed people in distribution and cateringa  8519 18.71 2.609 
Employed people in transportationa 8519 5.436 1.630 
Employed people in banking and financea 8519 10.78 3.336 
Employed people in other servicesa 8519 25.11 4.402 
Full-time workersa 8519 72.81 10.09 
Female employmenta 8519 10.24 1.469 
Inactive populationb 8519 32.80 5.996 
People whose ethnic group is whiteb 8519 96.15 8.473 
Migrants (within/between wards or from outside UK)b 8519 10.19 4.022 
Studentsb 8519 3.102 1.417 
Note: a / percentage of economically active population; b / percentage of residents. 
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A6 Pre-treatment characteristics 
 
Table A6.1 
Pre-treatment characteristics (1992-1999),  
unemployment benefit claimants as dependent variable 
Variable Source 
Pre-treatment averages 
Cornwall 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
Englande 
South 
Yorkshire 
Synthetic  
South 
Yorkshire 
Englandf 
Euros of Structural Funds per capitaa DG Regio 26.74 20.62 11.08 28.69 25.92 11.08 
Per capita GDPa OECD 10,980 15,665 18,054 13,840 19,640 18,155 
Population in employmentb LFS LAD 53.23 53.77 58.57 52.20 53.69 58.51 
Economically inactive populationc LFS LAD 41.14 40.32 36.51 41.04 39.73 36.53 
Female employmentb LFS LAD 21.33 22.75 23.73 22.24 22.61 23.77 
Full-time workersc LFS LAD 52.35 52.92 56.72 49.47 51.58 56.61 
Self-employed workersb LFS LAD 11.64 7.54 7.64 5.17 5.41 7.42 
Long-term unemployment as % of 
unemploymenta 
Eurostat 26.18 27.07 25.13 29.98 35.41 25.27 
Sectorial shares (percentage) 
       
Agriculture & Mininga Eurostat 6.28 3.07 2.39 0.6 0.88 2.19 
Manufacturinga Eurostat 11.63 16.48 16.59 18.95 18.48 16.85 
Construction a Eurostat 5.41 4.87 4.64 5.61 4.83 4.64 
Wholesale & retail tradea Eurostat 25.80 25.34 25.90 27.33 25.66 25.95 
Financial & insurance activitiesa Eurostat 9.68 11.97 14.25 11.78 12.50 14.33 
Real Estate; scientific activities; public 
administration and defense; educationa 
Eurostat 31.37 33.62 30.11 30.68 31.06 30.08 
Education and training 
       
16-19 year old in full-time educationb LFS LAD 3.37 3.16 3.33 2.73 2.92 3.31 
Working age population with NVQ 3 or 
aboved 
LFS LAD 33.88 33.97 36.37 31.45 33.42 36.35 
Working age population receiving job related 
trainingb 
LFS LAD 10.64 11.79 12.14 12.62 12.36 12.20 
Regional Quality of Government (QoG)a QoG Institute 1.15 1.04 0.92 0.69 0.82 0.90 
Note: Sectorial shares and LSF LAD variables are calculated as percentage of working age population. a / average for 
1995-1999; b / average for 1992-1999; c / average for 1993-1999; d / average for 1994-1999; e / average for all English 
regions excluding Merseyside and South Yorkshire; f / average for all English regions excluding Merseyside and 
Cornwall. 
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Table A6.2 
Pre-treatment characteristics (1995-1999),  
GDP pc as dependent variable 
Variable Source 
Pre-treatment averages 
Cornwall 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
Englanda 
South 
Yorkshire 
Synthetic  
South 
Yorkshire 
Englandb 
Euros of Structural Funds per capita DG Regio 26.74 27.32 11.08 28.69 28.63 11.08 
Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP Eurostat 10.83 10.99 11.6 8.14 10.8 11.5 
Patent applications per 10000 inhabitants Eurostat 0.40 0.44 0.90 0.29 0.34 0.89 
Human resources in science and technology Eurostat 26.16 25.74 33.90 25.09 26.32 33.86 
Km of roads per squared km of land Eurostat 2.13 2.07 3.25 3.80 2.77 3.31 
Population in employment LFS LAD 53.23 53.68 58.57 52.20 52.21 58.51 
Economically inactive population LFS LAD 41.14 39.75 36.51 41.04 41.13 36.53 
Long-term unemployment as % of 
unemployment 
Eurostat 26.18 30.96 25.13 29.98 35.96 25.27 
Sectorial shares (percentage) 
       
Agriculture & Mining Eurostat 6.28 2.16 2.39 0.6 0.71 2.19 
Manufacturing Eurostat 11.63 19.73 16.59 18.95 19.03 16.85 
Construction Eurostat 5.41 5.37 4.64 5.61 5.41 4.64 
Wholesale & retail trade Eurostat 25.80 24.51 25.90 27.33 24.65 25.95 
Financial & insurance activities Eurostat 9.68 8.74 14.25 11.78 10.51 14.33 
Real Estate; scientific activities; public 
administration and defense; education 
Eurostat 31.37 31.76 30.11 36.68 33.21 30.08 
Education and training 
       
16-19 year old in full-time education LFS LAD 3.37 3.17 3.33 2.95 3.21 3.31 
Working age population with NVQ 3 or above LFS LAD 33.88 31.34 36.37 31.45 32.28 36.35 
Working age population receiving job related 
training 
LFS LAD 10.64 11.99 12.14 12.62 11.78 12.20 
Regional Quality of Government (QoG) QoG Institute 1.14 0.97 0.92 0.65 0.85 0.90 
Note: Sectorial shares and LSF LAD variables are calculated as percentage of working age population. a / average for all 
English regions excluding Merseyside and South Yorkshire; b / average for all English regions excluding Merseyside and 
Cornwall. 
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A7 Synthetic control method, regional weights  
 
Table A7.1 
Regional weights in the synthetic Cornwall and South Yorkshire 
 Dependent variable: 
Region 
Unemployment GDP per capita 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
Synthetic 
South 
Yorkshire 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
Synthetic 
South 
Yorkshire 
Weight Weight Weight Weight 
Tees Valley & Durham 0.088 0.365 0.605 0.58 
Northumberland  0.125 0.100 0 0.403 
Cumbria 0 0 0 0 
Cheshire  0 0 0 0 
Greater Manchester 0 0.156 0 0 
Lancashire 0 0 0 0 
East Yorkshire 0 0.251 0 0 
North Yorkshire 0 0 0 0 
West Yorkshire 0 0 0 0 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 0 0 0 0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & 
Northamptonshire 
0 0 0 0 
Lincolnshire 0 0 0.195 0.001 
Herefordshire Worcestershire  0 0 0 0 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 0 0 0 0 
West Midlands 0.212 0 0 0 
East Anglia 0 0 0 0 
Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 0 0 0 0 
Essex 0 0 0 0 
Inner London 0 0.128 0 0 
Outer London 0 0 0 0 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 0 0 0 0 
Surrey East & West Sussex 0 0 0 0 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 0 0 0 0 
Kent 0 0 0 0.016 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Bristol/Bath 
area 
0 0 0 0 
Dorset & Somerset 0 0 0 0 
Devon 0.575 0 0.2 0 
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A8  Synthetic control method, robustness tests 
Figure A8.1 
‘Leave-neighbours-out’ test 
Cornwall vs. synthetic Cornwall, excluding Devon 
 
Region Synthetic CW 
Weight 
Tees Valley & Durham 0 
Northumberland  0.052 
Cumbria 0.305 
Cheshire  0 
Greater Manchester 0 
Lancashire 0 
East Yorkshire 0 
North Yorkshire 0 
West Yorkshire 0 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & Northamptonshire 0 
Lincolnshire 0 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire  
0 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 0 
West Midlands 0.485 
East Anglia 0 
Bedfordshire &Hertfordshire 0 
Essex 0 
Inner London 0 
Outer London 0 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 0 
Surrey East & West Sussex 0 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 0 
Kent 0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Bristol/Bath 
area 
0 
Dorset and Somerset 0.159 
 
South Yorkshire vs. synthetic South Yorkshire, excluding regions neighbouring SY 
 
Region Synthetic SY 
Weight 
Tees Valley & Durham 0.434 
Northumberland  0.026 
Cumbria 0.124 
Cheshire  0 
Greater Manchester 0.237 
Lancashire 0 
Leicestershire, Rutland & Northamptonshire 0 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire & 
Warwickshire  
0 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 0 
West Midlands 0 
East Anglia 0 
Bedfordshire &Hertfordshire 0 
Essex 0 
Inner London 0.179 
Outer London 0 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire 0 
Surrey East & West Sussex 0 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 0 
Kent 0 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Bristol/Bath 
area 
0 
Dorset and Somerset 0 
Devon 0 
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Figure A8.2 
Placebo treatment in 1996 
Panel A: Cornwall Panel B: South Yorkshire 
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A9 Balancing tests, propensity score matching 
 
Table A9.1  
Balancing tests, propensity score matching for ward-level analysis 
 Cornwall South Yorkshire 
  Mean t-test Mean t-test 
Variable 
Treated 
(Cornwall) 
Control 
(matched) 
t     p>t 
Treated  
(South 
Yorkshire) 
Control 
(matched) 
t    p>t 
Unemployment (1996-1999) 3.72 3.72 0.00 0.998 4.24 4.46 -0.75 0.453 
1991 variables:         
Employed people in agriculture, 
forestry and fishinga 
7.40 6.81 0.62 0.536 0.55 0.59 -0.3 0.768 
Employed people in mininga 2.16 2.43 -0.64 0.521 4.77 5.08 -0.52 0.606 
Employed people in 
manufacturinga  
8.67 8.39 0.6 0.550 15.62 15.05 0.88 0.379 
Employed people in constructiona 8.62 8.20 1.03 0.302 7.20 7.02 0.59 0.559 
Employed people in distribution 
and cateringa  
21.79 22.54 -0.84 0.404 18.48 17.93 0.91 0.363 
Employed people in 
transportationa 
4.45 3.93 1.47 0.142 5.82 5.45 0.9 0.369 
Employed people in banking and 
financea 
6.78 6.60 0.49 0.626 4.57 4.75 -0.73 0.469 
Employed people in other 
servicesa 
26.44 26.78 -0.36 0.723 22.70 22.84 -0.13 0.896 
Self-employed workersa 11.25 10.94 0.51 0.607 4.09 3.98 0.43 0.669 
Full-time workersa 57.91 57.57 0.27 0.786 50.87 51.63 -0.73 0.466 
Female employmenta 21.38 21.39 -0.03 0.979 21.01 21.20 -0.93 0.356 
Inactive populationb 38.38 38.93 -0.66 0.511 35.39 35.64 -0.35 0.724 
People whose ethnic group is 
whiteb 
99.49 99.44 1.19 0.237 97.22 98.01 -1.13 0.261 
Migrants (within/between wards 
or from outside UK)b 
10.39 10.93 -1.18 0.238 9.02 9.96 -1.76 0.081 
Studentsb 3.17 3.11 0.29 0.768 2.73 2.53 0.82 0.411 
no of wards 134 134     94 94     
Note: a / percentage of economically active population; b / percentage of residents. 
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A10 Fixed effects model, sample of English regions 
Table A10.1 
EU funds, unemployment, and economic growth in English regions 
 Dep. Variable: Δ Unemployment bc Δ ln GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged unemployment bc -0.129*** -0.135*** -0.135***    
 
 (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0114)     
Lagged ln GDP per capita    -0.321*** -0.314*** -0.250*** -0.319*** 
    
(0.0366) (0.0345) (0.0364) (0.0372) 
EU funds per capita -6.35e-05   0.000166**   0.000166* 
 
(0.000201)  (6.89e-05)  (9.51e-05) 
Objective 1 regions  -0.114*** -0.0463***  0.00587* 0.00189* 0.00506 
  (0.0351) (0.0162)  (0.00331) (0.00114) (0.00407) 
(Obj1 regions) x (EU funds per 
capita)         0.000141** 
         
(6.05e-05) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 536 536 500 507 507 507 507 
R-squared 0.939 0.941 0.940 0.790 0.790 0.790 0.791 
NUTS2 regions 30 30 28 30 30 28 30 
Note: Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: share of tertiary education 
degree holders in the regional workforce, share of agricultural employment, share of employed people in manufacturing, stock of total 
motor-roads per inhabitant, patent applications per 10000 inhabitants. Cornwall and South Yorkshire excluded from sample in 
specifications (3) and (6). 
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Abstract  
  
Transport infrastructure investment is a cornerstone of growth-promoting strategies. However, 
the link between infrastructure investment and economic performance remains unclear. This may 
be a consequence of overlooking the role of government institutions. This paper assesses the 
connection between regional quality of government and the returns of different types of road 
infrastructure in the regions of the European Union. The results unveil the influence of regional 
quality of government on the economic returns of transport infrastructure. In weak institutional 
contexts, investment in motorways – the preferred option by governments –  yields significantly 
lower returns than the more humble secondary roads. Government institutions also affect the 
returns of transport maintenance investment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure investment has always been considered key for economic growth and has been one 
of the cornerstones of regional development strategies in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. 
So intense has the focus on infrastructure been that formerly lagging regions have become leaders 
in transport infrastructure endowment. After 20 years of intensive European investment in 
transport infrastructure, Spain had the largest motorway network among the first 15 members of 
the EU, while Portugal leads in kms per GDP. The United Kingdom came last in the latter two 
rankings.  
However, whether efforts to promote greater economic, social and territorial cohesion by 
developing new transport infrastructure have delivered the expected economic results has come 
under considerable scrutiny. Recent scholarly literature has underlined that the returns of transport 
infrastructure investment have been more limited than that of expenditures in other development 
axes, such as human capital and innovation (Rodríguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2004; Crescenzi, 2005; 
Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). But why this is the case is still unclear.   
One possible explanation posits that changes in accessibility deriving from new roads may benefit 
the economic core at the expenses of the periphery. This concept has been popularised in recent 
years by New Economic Geography (NEG) theories (Puga & Venables, 1997). A different 
possibility, which we explore in this paper, is that the returns of infrastructure investment are 
mediated by the quality of regional government institutions co-responsible for ensuring the 
selection and realization of specific projects. The local institutional environment in which 
investments are made will affect the scale and type of new infrastructure investments and, 
consequently, their economic returns. Poor institutions enhance the opportunities for private gain 
at the expense of a sound provision of public goods (Acemoglu & Dell, 2010). In weak 
government quality conditions new investment in transport infrastructure may respond more to 
political and individual interests than to economic and collective ones (Crain & Oakley, 1995; 
Henisz, 2002). Institutional failure is at the heart of a greater propensity to finance ‘flagship’ and 
large-scale transport projects (i.e. motorways, high-speed rail), more appealing to incumbent 
politicians seeking re-election (Rodríguez-Pose, 2000; Cantarelli et al., 2010), at the expense of 
less flashy ‘ordinary’ transport investments (i.e. secondary roads, freight railways). It may also 
lead to a more prominent role of political and business pressure groups, resulting in problems 
such as collusion at tender-stage, misrepresentation of costs and benefits and of the time needed 
for implementation (Kenny, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2009; World Bank, 2011).  
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The role of institutions and of government quality as mediators of the returns of public policy – 
while increasingly acknowledged (e.g. Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Esfahani & Ramírez, 2003) – has 
seldom been proven empirically. To our knowledge, there are no analyses which have examined 
the triple link between quality of government, infrastructure investments, and economic growth 
for the European regions. We address this gap by analysing the influence of transport 
infrastructure on economic growth both independently and in interaction with specific 
institutional characteristics. Our main hypothesis is that investing in transport infrastructure in 
poor or inadequate local government institutional conditions can seriously undermine the returns 
of the investment.  
We use the annual variation in the network of motorways and in all other regional roads as our 
proxy for transport infrastructure investment. Investing in these two infrastructure categories 
implies significantly different levels of visibility, costs, and potential economic returns. While 
additional investment in motorways requires a larger financial effort and often aims to improve 
inter-regional connectivity, investment in other roads tends to be substantially cheaper and 
generally targets local bottlenecks and the strengthening of internal mobility within a region. 
Similarly, investments in new infrastructure may be preferred to the maintenance of existing 
infrastructure. Hence, in areas with a weaker quality of government, where the interests of 
individual actors may prevail over those of society as a whole, motorways – with their greater 
political visibility and greater corruption opportunities – may be regarded as a more attractive 
option than secondary roads or road maintenance expenditure.  
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 166 EU regions during the period 1995-2009. Our 
estimation method (panel fixed effects) controls for unobservable time-invariant regional features 
and time-specific common shocks, as well as for the key time-varying regional growth 
determinants, such as innovation capacity, human capital and industrial structure.  
The results of the analysis provide little evidence of a positive correlation between regional 
investments in motorways and economic growth, even if associated with better regional 
government institutions. In contrast, variations in the endowment of other roads display a stronger 
connection with regional economic performance in regions with higher quality regional 
governments. Also the maintenance of transport infrastructure is positively associated with 
economic growth only in regions with sound government institutions. 
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2. Infrastructure, institutions and economic growth 
 
Infrastructure and economic growth 
 
A minimum level of public capital investment is essential for economic activity (Button et al., 
1995). Infrastructure promotes local accessibility and leads to improvements in the provision of 
services, to reductions in production costs, to enhanced productivity (Biehl, 1991; Moreno et al., 
1997), and to the relocation of economic activity, facilitating economic growth. However, once a 
necessary basic threshold of infrastructure provision is reached, the impact of additional public 
investment remains uncertain. A recent report claims that all OECD countries are already beyond 
that threshold and that additional road expansions may have limited effects on economic 
performance (OECD, 2009a).  Timing is also crucial, as the returns to infrastructure investment 
tend to be positive when new roads are built, but the positive impact fades away for incremental 
expansions of existing transport connections (Fernald, 1999). 
The notion of a positive linear effect of transport infrastructure investment on aggregate 
productivity (Aschauer, 1989; Munnel, 1990) has also been strongly challenged by subsequent 
economic research, both for the US (Holtz-Eakin & Schwartz 1995; Kelejian & Robertson, 1997) 
and Europe (Cappelen et al., 2003; Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). In the case of Europe, 
single country analyses (Cadot et al., 1999; Stephan, 2000), as well as cross-country investigations 
(Cappelen et al., 2003; Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012) report much lower elasticities than 
those found by Aschauer (1989) or even insignificant coefficients.  
The explanations as to why the returns of additional investments in infrastructure have not lived 
up to expectations vary. Some contributions have analysed the dynamic response over time of 
regional GDP to public spending in transport infrastructure. From this perspective, improvements 
in transport networks represent powerful growth stimuli only at specific moments, but have 
limited effects in other time periods. Leduc and Wilson (2013) demonstrated that motorway 
investment in US States had no impact on economic growth while road constructions were 
underway, an effect which became positive once the new infrastructure became operational. Other 
studies have shown, however, that most positive growth effects are short-lived. The connection 
between infrastructure and regional growth in Europe tends to vanish two or three years after it 
becomes available (Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; OECD 2009b).  
The differential impact of public capital on productivity, wages and employment has also been 
the centre of attention. According to Dalenberg & Partridge (1997), public capital serves as a 
household amenity that increases labour supply with no impact on productivity. In their view, the 
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weak productivity of US highways is explained by the fact that households may be willing to 
accept lower wages to live in places where infrastructure is more developed. In this case, the 
amenity effect may dominate the productivity effect, meaning that infrastructure investment has 
little or no effect on growth. 
Diverse conditions across different types of regions may also affect the returns of infrastructure 
(Fujita & Thisse, 2002). In particular, NEG analyses have focused on the role of different types 
of roads. Puga and Venables (1997), Puga (2002) and Ottaviano (2008) have distinguished 
between the economic effect of long-distance inter-regional transport infrastructure, which affects 
overall ‘accessibility’ and provokes further economic concentration, and short-distance or intra-
regional infrastructure, that generally facilitates the diffusion of public services and the formation 
of human capital within peripheral regions. Studies outside the NEG framework focusing on core-
periphery differences in factor endowments have reached similar conclusions (Vickerman, 1995; 
Cappelen et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004).  
 
Governance and infrastructure investment 
 
One crucial factor behind the returns of transport infrastructure which has so far attracted limited 
attention in the empirical literature is linked to the institutional conditions in each territory. The 
system of incentives and constraints shaped by local institutions and the efficiency of the local 
political administration influence the total returns to investment in transport infrastructure (Crain 
& Oakley, 1995; Henisz, 2002; Acemoglu & Dell, 2010). Political and institutional factors may 
influence both infrastructure spending and its economic returns at every phase of the investment 
(Esfahani & Ramirez, 2003). From the planning and selection of transport projects to their 
implementation, the characteristics of the local governance system play an important role in 
determining future efficiency. The link between transport infrastructure investment and the 
planning system, the need for large budgets, the high number of actors involved, and the difficulty 
in applying effective control mechanisms make the transport sector particularly vulnerable to 
political interference (Wachs, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Cantarelli et al., 2010), corruption (Tanzi 
& Davoodi, 1997; 1998; Kenny, 2006), and collusion (World Bank, 2011). The quality of local 
institutions determines the risk of moral hazard and, consequently, the capacity of decisions on 
infrastructure investment to deliver.  
In the following subsections, we develop the conceptual and theoretical arguments at the base of 
our hypothesis at each stage of the infrastructure building process and posit that the economic 
returns of transport infrastructure investments are deeply affected by the presence of deficient 
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governance. We integrate some significant case-studies drawn from the European context in the 
discussion. 
Investment planning and project selection: political economy factors inflating transport 
investment 
Inadequate political institutions may negatively affect the economic returns to transport 
infrastructure investment well before the money is actually spent. Governments are directly 
responsible for appropriate infrastructure planning and rigorous project selection, making 
transport infrastructure planning and financing fundamentally a political topic. In theory, 
decision-makers should base their decisions on rigorous cost-benefit considerations. However, 
decision-making on new transport investment in European countries is “generally politicized, 
rarely fully transparent, and there is little ex-post analysis on whether projects and policies meet 
expectations” (Short & Knopp, 2005: 363). Even when the investment is preceded by ex-ante 
impact studies, the secrecy which frequently surrounds forecasting methods does not guarantee 
the absence of deliberate cost-benefit misrepresentations (Wachs, 1989; Short & Knopp, 2005; 
Cantarelli et al., 2010). Incumbent planners may “purposely spin scenarios of success and gloss 
over the potential for failure” (Flyvbjerg, 2009: 350) of transport projects in order to strengthen 
their own political positions.  
Infrastructure investment is very tangible and highly visible providing policy-makers with 
excellent opportunities for ribbon-cutting before elections with political considerations prevailing 
over solid economic valuation (Cadot et al., 2006). Vested political and economic interests can 
influence the activity of local administrations in weak institutional contexts, making the 
promotion of new large infrastructure projects preferable from a political perspective to investing 
in the maintenance of the old transport network or to the promotion of alternative, less ‘glitzy’ 
projects (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Kenny, 2007). Special interests and pork-barrel politics can 
drive infrastructure investment decisions at the expense of social welfare and economic efficiency 
(Cadot et al., 1999; Kemmerling & Stephan, 2008). In addition, mega-projects are riskier, due to 
long planning horizons, and more susceptible to cost miscalculations (Flyvbjerg, 2009): collusion 
and clientelism may also play an important role in this context (Cadot et al., 2006).  
Examples of political interest and/or weak local institutions leading to suboptimal infrastructure 
developments are plentiful. Many of those examples can be found in Spain. Substantial 
investments in motorways in the 1990s drove the catching-up process in transport infrastructure 
endowment. Yet, investment in infrastructure increased even further in the 2000s, when the road 
deficit relative to the countries in the core of Europe no longer existed (Bel, 2010). The wave of 
investment in motorways before the start of the crisis was mostly realised through toll road 
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concessions that set favorable conditions for private groups (Acerete et al., 2009). The Spanish 
entrepreneurial sector threw its considerable economic weight in order to inflate investments in 
new roads, investments which were seldom – if ever – preceded by accurate cost-benefit analyses 
and by the drafting of financial and economic long-term plans (Bel, 2010). The resulting roads 
often became ‘white elephants’ of questionable economic and public utility (Bel, 2010). Such is 
the case of the toll motorway connecting Madrid and Toledo (AP-41), inaugurated in 2006 with 
a forecasted traffic intensity of over 25,000 vehicles per day. The actual figures have been 
nowhere close,35 as the new motorway has not been able to divert enough traffic away from its 
‘competitor’, the pre-existing toll-free Madrid-Toledo motorway. The Spanish high-speed 
railway network can also be considered a rich source of ‘white elephants’ (Albalate & Bel, 2012). 
Another highly controversial project is the ‘Vasco da Gama’ bridge in Lisbon (Portugal), which 
opened to traffic in 1998 and is the longest bridge in Europe. It is the second bridge over the river 
Tagus, built in theory to alleviate the highly congested ‘25 de Abril’ bridge. The project was 
financed using government grants, private resources, loans from the European Investment Bank 
and the Cohesion Fund, with the EU being the main contributor. The project was strongly 
promoted by the Ministry of Public Works of Portugal, supported by 17 municipal governments 
of the Lisbon metropolitan area and quickly approved by the European Commission, despite a 
dedicated commission identifying at least two other alternative and cheaper river crossings 
connecting more densely populated areas (Bukowski, 2004; Painvin, 2009). Partially as a result 
of its location the bridge failed to live up to expectations (Melo, 2000; Painvin, 2009). The 
estimated traffic of 132,000 daily vehicles never materialised. The Daily traffic across the bridge 
averaged only some 55,650 vehicles in 2015, and traffic has been declining since it peaked at 
about 67,500 vehicles in 2004 (for both statistics see INE, 2017). The political desire to build the 
longest bridge in Europe and the need to spend European funds quickly prevailed over the 
necessity to reduce congestion in the city by using a more suitable alternative location for the 
project. 
Investment planning and project selection: lack of resources, corruption and collusion  
Superfluous or wrongly planned infrastructure investment may also be the result of inadequate 
policy-making and scarce economic resources. In cases when the responsibility for investment 
planning is decentralised, regional and local authorities may lack sufficient financial leverage to 
implement investments with higher returns. If political decentralization is not matched by an 
adequate devolution of economic power, financial instability and coordination problems may 
                                                          
35 According to official data by Spain’s Ministerio de Fomento (2017), the number of daily vehicles peaked at 2,800 in 
2008. The number of users declined to a paltry 881 in 2016. 
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arise. In Italy, for example, the 2001 constitutional reform transferred a large share of 
responsibility for the programming, planning, and managing road development to the regions. 
However, Italian regional governments have never had sufficient financial resources to properly 
exercise this role (Casadio & Paccagnella, 2011). As a consequence, the regions have either been 
forced to further decentralize powers to the provinces or to create new ad hoc organizations for 
the management and realization of road investments (Marangoni & Marinelli, 2011). 
Next to a lack of financing capacity, local corruption is also one of the main factors behind the 
inefficient planning of public capital spending. In competitive auctions economic efficiency is 
best ensured when infrastructure projects are contracted to the companies presenting the best bid. 
This process requires a great degree of transparency. However, the auctions’ outcome is often 
perverted by corruption and collusion. In weak institutional environments bribery can lure 
government officials to select suboptimal bids or, in cases of limited contractors, collusion may 
be the outcome.  
Several studies have documented the existence of cartels controlling construction bids in 
European countries. A 2002 enquiry unveiled frauds, unjustified subsidies and bribery of vast 
proportions from a state-corporate network monopolizing the construction sector in the 
Netherlands (Van der Heuvel, 2005). In Italy the responsibility for managing auctions36 on 
highway and roads concessions belongs to the regions, with construction companies often 
lamenting a supposed lack of neutrality in the award of contracts. In the South of the country at 
least one third of projects are contracted to firms with close links to the awarding administration 
(Bentivogli et al., 2011). Corruption and collusion in the transport sector are severe in many 
Eastern European countries as well (Kenny, 2006). In Romania a cartel of firms used to raise the 
price of road construction tenders by up to 30 percent over their market equilibrium level (Oxford 
Business Group, 2004). Numerous cases of pre-defined tender prices have also emerged in 
Slovakia (OECD, 2006) and Poland (Cienski, 2013).  
Project implementation: cost overruns and delays  
Cost overruns and delays tend to be the norm in the implementation of transport infrastructure 
projects in weak institutional contexts. According to Flyvbjerg et al. (2005), an underestimation 
of the total costs of large-scale infrastructure projects happens nine out of ten times with cost 
overruns in road projects on average 20 percent above initial predictions. Political-economic 
factors are generally regarded as the main explanation for cost overruns (Cantarelli et al., 2010). 
                                                          
36 The national level is responsible for a few projects of national relevance (grandi opere), while the regional level 
manages all other auctions. 
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In areas with weak institutions and governance systems, political and economic interest groups 
often voluntarily misrepresent the costs and benefits of a project in order to facilitate its approval.  
Increases in the total costs of infrastructural projects may be also related to distortions taking 
place at the moment of their execution. Legal disputes – often resulting from clashes between 
local authorities and the company implementing the infrastructure – can cause severe delays. 
Finally, additional time and cost overruns can be originated by the incapacity of legal institutions 
(either national or local) to enforce the project’s procurement contracts, and by the lack of 
appropriate bureaucratic structures monitoring the execution of works. 
Such conditions are more prevalent in areas where rent-seeking and/or the presence of organised 
crime abound. These endemic situations may transform what initially appear to be feasible 
projects into ‘white elephants’, as was the case of the renovation of the Italian ‘A3’ motorway 
between Salerno and Reggio Calabria. Works began in 1997 and were only completed in 2016. 
Meddling by organised crime – attested by the National Anti-Mafia Commission – together with 
lengthy court disputes have made costs skyrocket, with the Italian State providing compensation 
of over 300 million Euros to the private contractors for ‘unpredicted costs’ (Turano, 2011). 
 
Infrastructure investment in the periphery 
 
Political meddling, delays, and unexpected cost overruns are frequently much more serious in the 
European periphery than in the core. As indicated by Charron et al. (2014), government quality 
in most regions of the European periphery is well below par. Many of the regions in the periphery 
of Europe have limited experience in project planning, monitoring and evaluation, along with 
greater problems of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, inefficient rule of law 
and, last but not least, low government effectiveness. These conditions are perfect for the 
prevalence of political and/or individual criteria over economic and/or collective ones when 
designing, implementing, and exploiting infrastructure projects.  
The impact of infrastructure projects in peripheral regions suffers as a result. Political instability, 
weak accountability, and ineffective governments limit the impact of infrastructure (Crain & 
Oakley, 1995; Henisz, 2002; Esfahani & Ramirez, 2003), whereas lobbying and corruption inflate 
expenditures in publicly funded projects (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; World Bank, 2011). This is 
particularly the case of large-scale transport projects that are politically appealing but have the 
effect of worsening the financial burden of a region, increasing the risk of a default. This risk 
becomes more serious if corruption is widespread. In these circumstances, the financing of debt 
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is more costly and public investment projects less productive (Ciocchini et al., 2003; Ahlin & 
Pang, 2008).   
Institutional and government failures – more prevalent in peripheral areas – are therefore likely 
to emerge as barriers for the transformation of transport infrastructure investment into new 
economic activity and development. However, despite the salience of local institutions and 
government quality in determining how infrastructure shapes economic performance, only a 
limited number of empirical studies have attempted to assess the effect of institutions on the 
economic returns of infrastructure. Research by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Esfahani and 
Ramirez (2003) uncover a positive role of institutional quality on economic growth, acting 
through the channel of more efficient and productive investments in infrastructure. These analyses 
are, nevertheless, conducted at a national level, with no focus on how the quality of regional 
government shapes the returns of transport infrastructure investments in the regions of Europe. 
 
3. Model, data, and descriptive statistics 
 
Model specification and data 
 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to test whether the quality of regional government shapes the 
returns of infrastructure across the regions of Europe. Different typologies of transportation 
investment are considered. We distinguish between variations in the endowment of motorways 
and of other regional roads37, assuming that this distinction would also reflect a set of structural 
differences in the investment based on political preferences for different types of roads, the 
financial effort required to implement them, as well as their potential association with economic 
growth. The influence of institutions on transport infrastructure is modelled through the inclusion 
of an interaction term between our two proxies for investment in roads and the regional quality 
of government. The model takes the following form: 
 
∆ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 ∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑄𝑜𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿(∆ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟 × 𝑄𝑜𝐺)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂 𝛸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
                                                          
37 While in some EU countries national, not regional governments are responsible for the promotion of some types of 
transportation investments (e.g. motorways), local institutions may still indirectly influence national decisions by the 
central government about when, where, and how to invest in transport infrastructure. The capacity to invest in 
infrastructure depends very much on the level of decentralisation of each country, but the soft power to influence 
decision-makers is present everywhere and may indeed be more important than direct capacity to build different types 
of structure. 
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Where: 
the dependent variable ∆ ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the annual change of the natural logarithm 
of GDP in region i (i.e. the logarithmic approximation of the annual regional growth rate).  𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the annual lagged level of regional GDP.  
The main variables of interest in the model are the variation in the regional stock of transport 
infrastructure, the regional Quality of Government (QoG) index (Charron et al., 2011), and the 
interaction term between these two variables. 
𝛸𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of independent variables as controls, 𝜃𝑖 are regions-specific unobservable fixed 
effects, 𝜏𝑡 are year dummies, and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜂 are the parameters to be 
estimated. 
Given the absence of comparable data on regional expenditure for transport projects across 
countries, we use the change in the regional endowment of road infrastructure as our proxy for 
infrastructure investment. The number of kilometres of roads normalised by thousand inhabitants 
is our indicator of infrastructure. Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012) show that results of 
growth models assessing the effect of roads infrastructure remain substantially unaltered if 
alternative standardisations are employed – e.g. kilometres of road divided by regional GDP or 
by squared kilometres of land. The variable in first difference is assumed to reflect the regional 
variation in roads resulting from successfully completed new infrastructural investments38.  
Our variable accounts for all completed and fully functional infrastructure projects that can 
influence regional economic activity. It considers both publicly- and privately-funded 
improvements in transportation. However, being a measure of the ex-post outcome of the 
investment, it cannot account for time overruns in project construction or for financial waste from 
unfinished projects. More importantly, it does not capture all investments in road maintenance 
and improvement, which represent about 30 percent of total transport infrastructure investment in 
European countries during the 1995-2009 period (OECD, 2011). For this reason, an extension of 
our work considers a more complete model including a proxy for maintenance investment, only 
available, however, at the national level.  
                                                          
38 Given that the focus is on investments, the models do not include the stock of infrastructure among controls. If the 
places that witnessed the greatest improvement in QoG over 1995-2009 were places that historically had low levels 
of infrastructure and are only now catching up, then the initial stock of infrastructure could be considered an omitted 
variable in our model, potentially biasing the coefficient of the QoG Index and of the interaction term. However, a 
lower level of infrastructure endowment at the beginning of the period does not seem to be associated with greater 
improvements in government institutions. The pairwise correlation coefficient between average QoG growth and 
infrastructure endowment in 1995 is negative and insignificant for motorways (-0.055) and positive for other roads 
(0.444). 
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In order to assess the role of local institutions on transport investment, we interact our 
infrastructure investment proxies with the Quality of Government (QoG) index, a survey-based 
indicator of government quality in European regions compiled by the Quality of Government 
Institute at the University of Gothenburg in 2009. The index was built on the basis of 
questionnaires gauging the quality and impartiality of public services and the perception of 
corruption by local citizens. Responses to the survey have been aggregated at the NUTS1 or 
NUTS2 level for the EU-27. In a later work, Charron et al. (2014) have extended the QoG index 
to a longer time-span by integrating it with the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) 
(Kauffman et al., 2009), identifying in this way four different dimensions of government quality 
corresponding to the WBGI categories: control of corruption, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, and government accountability.  
We make use of the classification by the European Statistical Office (Eurostat) of regional roads 
into ‘motorways’39 – all dual carriageway roads – and ‘other roads’ – all other state, provincial, 
and communal roads. Motorways are more visible, costly to build, and normally connect urban 
centres across different regions. The development of local roads is much less politically 
glamorous and less likely to give rise to the same ‘hub-and-spoke’ effects as motorways. Both 
types of road investments may be influenced by the quality of regional and local governments. 
This influence can be exerted directly, if sub-national institutions are responsible to define the 
type of infrastructure to be constructed in their territory, or indirectly, if they condition decisions 
by the central or federal government about when, where, and how to invest in transport 
infrastructure. Due to the complexity of the multi-level decision making process for roadbuilding 
works at the level of the EU and the individual Member States, local institutions play a key role 
in the investment process. 
The vector of controls 𝛸𝑖,𝑡 includes a number of factors influencing economic growth. In line with 
the endogenous growth approach and, as customary in the scholarly literature, the model controls 
for innovation capacity, human capital, and labour market structure (OECD, 2009b; Crescenzi & 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Parent & LeSage, 2012; Capello & Lenzi, 2014). Transport connectivity 
improvements determine the potential for a region to absorb and transfer new knowledge and 
ideas from/to other places. The capability of the regional economy to translate internal and 
external knowledge and innovation into economic growth, in turn, is deeply affected by the social 
and institutional conditions of the areas where economic activities take place (Cohen & Levinthal 
                                                          
39 Eurostat defines a motorway as a “Road, specially designed and built for motor traffic, which  does not serve 
properties bordering on it, and which: a) Is provided, except at special points or temporarily, with separate 
carriageways for traffic in two directions, separated from each other, either by a dividing strip not intended for traffic, 
or exceptionally by other means; b) Has no crossings at the same level with any road, railway  or tramway track, or 
footpath; c) Is especially sign-posted as a motorway and is reserved for specific categories of road motor vehicles”.  
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1990; Fagerberg, 1994; Cooke et al., 1997). The composition of the labour force, the level of 
skills, and the quality of regional governments determine the capacity of regions to remain 
competitive over time by making the best possible use of the available inputs (Rodríguez-Pose & 
Crescenzi, 2008; Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015). We account for the main characteristics 
of the regional socio-economic environment shaping regional competitiveness by including three 
different control variables: a) the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications per 
thousand of regional inhabitants, as a measure of innovation capacity; b) the natural logarithm of 
the percentage of employed people with tertiary education, as a proxy for human capital 
availability; and c) the share of employed people in the primary sector as a proxy for the upgrading 
of local skills.  
In addition, transport infrastructure investment affects economic performance beyond the 
geographical boundaries within which it takes place (Cohen, 2010). When a reduction in transport 
costs helps connecting economic activities with new markets and boost trade new transport 
infrastructure generates positive spillovers. When new transport connections lead to a loss of 
productive resources due to the emigration of skilled labour, the spillover effects become 
negative. We control for spillovers from infrastructure investment in neighbouring regions with a 
spatial lag of the transport investment variable based on Euclidean distance.  
All controls are extracted from the Eurostat Regio database for the period 1995-2009 (see Table 
A1 for the details and sources of the variables included in the analysis).  
The study is performed on a sample of EU NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions determined by data 
availability. Having included in the model measures of regional government quality, we select for 
all countries the spatial scale with the highest political meaning and reflecting a real capacity to 
have an influence on infrastructure investment and maintenance decisions. We also consider the 
regional level with the greatest degree of autonomy for implementing infrastructure projects. This 
implies using NUTS1 regions for Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom and NUTS2 in 
the remaining countries: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Slovakia. The full sample covers 166 European 
regions. Data constraints (Greece, Denmark, Croatia, Bulgaria) or the absence of regional sub-
divisions at the NUTS2 level (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus), or lack 
of sub-national variation in the QoG Index (Finland, Ireland), prevent us from covering remaining 
EU countries. 
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Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the stock of kilometres of motorways and other roads in all countries in the 
sample at the beginning and at the end of the period of analysis. Spain and Portugal were the 
countries that witnessed the greatest expansion in their motorway network (Table 1). These two 
countries already enjoyed some of the most extended motorway network in Europe in 1995. Spain 
was second only to Austria for number of motorway kilometres per inhabitant. Between 1995 and 
2009, Austria and Spain followed very different roadbuilding strategies: while Austria favoured 
the development of secondary roads, Spain invested in motorways. In 2009 Spain was the 
European country with the highest endowment of motorways per capita: 2.45 times the average 
of the countries in the sample. Portugal followed with 1.69 times above the average (Table 1). 
Other countries with significant investments in roadbuilding, such as France, followed a more 
mixed strategy, combining new investments in motorways and in secondary roads.  
Overall, it is the European periphery where the bulk of the investment in motorways has taken 
place. Less developed regions have added around 1,400 kilometres more than regions of the EU 
core (Table 1). In more developed regions the transportation effort has been more geared towards 
secondary roads. Core regions have added more than 100,000 kilometres of secondary roads 
relative to peripheral regions during the period of analysis (Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Stock of motorways and other roads at the beginning and at the end of the period – countries in sample 
 Motorways Other roads 
 kilometres Per thousand inhabitants kilometres Per thousand inhabitants 
 1995 2009 Difference 1995 2009 1995 2009 Difference 1995 2009 
Austria 1,589 1,697 108 0.224 0.236 105,193 108,509 3,316 12.61 13.41 
Belgium 1,665 1,764 99 0.135 0.134 139,575 141,901 2,326 11.63 11.59a 
Czech Republic 361 730 369 0.032 0.068 55,243 54,990 -253 5.39 5.22 
Germany 11,371 12,826 1,455 0.138 0.171 217,590 218,156 566 2.67 2.78 
Spain 6,790 13,806 7,016 0.220 0.402 151,443 147,088 -4,355 5.18 4.71 
France 8,275 11,163 2,888 0.158 0.212 948,963 1,031,114 82,151 21.50 21.67 
Hungary 293 1,273 980 0.028 0.137 29,731 29,952b 221 3.33 3.41b 
Italy 6,473 6,661 188 0.159 0.171 159,066 173,946 14,880 5.92 4.57 
Netherlands 2,291 2,633 342 0.175 0.185 113,418 134,195 20,777 9.36c 10.21 
Poland 303 849 546 0.008 0.021 372,233 383,981 11,748 10.65 10.96 
Portugal 671 2,705 2,034 0.100 0.278      
Romania 113 321 208 0.004 0.013 72,746 81,392 8,646 3.18 3.80 
Sweden 1,279 1,885 606 0.122 0.169 96,713 96,598 -115 15.96 15.41 
Slovakia 219 400 181 0.051 0.088 42,388 43,489 1,101 7.25d 7.41 
United Kingdom 3,422 3,674 252 0.058 0.059 407,628 416,002 8,374 7.83 7.60 
All regions 44,375 59,682 15,307 0.119 0.164 2,590,193 2,962,697e 372,504 9.72 10.01 
Less developed regions 10,911 19,295 8,384 0.065 0.125 800,276 931,945e 131,669 7.61 9.64 
More developed regions 33,464 40,383 6,919 0.160 0.190 1,789,917 2,030,752 240,835 11.25 10.26 
Notes: Less developed regions are all regions part of the ‘Objective 1’ program during 2000-2006; more developed regions are all regions not eligible for ‘Objective 1’ support; the values are sums in 
‘kilometres’ columns and averages in ‘per thousand inhabitants’ columns. a / 2007 value. b / 2003 value. c / 1996 value. d / 1997 value. e / for Hungarian regions the sum is made using the 2003 value. 
Source: own calculation with Eurostat and QoG Institute data. 
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Figures 1 and 2 combine data on transport infrastructure investment with regional economic 
performance during the period of analysis. Regions are classified according to their average per 
capita growth rate between 1995 and 2009 and their investment in motorways and other roads 
respectively. The figures confirm that countries in the Iberian Peninsula recorded the largest 
increases in motorways, with Hungary following suit. Other regions, such as Limousin in France, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in Germany, or Småland and the Islands or West Sweden, both in 
Sweden, also witnessed considerable expansions in motorway endowment (Figure 1). The 
greatest improvements in secondary roads took place in the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, 
Romania, central France, and central and southern Italy (Figure 2). The highest growth rates took 
place in Central and Eastern Europe and fundamentally in Poland and Romania. The lowest 
growth happened in France, northern Italy, and western Germany (Figures 1 and 2).  
 
Figure 1 
Per capita GDP growth and motorways investment in the EU, 1995-2009 
 
 Source: own elaboration with OECD and Eurostat data  
  
- 122 - 
 
Figure 2 
Per capita GDP growth and other roads investment in the EU, 1995-2009 
 
Source: own elaboration with OECD and Eurostat data. 
 
4. Regression results 
 
The empirical model specified in Equation (1) is estimated by means of fixed effects panel 
methods with the inclusion of time dummies. Clustered standard errors correct for possible 
problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The effect of spatial autocorrelation (i.e., 
the lack of independence among the error terms of neighbouring observations) is minimised by 
introducing ‘spatially lagged’ variables among the controls that explicitly take into consideration 
the interactions between neighbouring regions, thereby minimising their effect on the residuals. 
The Moran’s I test confirms the lack of spatial auto-correlation in the residuals. In the 
interpretation, we focus on the relative sign and significance of the key coefficients rather than 
trying to discuss specific point estimates. 
Changes in motorway endowment as investment proxy are analysed first, with the results 
presented in Table 2. The first column refers to a baseline specification including initial GDP per 
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capita, a control for the regional population, region and time effects. In the following specification 
(column (2)), additional regressors are included to control for other key determinants of regional 
growth, i.e. the share of employment in the agricultural sector, a measure of regional innovative 
capacity (patent applications per thousand inhabitants), and a proxy for human capital endowment 
(the stock of highly educated individuals in the region). The model is completed with a spatially-
lagged variable controlling for transport investments in neighbouring regions, obtained by 
weighting the infrastructure variable by means of a Euclidean distance matrix.  
 
Infrastructure proxy: motorways 
 
The baseline specification presented in Table 2 column (1) shows that both motorway investment 
and government quality are important drivers of regional growth. The significant and positive 
coefficient of infrastructure is in line with the neoclassical perspective emphasizing the centrality 
of public capital accumulation for explaining variations in aggregate productivity (Aschauer, 
1989). However, when the model is completed with socioeconomic, educational, and innovation 
variables (column (2)) the coefficient of motorways investment sensibly reduces its magnitude 
and loses statistical significance. This is consistent with the hypothesis that development 
strategies centred on expenditure in new transport infrastructure may not be sufficient to stimulate 
the growth potential of every region (Vickerman, 1995).  
The insignificant correlation between motorways investment and regional growth can be 
interpreted in different ways. If transport infrastructure is provided optimally in EU regions, the 
marginal returns of additional expenditures is equal to zero and new investment would have no 
effects on growth. Another potential explanation it is to assume that new motorway investment 
attracts individuals willing to accept lower wages to live closer to transport junctions (Dalenberg 
& Partridge, 1997). In the latter case, the wage decrease may offset any positive economic 
stimulus derived from the investment, hence determining a zero effect on total productivity. 
Alternatively, it may be that local development dynamics in some territories may depend less on 
the construction of new infrastructure and more on regional processes of knowledge generation, 
the presence of a highly-educated workforce, and socio-institutional conditions (Crescenzi, 2005; 
Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). By contrast, the positive and significant coefficient of QoG 
is not altered by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, meaning that the quality of 
regional institutions is strongly correlated to the economic success of European regions.  
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Table 2 
Motorways investment, quality of government and regional growth 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Full Sample Less Developed Regions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged GDP  
-0.0302*** -0.0940*** -0.0422*** -0.123*** 
(0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0201) 
Investment in motorways  
0.126** 0.0847 -0.0286 -0.0478 
(0.0613) (0.0525) (0.0917) (0.0773) 
Quality of Government 
0.0318*** 0.0346*** 0.0636*** 0.0603*** 
(0.00500) (0.00466) (0.0107) (0.00788) 
(Investment in motorways) × (QoG) 
-0.118 -0.0663 -0.184 -0.110 
(0.0856) (0.0739) (0.146) (0.103) 
     
Spatial weight of investment in 
motorways 
 0.784***  0.409** 
 (0.162)  (0.187) 
Agricultural employment  
 -0.00285***  -0.00292*** 
 (0.000648)  (0.000829) 
Patent applications  
 0.00657***  0.00748*** 
 (0.00171)  (0.00279) 
Human capital 
 0.0158***  0.0417*** 
 (0.00469)  (0.0102) 
Regional population 
-4.46e-05*** -1.53e-05** -3.83e-05* 1.14e-06 
(1.21e-05) (7.52e-06) (2.06e-05) (1.12e-05) 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations  2,293 2,269 960 936 
R2 0.377 0.458 0.361 0.449 
NUTS regions 166 166 70 70 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. QoG = Quality of Government Index. 
 
Higher scores in the QoG index or its components (see Table A6 in the Appendix where estimates 
for the individual components of the index are reported) are, however, not associated with 
increases in the productivity of new motorways. In all specifications the coefficient of the 
interaction term is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent significance level. 
Therefore, while a more effective, accountable and transparent regional government is pivotal in 
the promotion of successful development policies, it may not suffice for translating new 
investments in motorways into higher growth. The spatially-weighted variable displays a positive 
and significant coefficient, implying that being surrounded by regions investing in new 
motorways generates network externalities which affect local growth positively. However, the 
results suggest that only some areas may be able to reap the advantages arising from the expansion 
of the motorway network, while other European regions may see their productive resources being 
lured away by new investments in motorways.  
Peripheral, isolated, and less economically advanced regions are most at risk of losing out from 
the potential agglomeration of economic activity linked to motorways. Hence, in order to gain a 
better understanding of how peripheral economies respond to changes in transportation 
endowment and government quality, we replicate the estimation of the model on a restricted 
sample of less developed regions – defined as those that were part of the ‘Objective 1’ of the EU 
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Structural Funds during the period 2000-2006. The less developed regions sample includes 70 
NUTS 1 and 2 regions mainly from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, as 
well as Eastern Germany, Southern Italy, Southern and Western Spain, Portugal, and Northern 
Sweden.  
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 report the estimation results for the less developed sample. 
Restricting the sample to the regions receiving the bulk of EU Structural Funds can suggest 
whether financial resources for the promotion of territorial Cohesion among EU regions have 
been allocated efficiently. For many years, the highest share of EU regional development funds 
was allotted to transport infrastructure (Rodríguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2004). However the belief that 
growth in peripheral regions is best fostered through investments in ‘hard’ transport infrastructure 
connecting isolated and remote areas with the European economic hubs is not supported by our 
empirical results. New investments in motorways in lagging regions have not been associated 
with higher levels of growth, as indicated by the negative and insignificant coefficient (column 
(3), Table 2). In addition, the negative and insignificant interaction term between new motorway 
investment and government quality highlights that higher investment in motorways is not 
significantly associated with regional growth, even if promoted by a relatively more efficient 
regional government.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that lagging areas need to strengthen local socio-institutional 
development pre-conditions in order to stimulate their competitive advantages, column (4) in 
Table 2 indicates that social and structural factors – including human capital assets, innovation 
capabilities, and local government quality – are far more accurate predictors of regional growth 
that investments in motorways. All of these variables display a higher correlation with growth, 
indicating their importance in regions that, because of their peripherality, tend to be relatively less 
endowed with a skilled labour force, have a lower innovative potential,40 and lack a well-
functioning institutional system of governance.  
 
Infrastructure proxy: other roads 
 
We now re-estimate the model with the annual change in kilometres of other roads as our 
infrastructure proxy. As before, we reproduce the estimation first on the full sample of regions 
(columns (1) and (2), Table 3) and then on the smaller sample of less developed regions (columns 
                                                          
40 These results suggest that growth-enhancing factors in lagging regions differ between Europe and the US. In contrast 
to the results for less developed European regions, the economic dynamism of US lagging areas seems to rely less than 
that of European regions on elements, such as the proportion of patent applications and the share of high-skilled 
employment (Stephens et al., 2013). 
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(3) and (4), Table 3). The number of observations is reduced to 161 and 66 respectively, due to 
data availability issues for Portuguese regions. The presentation of the estimation output follows 
the structure of Tables 2 and is reported in Table 3, while results for the individual components 
of the QoG index are reported in Table A7 in the Appendix. 
In the full sample – and, as was the case for motorway development – when we exclude control 
variables, infrastructure investments are positively and significantly correlated with economic 
growth (column (1), Table 3). This effect is, however, not robust to the inclusion of additional 
growth determinants in the model, providing no statistical evidence that an upgrade in the network 
of state, regional, and local roads may independently act as an engine for growth (column (2), 
Table 3). Conversely, institutional quality is confirmed as a robust growth predictor.  
 
Table 3 
Other roads investment, quality of government and regional growth 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Full Sample Less Developed Regions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged GDP  
-0.0252** -0.0901*** -0.0473*** -0.129*** 
(0.0101) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0218) 
Investment in other roads  
0.00102** 0.000607 0.00136 0.000401 
(0.000487) (0.000476) (0.00768) (0.000497) 
Quality of Government  
0.0235*** 0.0246*** 0.0628*** 0.0595*** 
(0.00484) (0.00436) (0.0109) (0.00801) 
(Investment in other roads) × (QoG)  
0.00157* 0.00234*** 0.00268** 0.00352*** 
(0.000829) (0.000873) (0.0128) (0.00118) 
     
Spatial weight of investment in other 
roads 
 0.00366**  0.00299 
 (0.00155)  (0.00204) 
Agricultural employment  
 -0.00352***  -0.00339*** 
 (0.000626)  (0.000834) 
Patent applications 
 0.00534***  0.00753*** 
 (0.00180)  (0.00276) 
Human capital 
 0.0136***  0.0420*** 
 (0.00512)  (0.0134) 
Regional population 
-4.46e-05*** -1.53e-05** -3.56e-05* 5.04e-06 
(1.21e-05) (7.52e-06) (1.78e-05) (8.77e-06) 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations  2,158 2,134 889 876 
R2 0.387 0.472 0.383 0.472 
NUTS regions 161 161 66 66 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. QoG = Quality of Government Index. 
 
As mentioned above, the direct effect of new ‘other road’ infrastructure may not be captured by 
the data because of how the investment variable is constructed. Another hypothesis, however, is 
that investments have been successful in some regions, but have had only a limited effect on the 
aggregate productivity of others. If this is the case, the coefficient of the investment variable may 
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suggest that the resources governments allocated to productivity-enhancing projects were partly 
offset by interventions that ended up being wasteful and economically inefficient. As widely 
discussed in section 2, self-interested public officials may take investment decisions that do not 
represent socially and economically optimising goals. A sound institutional environment where 
policy-makers are competent and averse to moral hazard behaviours sets the necessary conditions 
for transport projects to achieve economic success. The positive and statistically significant 
interaction term in all specifications of Table 3 suggests that investments in roads other than 
motorways, if associated with higher quality of government institutions, have a positive 
correlation with the economic performance of European regions.41 This confirms that the 
economic returns from transport investments are conditional on a number of institutional factors 
including the transparency of the local administrations, a government’s political and financial 
autonomy, the effectiveness of the judicial system, and the risk of corruption.  
Our results show that the quality of regional governments may have an influence on the 
profitability of investments in other roads, but play little role in making motorways investments 
more productive. It may also be the case that regions with lower government quality and weaker 
institutions may prefer or – whenever they are not directly responsible for the funding – demand 
motorways as a more flamboyant, visible, and electorally-rewarding investment than secondary 
roads. In either case, the outcome is the same: no influence on economic growth. By contrast, 
regions with better government quality that put greater effort on the overall road network are 
rewarded by higher levels of growth. 
Motorways also represent an important opportunity cost in development terms. Because of their 
cost, an emphasis in motorways tends to leave limited resources for other types of interventions. 
The upgrading of local roads, reinforcing the internal connectedness of a region, is generally 
cheaper and allows greater room for alternative (or complementary) interventions. Hence, the 
development of transport projects that are embedded in the local economic fabric and contribute 
to mobilize people, goods, and knowledge may truly bring about economic stimuli for all types 
of economies. When comparing the coefficients of the interaction term in Table 3, the positive 
effect of a mutual variation in other roads investments and government quality is higher for the 
sub-sample of less developed regions. This is certainly due to the higher importance of institutions 
for the economic development of lagging areas than in the core of Europe. These results point to 
the growth potential of well-targeted investments in secondary roads, which often tend to be 
                                                          
41 A different interpretation of the insignificant coefficient of investment in other roads may be that, at the margin, 
additional expenditures in secondary roads produce no effect on total output because the level of transport infrastructure 
in EU regions is already optimal. If this is the case, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term may 
imply that marginal returns are higher in regions with stronger governance because increases in the quality of 
government determine a more-than-proportional increase in total output. In other words, when investments in other 
roads are pursued in the framework of supportive institutions, they benefit from increasing returns to scale. 
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disregarded by subnational governments, especially in those peripheral regions of Europe where 
the quality of government is well below the average.  
The control variables maintain the sign and significance reported in the previous version of the 
model. The coefficients for patent applications and a highly-educated labour force in the less 
developed regions subset (column (4), Table 3) is higher than the one observed in the full sample, 
showing that innovative capacity and a good endowment of human capital are more crucial for 
economic growth in the periphery than in the core of Europe. Quality of government in the 
periphery of Europe is a far more accurate predictor of regional economic growth than 
investments in motorways. 
 
Maintenance investment 
 
So far the analysis has considered only the effect of new finished road infrastructure projects on 
growth. However, a large share (about 30 percent) of total infrastructure investment has been 
devoted to maintenance and improvements of existing transport networks. The proportion of 
expenditures for maintenance varies significantly across European countries. Areas where 
investment decisions have been highly politicised have had a preference for new infrastructure 
over maintenance spending, due to the higher political returns of newly created roads.  
In this section we re-estimate the model including a control for investment in maintenance. In 
absence of data at the regional level, we resort to the OECD database, providing national-level 
statistics of annual expenditures for transport infrastructure maintenance subdivided by transport 
type. We consider two types of expenditures, total transport infrastructure and road 
maintenance,42 normalised by national GDP. As before, we interact the maintenance investment 
variables with the Quality of Government index, in order to test if the effect of maintenance 
spending on regional growth varies depending on the local quality of government.  
The results of the extended model are presented in Table 4. Panel A (columns (1)-(4)) reports the 
estimates with the inclusion of total infrastructure maintenance, while Panel B (columns (5)-(8)) 
focuses on road maintenance. The coefficient of maintenance investment is always negative and, 
in the case of total transport infrastructure, statistically significant. Although this result may at 
first seem counter-intuitive, it may be related to the balance between the resources allocated to 
maintenance relative to new investments. Economists looking at the impact of these two types of 
investment on growth have argued that a minimum level of maintenance is required in order to 
                                                          
42 These two variables are available for all countries in the sample, with exception of the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Spain in the case of total infrastructure maintenance, and Germany and Spain, in the case of road maintenance. 
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display positive growth effects. Rioja (2003) has estimated that for Latin American countries 
maintenance investments in public infrastructure below 1 percent of GDP would have a negative 
effect on GDP change. In our case, the average investment in total transport is 0.64 percent of 
GDP for the full sample, and 0.79 percent of GDP in less developed regions (Table A2). Hence, 
this result may imply that maintenance investment in all EU regions is still below a minimum 
critical value.  
 
Table 4 
Maintenance investment 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Panel A 
Total transport infrastructure maintenance 
Panel B 
Road maintenance 
Motorways Other roads Motorways Other roads 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP 
-0.0983*** -0.152*** -0.0824*** -0.152*** -0.0851*** -0.119*** -0.0770*** -0.125*** 
(0.0172) (0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0234) (0.0160) (0.0268) (0.0175) (0.0297) 
Investment in motorways  
0.114 -0.0415   0.0873 -0.126   
(0.0722) (0.110)   (0.0756) (0.128)   
Investment in other roads  
  0.000593 0.000430   0.000623 0.000486 
  (0.000465) (0.000486)   (0.000473) (0.000490) 
Quality of Government  
0.0200*** 0.0478*** 0.0148*** 0.0537*** 0.0319*** 0.0613*** 0.0228*** 0.0624*** 
(0.00548) (0.00905) (0.00561) (0.00940) (0.00553) (0.00894) (0.00580) (0.00984) 
(Investment in motorways) × (QoG)  
-0.0804 -0.144   -0.103 -0.102   
(0.0952) (0.108)   (0.0847) (0.119)   
(Investment in other roads) × (QoG) 
  0.00193*** 0.00353***   0.00210** 0.00344*** 
  (0.000703) (0.00112)   (0.000833) (0.00114) 
Spatial weight of investment in 
motorways 
0.962*** 0.602**   0.900*** 0.571*   
(0.268) (0.298)   (0.252) (0.311)   
Spatial weight of investment in other 
roads 
  0.00136 -1.31e-06   0.00230 -1.29e-06 
  (0.00153) (0.00212)   (0.00154) (0.00215) 
Transport infrastructure maintenance  
-0.00521** -0.00881*** -0.00405* -0.00845***     
(0.00234) (0.00272) (0.00240) (0.00290)     
(Transport infrastructure 
maintenance) × (QoG) 
0.0176*** 0.0166*** 0.0129*** 0.0130***     
(0.00414) (0.00411) (0.00405) (0.00414)     
Road maintenance  
    -0.00484 -0.00119 -0.00181 -0.00239 
    (0.00567) (0.0119) (0.00571) (0.0126) 
(Road maintenance) × (QoG) 
    0.00821 0.00239 0.00588 -0.000769 
    (0.00628) (0.0114) (0.00657) (0.0111) 
Other controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 1,637 710 1,514 650 1,793 710 1,670 650 
R2 0.443 0.429 0.443 0.438 0.420 0.395 0.428 0.413 
NUTS regions 122 55 117 51 134 55 129 51 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. 
Controls: agricultural employment, patent applications, human capital, regional population. QoG = Quality of Government 
Index. 
A different interpretation is that the investment has limited effect on productivity, because a 
proportion of the allocated resources is not effectively spent for infrastructure maintenance, but 
rather captured by interest groups through corruption or collusion mechanisms. This hypothesis 
is supported by the fact that the interaction term between government quality and maintenance 
expenditures is positive and significant for total transport infrastructure, but insignificant for road 
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investment (Table 4, column (8)). The significant interaction term between government quality 
and total transport maintenance holds both for the full sample and the sample of less developed 
regions, as well as for motorways and for other roads investment. This means that investing in the 
maintenance of the overall transport network (total transport maintenance) has more beneficial 
effects on economic performance, the higher the government quality of the region in which the 
investment is made. All other coefficients are in line with the ones reported in the previous tables.  
 
Robustness checks 
 
In this section we test the robustness of our estimation results. We consider a number of factors 
that may affect our estimates: the time-span employed in the empirical analysis, the specification 
of the model, the persistence of institutions, and the endogeneity of our key variables. The results 
of the robustness tests are displayed in Appendix A5. 
Changes in time-span. The literature on the relationship between infrastructure and growth has 
produced different results depending on the different time-spans considered. Our model has been 
tested on the 1995-2009 time period, but the results may not hold for different periods. We 
therefore test the robustness of our estimates to a change in time span by excluding the first four 
and last four years. Table A5.1 in the Appendix shows the results of the main model for the 1995-
2005 and 1999-2009 periods. The results of the analysis are confirmed for both sub-periods. 
Quality of government is a significant factor behind economic growth and infrastructure 
investment in other roads is associated with regional GDP growth only in interaction with the 
QoG index – this result being stronger in less developed regions. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is larger in magnitude for the 1995-2005 period, probably due to the fact that the marginal 
returns of the investment are higher when the road network is less developed (Fernald, 1999). 
Changes in specification. The model specified in Equation (1) is a dynamic specification where 
the lagged level of GDP enters as a regressor. This allows to test for convergence and to control 
for the initial conditions of the regions. Here we present the estimates of a more parsimonious 
version of the model, excluding the ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 variable. Panel A in Table A5.2 shows that while the 
magnitude of the coefficient of some variables changes marginally, the main results are 
confirmed. Infrastructure investment alone is not significantly linked with regional GDP change; 
investment in secondary roads is more strongly linked to economic growth in regions with better 
government quality.   
Panel A of Table A5.2 demonstrates that our results are robust to the exclusion of some regressors. 
Panel B of Table A5.2 presents a more complete version of the model in Equation (1), with the 
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inclusion of a new control variable. Models connecting transport infrastructure with economic 
growth typically rely on Cobb-Douglas production functions including private capital as one 
factor of production. Our original model does not control for private investment because data for 
this variable at the regional level is available only from 2000. Adding gross fixed capital formation 
as a proxy for the stock of private capital does not significantly alter the results (Table A5.2). One 
difference is that the coefficient of other roads investment is now positive and significant at 5 
percent level.43 This variable’s connection with economic growth becomes stronger if interacted 
with government quality.    
Persistence of institutions. Institutions change slowly over time (Guiso et al., 2016), and indeed 
the average annual change in the QoG index used in our dataset is low.  
In order to allow for a higher variation in regional government institutions, we perform two 
robustness estimates. First, the analysis is replicated by averaging all variables across 3-year 
periods. In such a way, the 1995-2009 dataset is collapsed into five periods only. This reduces the 
number of observations considerably, but allows to obtain a QoG index having a -0.048 average 
value for period-by-period change, as opposed to -0.014 in the annual dataset. The results of the 
robustness test, displayed in the first two columns of Table A5.3, confirm the main findings of 
the model. As a second test, we collapse the dataset into a cross-section, by averaging all key 
variables across the 14 years of our dataset (1995-2009). As shown in the third and fourth columns 
of Table A5.3, the main results remain again unchanged. 
Endogeneity. The estimated effect of transport infrastructure and government quality on 
economic growth may be imprecise or biased if the direction of causality is running in the opposite 
way from that assumed in our model: i.e. if infrastructure investment and the quality of 
institutional structures are the consequences, not the causes, of the economic performance of EU 
regions.  
A vast body of literature has attempted to account for the potential endogeneity of infrastructure 
capital and institutional conditions by means of instrumental variables. Some studies have 
addressed endogeneity using time-lags as instruments with Generalised Methods of Moments 
(GMM) estimation techniques (Calderón & Servén, 2004; Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012), 
while others have employed instruments based on historical factors correlated with the 
endogenous variables but exogenous to current economic conditions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Tabellini, 2010 for institutions; Duranton & Turner 2011; 2012, for transport infrastructure).  
                                                          
43 This difference with respect to previous results is not driven by the inclusion of private capital, but by the change in 
time-span (2000-2009). Estimating the model for this period without private capital produces similar coefficients and 
standard errors for the variable of other roads investment. 
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Our model includes two variables of interest which may be endogenous to economic growth, as 
well as the interaction term between them, making any identification strategy based on ‘external’ 
instruments complicated to apply. Moreover, data on historical variables for European regions is 
not readily available. Hence, in order to minimize endogeneity issues we resort to a dynamic panel 
analysis through a GMM-system model.44 The GMM produces estimates in line with the results 
in Tables 2 and 4 (Table A5.4). The quality of regional governments remains a significant driver 
of growth and the interaction term between other roads and government quality is positive and 
significantly associated with regional economic performance, although only at the 10 percent 
level. Unlike the fixed effects results, the coefficient of infrastructure investment is not 
statistically significant, if the control variables are excluded from the model. 
This econometric approach is, however, unlikely to fully correct for the endogeneity issues of our 
model. As government quality is strongly path-dependent, time-lags do not represent valid 
sources of exogenous variation. Reverse causality, measurement errors and omitted variable 
remain an issue potentially biasing the results. For this reason, we cannot make any claim 
regarding the causality of the relationships observed. Hence, our results must be considered as a 
descriptive analysis of the complex set of relationships between transport infrastructure 
investment, government quality, and economic growth discussed in the introductory section of 
this paper.       
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the importance of government quality for the economic returns of 
transport infrastructure investments in the European regions. We assumed that government 
institutions played a strong conditioning role on the effectiveness of public investments in road 
infrastructure and that government quality would also affect decisions and the returns of different 
types of roads: motorways vs. ordinary roads.  
The analysis, performed using these two different proxies for infrastructure investment and by 
interacting them with measures of institutional quality, unveils a very weak or insignificant direct 
correlation between economic growth and regional investments in either motorways or other 
                                                          
44 We choose a GMM-system over a GMM-difference model because it better accounts for the high persistence over 
time of the variables (Roodman, 2009). To make the number of instruments lower than the number of groups, we only 
use the second-order time lags as instruments and limit the regressors to the key variables of interest. As this implies 
excluding population –no longer controlling for ‘per capita’ effects – we replace the dependent variable with per capita 
GDP change. The GMM model is estimated for the full sample only because restricting the sample to less developed 
regions would imply having more instruments than regions. 
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roads, but a strong and highly significant connection with regional economic performance if other 
roads investment is interacted with government quality. The results hold for all different measures 
of government quality in our dataset. These findings suggest that, as hypothesised, positive rates 
of returns from infrastructure investment are mediated by the presence of adequate government 
institutions. Only certain types of transport infrastructure investment are associated with higher 
growth across the regions of Europe. In particular, improvements in secondary road network in 
sound government quality conditions are linked to higher growth. By contrast, the highly popular 
motorway development schemes which have been at the centre of development strategies mainly 
in the periphery of Europe – and in particular in Portugal and Spain – are not associated with the 
expected economic outcomes, even if promoted by credible, competent and transparent local 
governments (which is not always the case). Government institutions also help translating 
investments in maintenance of transport infrastructure into economic growth. Maintenance 
investment alone is weakly associated to economic performance, and this association may even 
turn negative, if conducted in environments where corruption and collusion are rife. In all cases, 
government quality on its own or after controlling for human capital endowments and innovation 
has been more strongly linked to economic growth than transport infrastructure investment. 
These results can be partly ascribed to the differences in the two typologies of road infrastructure 
considered in our study. The category of other roads includes local and regional roads, whose 
construction tends to weigh less on public finances if compared to motorways expenditures and 
is often made to enhance within-region rather than between-region connectivity. This distinction 
is relevant especially for peripheral areas located far away from the main urban centres and with 
fewer economic resources at their disposal. Their lower visibility and potential electoral dividends 
also make this type of investment more likely to respond to real needs and cost-benefit 
considerations. The glitzier large-scale motorway projects are more visible and generally yield 
greater electoral returns, but are costlier and may take away vital resources from other key 
infrastructure interventions or other development axes which could generate greater economic 
returns. 
When discussing the potential policy insights from these results, it is crucial to bear in mind some 
caveats. First, data constraints limit the possibility of drawing any causal conclusions from the 
analysis: time-varying omitted variables and reverse causality may still affect our estimates. 
Second, the time span covered is relatively limited, making it impossible to capture long-term 
growth trends. Third, our proxies for infrastructure investments are necessarily constrained by 
data availability: changes in road length of motorways and other roads, as well as national 
maintenance expenditures can be captured, but we cannot account for broader network effects 
(linked for example with the interactions between roads and railways or airports), traffic creation, 
and diversion effects.  
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Having acknowledged these limitations, our findings still offer relevant insights for economic 
development policies in Europe. First, the results of the analysis contribute to the increasing 
number of studies recognizing improvements of local institutions as a necessary prerequisite for 
efficient public spending, in general, and infrastructure investment, in particular (Acemoglu & 
Dell, 2010; Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015). As 
Esfahani and Ramírez (2003) put it, “achieving better [economic] outcomes requires institutional 
and organizational reforms that are more fundamental than simply designing infrastructure 
projects and spending money on them” (Esfahani & Ramírez, 2003: 471). The re-shaping of 
institutional structures is a challenging task for policy-makers, as reforms will have to be designed 
specifically for the environment in which they are to be applied. In any case, our results indicate 
that ‘institution-building’ needs to be put at the top of the development agenda, if other types of 
development interventions – and, fundamentally, transport infrastructure interventions – are to 
become more effective.  
A potential way to limit distortions in public investment decisions determined by political 
interests, pork-barrel politics, or corruption may be to set stricter rules for project evaluation and 
provide technical guidance to local governments lacking the administrative capacity to select the 
most profitable projects. Ex-ante and ex-post evaluations, monitoring analyses and appraisals – 
despite increasing legislation in this respect – are not yet a consolidated practice in all European 
regions. Highly objective evaluation techniques are unappealing for local politicians regularly 
trying to exert their influence over the investment’s decisions (Short and Knopp, 2005). Regions 
with weak government institutions require a more thorough following of their transport projects 
over the full cycle and a greater awareness of project specificities. As argued by a recent US 
Transportation Research Board (TRB) report, a key capability of infrastructure monitoring 
agencies is to be able to distinguish between the short-term and the long-term benefits of transport 
projects. This allows setting timeliness and maintenance-of-effort requirements according to the 
type of goal to be achieved. Short-term and long-term targets may be assigned specific 
implementation rules, but a uniform evaluation framework is recommended for each project 
(TRB, 2014). In the EU enforcing effective evaluation frameworks should require greater levels 
of enforcement by the European institutions awarding financial resources for infrastructure 
interventions. One way to do so would be to truly condition the disbursement of EU funds for 
infrastructure investment to the application of technical regulations for project evaluations. 
Other policy implications of our analysis concern the type of transport investment more advisable 
for peripheral regions. Our empirical results challenge the vision, already disputed in the literature  
(e.g. Puga, 2002), that one way to foster economic convergence in the EU is to link peripheral 
locations with the economic heart of the continent through the establishment of a core network of 
costly long-distance corridors of transport infrastructure. Conversely, our evidence supports the 
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idea that, considering improvements in government quality, economically backward regions 
should strengthen regional roads in order to facilitate the creation of linkages between key local 
economic actors. In lagging areas, investing only in long-distance connections may provide 
incentives for the main economic assets of the region (being them skilled individuals or successful 
businesses) to re-locate elsewhere. Efforts to improve institutional conditions and promote local 
accessibility should be accompanied by initiatives targeting other key development drivers, such 
as education or innovation.  
Overall, these policy indications are coherent with the ongoing reform of EU Cohesion Policy, 
increasingly prone to recognize different institutional capacities as drivers of persistent disparities 
and as major hindrances for regional convergence in Europe (Barca et al., 2012). Our findings 
indicate that considering place-based institutions as a key determinant of regional development 
may be the way forward to ensure effective development support, as long as it implies setting up 
consistent measures to condition the provision of additional funds on the proof of efficient 
spending from regional government authorities. Our results also suggest the need to pause and 
rethink about the interest and viability of many of the transportation policies financed with EU 
Structural Funds. Under the 2007-2013 budget period, almost half of EU Cohesion expenditures 
for transport infrastructure development were devoted to the realization of the Trans-European 
Transport Network (TEN-T), a planned set of road, rail, air, and maritime infrastructure 
investments that are intended to develop continuous North-South and East-West corridors in the 
continent. Despite a decline in infrastructure investment, transport infrastructure still attracts a 
considerable percentage of the almost €352 billion of Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020. 
A very large share of these funds has been or will be spent in lagging areas of Europe, precisely 
those where our analysis suggests that, unless there are significant improvements in government 
quality, the association of these funds with economic growth is likely to be limited. A coherent 
shift to a place-based approach to regional development should induce a thorough rethink of how 
new transport infrastructure investments can best contribute to future economic development 
across the regions of the EU. 
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Appendix 
 
A1  Variables description 
 
Table A1.1 
Description and source of variables 
Variable  Source Definition and notes 
Change of log GDP OECD Statistics First difference of the natural logarithm of regional GDP in current euros, 1995-2009. Data for Romanian regions obtained from 
Eurostat. 
Lagged GDP  OECD Statistics Natural logarithm of regional GDP lagged by one year. 
Investment in motorways  Eurostat  First difference of the number of kms of motorways, standardised by thousand regional inhabitants. 
Investment in other roads  Eurostat  
First difference of the number of kms of regional roads not classified as motorways, standardised by thousand regional inhabitants, 
1995-2009. Missing values for all Portuguese regions.  
Transport infrastructure maintenance  OECD Statistics 
Spending on preservation of the existing transport network and maintenance expenditure financed by public administrations. Data 
at the national level, 1995-2009. Current euros as percentage of national GDP. Maintenance expenditures for road, rail, inland 
waterways, maritime ports and airports. Missing values for the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. 
Road maintenance  OECD Statistics Investment and maintenance expenditures for roads as percentage of GDP. Data at the national level, 1995-2009. Current euros 
as percentage of national GDP. Missing values for Germany and Spain. 
Quality of Government (QoG)  
Own calculation with QoG 
Institute data and World Bank 
Governance Indicators 
EU Quality of Government (QoG) index elaborated by the University of Gothenburg, a survey-based index constructed around 
three main pillars: quality of education, public health care and law enforcement; impartiality in education, public health and legal 
protection; level of corruption in education, health care and the legal system. This index has been extended over time adopting the 
World Bank Governance Indicators developed by Kauffmann et al. (2009). See Charron et al. (2014) for a detailed explanation on 
how the index was constructed. 
Control of Corruption 
Own calculation with QoG 
Institute data and World Bank 
Governance Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the following questions: 
‘Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system.’ (0-10); ‘Corruption is prevalent in the public healthcare system in 
my area.’ (0-10); ‘In the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to: health or medical 
services?’ (y/n); ‘In your opinion, how often do you think other citizens in your area use bribery to obtain public services?’ (0-10) 
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Rule of Law 
Own calculation with QoG 
Institute data and World Bank 
Governance Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the following questions: 
‘how would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?’ (0-10); ‘The police force gives special advantages to certain 
people in my area.’ (0-10); ‘All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area’ (1-4); ‘Corruption is prevalent in the police 
force in my area’ (0-10). 
Government Effectiveness 
Own calculation with QoG 
Institute data and World Bank 
Governance Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the following questions: 
‘how would you rate the quality of public education in your area?’ (0-10); ‘how would you rate the quality of the public healthcare 
system in your area?’ (0-10); ‘Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my area’ (0-10); 
‘Certain people are given special advantages in the public healthcare system in my area.’ (0-10); ‘All citizens are treated equally in 
the public education system in my area.’ (1-4); ‘All citizens are treated equally in the public healthcare system in my area.’ (1-4). 
Government Accountability 
Own calculation with QoG 
Institute data and World Bank 
Governance Indicators 
Section of the QoG combined index based on the calculated score from the answers of its inhabitants to the following questions: ‘In 
your opinion, if corruption by a public employee or politician were to occur in your area, how likely is it that such corruption would be 
exposed by the local mass media?’ (0-10); ‘Please respond to the following: Elections in my area are honest and clean from 
corruption.’ (0-10).  
Spatial weight of investment in 
motorways/other roads 
Own calculation with Eurostat Spatially weighted average of first difference of transport infrastructure endowment in neighbouring regions, calculated with an 
Euclidean distance matrix setting the threshold at the minimum distance for each region to have at least one neighbour. 
Agricultural employment Eurostat Share of regional employment in NACE categories A (Agriculture, forestry and fishing) and B (Mining and quarrying). 
Patent applications Eurostat Natural logarithm of the number of applications filled for patents of all types per thousand of inhabitants. 
Human capital Eurostat Natural logarithm of the percentage of employed people (aged 25-64) with completed higher education (ISCED-97 levels 5 and 6). 
Regional population Eurostat Thousands of residents in the region. 
Gross fixed capital formation Eurostat 
Resident producers´ acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed tangible or intangible assets. Hundred million euros of national currency 
(current prices). Available 2000-2009. 
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A2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A2.1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
All regions Less developed regions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Regional GDP 2490 67062 86939 1050 34572 36196 
Kms of motorways 2421 321 387 1012 219 374 
Kms of other roads 2321 19273 17695 966 14785 9523 
Motorways per thousand inhabitants 2459 0.142 0.134 1030 0.093 0.127 
Other roads per thousand inhabitants 2321 9.555 8.273 966 8.285 6.586 
Change in motorways per thousand 
inhabitants 
(investment  in motorways)  
2293 0.0033 0.012 960 0.005 0.014 
Change in other roads per thousand 
inhabitants 
(investment in other roads)  
2150 0.013 0.272 893 0.029 0.218 
Transport infrastructure maintenance  1811 0.644 0.530 809 0.794 0.591 
Road maintenance  1967 0.351 0.267 809 0.460 0.263 
Quality of Government Indexa 2490 0.169 0.960 1050 -0.420 1.017 
Control of Corruption 2490 0.128 0.924 1050 -0.445 0.908 
Rule of Law 2490 0.169 0.938 1050 -0.376 0.982 
Government Effectiveness 2489 0.196 1.035 1050 -0.406 1.134 
Government Accountability 2489 0.125 0.951 1050 -0.410 1.049 
Spatial weight of investment in 
motorways 
2324 0.0033 0.0054 980 0.0042 0.0065 
Spatial weight of investment in other 
roads 
2312 0.068 0.43 968 0.123 0.613 
Agricultural employment 2490 7.807 9.20 1050 13.11 11.92 
Patent applications 2490 70.27 93.57 1050 16.76 33.33 
Human capital 2454 21.83 9.06 1018 18.06 7.86 
Regional population  2490 2639 2470 1050 2248 1533 
Gross fixed capital formation 1562 117.67 148.56 682 59.91 71.18 
a / The Quality of Government Index is measured relative to the EU mean in 2010 = 0. The mean of 0.169 is due to the 
fact that not all Member States are included in the sample – countries for which there are no sub-national difference in 
QoG (e.g. Finland, Ireland, Baltic countries) are not considered in the analysis. 
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A3  Robustness checks 
Table A3.1 
Robustness checks – change of time-span 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Panel A 
1995-2005 
Panel B 
1999-2009 Motorways Other roads Motorways Other roads 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP 
-0.164*** -0.213*** -0.162*** -0.217*** -0.101*** -0.141*** -0.0977*** -0.143*** 
(0.0181) (0.0256) (0.0205) (0.0277) (0.0190) (0.0301) (0.0183) (0.0295) 
Investment in motorways  
0.127** 0.0435   0.0362 -0.0994   
(0.0606) (0.105)   (0.0525) (0.0733)   
Investment in other roads  
  0.00124 0.00182   0.000745 0.000840 
  (0.000883) (0.00172)   (0.000464) (0.000508) 
Quality of Government 
0.0366*** 0.0487*** 0.0254*** 0.0483*** 0.0266*** 0.0597*** 0.0263*** 0.0630*** 
(0.00667) (0.0134) (0.00576) (0.0127) (0.00472) (0.00787) (0.00470) (0.00798) 
(Investment in motorways) × (QoG) 
-0.113 -0.185   -0.0775 -0.123   
(0.0874) (0.134)   (0.0781) (0.108)   
(Investment in other roads) × (QoG) 
  0.00796*** 0.0124*   0.00208*** 0.00365*** 
  (0.00295) (0.00695)   (0.000782) (0.00108) 
Spatial weight of investment in motorways 
0.627*** 0.453**   0.510*** 0.163   
(0.155) (0.192)   (0.165) (0.231)   
Spatial weight of investment in other roads 
  0.00641*** 0.00426*   0.00346** 0.00296 
  (0.00168) (0.00222)   (0.00151) (0.00200) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00298*** -0.00334*** -0.00383*** -0.00377*** -0.00441*** -0.00445*** -0.00437*** -0.00445*** 
(0.000954) (0.00124) (0.000838) (0.00116) (0.000736) (0.00101) (0.000723) (0.00102) 
Patent applications 
0.00506*** 0.00290 0.00324* 0.00263 0.00799*** 0.0106*** 0.00943*** 0.0122*** 
(0.00178) (0.00328) (0.00165) (0.00279) (0.00246) (0.00326) (0.00245) (0.00322) 
Human capital 
0.0186*** 0.0371*** 0.0157*** 0.0359*** 0.0109 0.0481*** 0.00960 0.0467*** 
(0.00452) (0.0102) (0.00497) (0.0134) (0.00841) (0.0147) (0.00849) (0.0152) 
Regional population 
-2.17e-05* -1.31e-05 -1.71e-05 6.74e-07 -1.91e-05** 1.33e-06 -1.80e-05** 9.22e-06 
(1.24e-05) (2.52e-05) (1.19e-05) (2.26e-05) (7.67e-06) (1.06e-05) (7.64e-06) (9.05e-06) 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations  1,625 672 1,496 612 1,798 750 1,754 726 
R2 0.218 0.235 0.242 0.264 0.505 0.494 0.506 0.508 
NUTS regions 166 70 161 66 166 70 161 66 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions.  
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Table A3.2 
Robustness checks – change of specification 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Panel A 
Estimates without inclusion of lagged GDP 
Panel B 
Control for private capital investment (2000-2009) Motorways Other roads Motorways Other roads 
FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR FS LDR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged GDP 
    -0.142*** -0.200*** -0.140*** -0.203*** 
    (0.0218) (0.0307) (0.0213) (0.0298) 
Investment in motorways 
0.0616 -0.0721   0.0275 -0.0570   
(0.0564) (0.0785)   (0.0527) (0.0750)   
Investment in other roads  
  0.000492 0.000325   0.00105** 0.00115** 
  (0.000520) (0.000545)   (0.000448) (0.000503) 
Quality of Government 
0.0276*** 0.0414*** 0.0191*** 0.0394*** 0.0308*** 0.0672*** 0.0310*** 0.0712*** 
(0.00336) (0.00559) (0.00323) (0.00537) (0.00516) (0.0113) (0.00514) (0.0114) 
(Investment in motorways) × (QoG) 
-0.0606 -0.100   -0.0772 -0.0615   
(0.0773) (0.103)   (0.0769) (0.114)   
(Investment in other roads) × (QoG) 
  0.00227** 0.00358***   0.00231*** 0.00401*** 
  (0.000887) (0.00106)   (0.000831) (0.00122) 
Spatial weight of investment in motorways 
0.677*** 0.454**   0.434** 0.0876   
(0.148) (0.188)   (0.171) (0.240)   
Spatial weight of investment in other roads 
  0.00421** 0.00415*   0.00264* 0.00194 
  (0.00168) (0.00217)   (0.00154) (0.00196) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00122*** -0.000962** -0.00187*** -0.00139*** -0.00468*** -0.00445*** -0.00466*** -0.00445*** 
(0.000357) (0.000427) (0.000319) (0.000440) (0.000924) (0.00115) (0.000906) (0.00113) 
Patent applications 
0.00358** 0.00372 0.00214 0.00352 0.00753*** 0.0121*** 0.00893*** 0.0136*** 
(0.00166) (0.00289) (0.00180) (0.00306) (0.00271) (0.00351) (0.00267) (0.00344) 
Human capital 
0.0103** 0.0196** 0.00704 0.0158 0.0135 0.0435** 0.0135 0.0428** 
(0.00416) (0.00759) (0.00450) (0.00953) (0.00990) (0.0176) (0.0101) (0.0182) 
Regional population 
-2.29e-05*** -1.69e-05* -2.59e-05*** -1.33e-05* -3.66e-05*** -0.000110** -3.28e-05*** -9.98e-05** 
(6.05e-06) (9.57e-06) (6.04e-06) (7.13e-06) (1.19e-05) (4.96e-05) (1.20e-05) (4.88e-05) 
Gross fixed capital formation 
    7.59e-05** 0.000481** 6.99e-05* 0.000471** 
    (3.66e-05) (0.000205) (3.71e-05) (0.000203) 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations  2,269 936 2,134 876 1,535 662 1,498 642 
R2 0.429 0.404 0.445 0.421 0.527 0.521 0.527 0.536 
NUTS regions 166 70 161 66 166 70 161 66 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FS = full sample; LDR = less developed regions. 
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Table A3.3 
Robustness checks – three-year averages and cross-section dataset 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log GDP  
Variables averaged over 3-year periods Cross-section dataset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged GDP 
-0.0332*** -0.0292**   
(0.0125) (0.0135)   
Investment in motorways 
0.178  -0.213  
(0.122)  (0.201)  
Investment in other roads  
 0.00162  -0.0180 
 (0.00279)  (0.0123) 
Quality of Government  
0.0388*** 0.0186*** 0.00489* 0.00430 
(0.00486) (0.00429) (0.00295) (0.00308) 
(Investment in motorways) × (QoG) 
-0.144  -0.0988  
(0.155)  (0.263)  
(Investment in other roads) × (QoG) 
 0.00690***  0.0159** 
 (0.00205)  (0.00746) 
Spatial weight of investment in 
motorways 
1.111***  0.622***  
(0.319)  (0.221)  
Spatial weight of investment in other 
roads 
 0.00854***  0.0240*** 
 (0.00296)  (0.00714) 
Agricultural employment  
-0.00248*** -0.00366*** -0.000124 -0.000118 
(0.000749) (0.000761) (0.000122) (0.000120) 
Patent applications 
0.00362* -0.000399 -0.00112 -0.00113 
(0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00090) (0.00086) 
Human capital 
0.0153*** 0.00955* 0.0113*** 0.0129*** 
(0.00514) (0.00544) (0.00333) (0.00396) 
Regional population 
-2.31e-05*** -2.81e-05*** -3.13e-07 -2.13e-07 
(7.59e-06) (7.20e-06) (3.17e-07) (3.23e-07) 
Region dummies ✓ ✓   
Year dummies ✓ ✓   
Observations  815 769 166 161 
R2 0.410 0.436 0.492 0.553 
NUTS regions 166 161 166 161 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3.4 
 Robustness checks – GMM estimates 
Dep. variable: 
Change of log per capita GDP  
GMM-system (2nd order lags as instruments) 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged per capita GDP 
-0.0305*** -0.0494*** 
(0.00499) (0.00757) 
Investment in motorways  
-0.0192  
(0.138)  
Investment  in other roads  
 -0.00452 
 (0.00328) 
Quality of Government  
0.00612** 0.00888** 
(0.00310) (0.00429) 
(Investment in motorways) × (QoG) 
-0.420  
(0.262)  
(Investment in other roads) × (QoG) 
 0.0122* 
 (0.00724) 
Spatial weight of investment in motorways 
0.518*  
(0.273)  
Spatial weight of investment in other roads 
 0.0235*** 
 (0.00672) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2,289 2,158 
NUTS regions 166 161 
Instruments 136 140 
AR (2) test (p-value) 0.85 (0.393) 0.36 (0.719) 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Abstract 
The European Union promotes development strategies aimed at producing growth with “a strong 
emphasis on job creation and poverty reduction”. However, whether the economic conditions in 
place in EU regions are ideal for the generation of high- and low-skilled employment and labour 
market inclusion is unclear. This paper assesses how the key factors behind EU growth strategies 
– infrastructure, human capital, innovation, quality of government – condition employment 
generation and labour market exclusion in European regions. The findings indicate that the 
dynamics of employment and social exclusion vary depending on the conditions in place in a 
region. While higher innovation and education contribute to overall employment generation in 
some regional contexts, low-skilled employment grows the most in regions with a better quality 
of government. Regional public institutions, together with the endowment of human capital, 
emerge as the main factors for the reduction of labour market exclusion – particularly in the less 
developed regions – and the promotion of inclusive employment growth across Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union is undertaking an effort to counterbalance the effect of the crisis on 
unemployment by trying to get people back into work. Employment generation is targeted by 
strategies such as Europe 2020, aimed at producing inclusive economic growth with “a strong 
emphasis on job creation and poverty reduction” (European Commission, 2010). However, 
concerns remain about the ‘inclusiveness’ of these measures. 
The challenge for the promotion of ‘inclusive’ or ‘equitable’ growth and cohesion in EU labour 
markets is double: competition from emerging markets and skilled-biased technological 
development. These challenges, it is claimed, raise the demand for skilled workers, while 
threatening the wages and jobs of the unskilled (Atkinson, 2009; 2013) and pose a serious risk for 
the creation of a more inclusive society. The situation has worsened with the current economic 
and financial crisis, which has fundamentally hit workers with few formal qualifications and 
reverted a two-decade-long decline in people at risk of poverty or social exclusion45 in the EU 
(European Commission, 2013). According to recent estimates, in 2013 more than 120 million 
people (1 out of every 4 EU inhabitants) were at risk of poverty and social exclusion (European 
Commission, 2014a). 
Strategies such as Europe 2020 have been designed to counter these trends and promote 
employment by focusing in particular on those in highest need. However, how these policies can 
lead to inclusive labour markets is still unclear (Bilbao-Osorio et al., 2014). It is uncertain what 
types of jobs will be generated, what are the optimal conditions for creating more jobs, and who 
will benefit or lose out from any potential job creation. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between economic factors and regional 
labour market outcomes by assessing how the elements on which the EU has invested – and plans 
to invest – the most affect employment generation and social inclusion in European regions. We 
focus on the four different axes regarded as key constituents of economic growth: human capital, 
research and innovation, infrastructure endowment, and the quality of public institutions.46  
Each of these axes represents a basic component of the framework in which labour investments 
take place. A growing body of literature has studied their potential impact on labour market 
                                                          
45 Social exclusion is a broad concept involving factors that may leave specific groups in society vulnerable. These 
include unemployment, lack of access to education, to childcare and to healthcare facilities, inadequate living 
conditions, and scarce social participation. In this study we focus particularly on labour market exclusion. 
46 For each of these elements, a large body of empirical research has examined their effect on economic growth in the 
EU regional context. See e.g. Rodríguez-Pose & Vilalta-Bufí (2005), OECD (2009) for human capital; Fagerberg et al. 
(1997), Bottazzi & Peri (2003), Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose (2011) for innovation; Moreno et al. (1997), Crescenzi & 
Rodríguez-Pose (2012) for infrastructure; and Crescenzi et al. (2016) for institutions. 
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outcomes, yet much less research has concentrated on their contribution to employment 
generation by skill-type and to social inclusion in the EU regional context. This paper tests the 
extent to which each development axis has been associated to employment generation and social 
inclusion in EU regions between 1999 and 2010. The analysis distinguishes employment by skill 
level, sub-dividing regions by level of economic development. The aim is to identify the 
conditions that exacerbate or reduce labour market disparities in different economic contexts. 
Additional light is shed on the dynamics of social exclusion by using long-term unemployment 
as a proxy for labour market marginalisation while testing for the presence of a long-run effect of 
economic endowments on labour conditions. 
The findings of the analysis stress that the economic factors behind employment growth are not 
always the same as those conditioning the evolution of social exclusion. As a consequence, 
targeting job creation and social inclusion goals requires different policy options depending on 
the specific needs of regions. While in the better-off EU regions innovation capacity contributes 
to employment growth, the presence of a highly-educated population drives employment in the 
less developed areas. The key result of the analysis is that the quality of regional government 
emerges as a fundamental element for the creation of employment for workers with limited skills, 
particularly in the periphery of Europe. Both human capital and government quality facilitate 
labour market inclusion: regions with a more qualified workforce and better public institutions 
have significantly reduced the share of long-term unemployment. The endowment of transport 
infrastructure is, at best, insignificant for generating regional employment and reducing labour 
market disparities. 
 
2. Social inclusion and the Europe 2020 strategy 
 
The Europe 2020 growth and jobs strategy was launched in 2010. For the first time a development 
strategy adopted by the EU incorporates social inclusion objectives as headline targets, alongside 
innovation, education, and environmental goals. Through Europe 2020, the EU expects to reduce 
the population at risk of poverty and social exclusion by at least 20 million (Social Protection 
Committee, 2011). Investing to make the European society more equitable and inclusive is part 
of broader vision aimed at ensuring economic recovery and social stability in the Continent for 
the years to come. 
Social exclusion is a broad concept involving all factors that may leave social groups isolated47 
(European Commission, 2004). In this study, we focus on labour market exclusion, that is, the 
                                                          
47 Social exclusion is defined as: “a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented 
from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or 
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persistence of large numbers of people excluded from work. One of the indicators used by the EU 
to calculate people at risk of labour market exclusion is the long-term unemployment (Atkinson 
et al., 2002). We refer to this variable in our empirical analysis as proxy for social exclusion. 
In order to attain Europe 2020 objectives on social inclusion, the EU has set up a “European 
Platform against poverty and social exclusion”, including a number of financial instruments. The 
most important are the European Social Fund (ESF) – of which 20% will be earmarked to fighting 
poverty and social exclusion –, the EU Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity 
(PROGRESS), and the European Globalisation and Adjustment Fund (EGF) (European 
Commission, 2011).  
Despite all these initiatives, recent trends on social exclusion in the EU have been far from 
encouraging (European Commission, 2014a). Moreover, the financial instruments targeting social 
inclusion often operate with limited resources for the task at hand. For 2014 and 2015 only 7% of 
all finances allocated to Europe 2020 flagship initiatives have been devoted to the European 
Platform against poverty (European Commission, 2014b). A report assessing the progress towards 
the achievement of Europe 2020 social inclusion objectives has certified that in many Member 
States social inclusion issues are not given appropriate attention, and “a balanced approach to the 
Europe 2020 agenda, where the poverty and social exclusion target and the objective of inclusive 
growth should achieve the same amount of attention as the other objectives of Europe 2020, has 
still to be achieved” (Frazier & Marlier, 2013: 11).  
If the direct EU measures to address social exclusion have so far not delivered the expected 
outcomes, this may be due either to a lack of sufficient finances devoted to this scope, or to a lack 
of capacity to manage resources adequately. Our analysis then aims to verify what type of regions 
have been most successful in creating employment and stemming long-term unemployment.  
 
3. Growth factors, employment, and social inclusion 
 
The development factors leading to economic growth have been theorised as affecting 
employment generation and social inclusion as well. In particular, four factors regarded as 
essential for economic growth – transport infrastructure, innovation, human capital, and 
government quality – have been related by the literature to employment/social conditions. This 
paper focuses on these four factors over the 1999-2010 period. The link between each of these 
                                                          
as a result of discrimination. This distances them from job, income and education opportunities as well as social and 
community networks and activities” (European Commission, 2004: 8).  
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factors and employment generation and social exclusion, as referred to by the theoretical and 
empirical literature, is presented below.  
 
Transport infrastructure 
 
There is a growing body of literature making the connection between transport accessibility and 
changes in the labour pool and in the demand for labour (Seitz & Licht, 1995; Dalenberg & 
Partridge, 1995; Cohen & Paul, 2004; Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al., 2010). The construction, 
operation and maintenance of transport infrastructure is also used as a means to create 
employment (OECD, 2002). Transport infrastructure is considered capable of attracting private 
investment and generating jobs, through increases in the demand for labour. However, private 
investment may take place even in absence of transport improvements and higher transport 
accessibility may displace other economic activities (Venables et al., 2014). Moreover, if 
improved transport conditions determine increases in firm output in unchanged market-demand 
conditions, cheaper transport inputs may lead firms to a substitution effect away from the use of 
labour (Lakshmanan et al., 2001; Vickerman, 2007). Therefore, the evidence on the link between 
infrastructure and employment remains ambiguous. 
Transport is also seen as essential in determining social outcomes (Banister & Hall, 1981). 
Individuals facing transport-related constraints, such as limited mobility, inaccessibility to goods 
and services and ‘lock-out’ from planning and decision-making processes may end up socially 
excluded (Lucas, 2012). However, transport disadvantage does not always lead to social exclusion 
and areas with good transport may have pockets of socially excluded individuals (Kenyon et al., 
2002; Currie & Delbosc, 2010; Lucas, 2012). Similarly, low levels of accessibility may 
correspond to high social inclusion (Preston & Raje, 2007). Whether improvements in transport 
increase or reduce social exclusion depends on how changes in the transport system affect the 
generalised costs of travel for those at risk. In general, if transport services are far away from 
where the socially excluded live, the costs (i.e. the psychologically weighted sum of travel times) 
increase and the probability of participation in society of vulnerable groups is reduced 
(Schönfelder & Axhausen, 2003).  
 
Innovation 
 
The effect of technological development on employment growth and social inclusion is equally 
controversial. A long-standing debate has addressed the labour implications of innovation. 
Economic theory generally predicts that the short-term effect of new technologies is a reduction 
of employment. In the medium/long-run, however, the market would counterbalance the effect, 
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producing increases in labour demand. This mechanism of compensation, however, is subject to 
a set of conditions that must be in place for it to work (e.g. Vivarelli, 2014). The picture is further 
complicated by the ‘skill-biased technological change’ hypothesis (Griliches, 1979), which 
stresses that the introduction of new technologies favours the creation of high-skilled 
employment. Hence, in presence of skill-biased innovation, unskilled unemployment increases. 
The empirical evidence on the link between innovation and employment is mixed. Most analyses 
support a positive impact of innovation on employment generation (e.g. Van Reenen, 1997; 
Greenan & Guellec, 2000; Bogliacino et al., 2011). The skill-biased technological change concept 
also goes in this direction (Berman et al., 1994; Machin & Van Reenen, 1998), although some 
research suggests a more complex relationship, depending on the level of skills available in a 
territory (e.g. Piva & Vivarelli, 2002; Autor et al., 2003). Evidence from developing countries 
indicates that the presence of institutional barriers makes employment creation from technological 
development less likely to occur (Vivarelli, 2014).  
Technological development and innovation can also solve social problems and favour pro-poor 
employment, but this link is far from automatic (Cozzens et al., 2007; Alzugaray et al., 2012). 
The development of knowledge economies has at times implied income and social inequalities, 
with more technologically advanced regions and more qualified workers advantaged at the 
expense of poorer areas and less skilled individuals. Lee and Rodríguez-Pose (2013), for instance, 
find that innovation capacity leads to higher labour market inequalities. Only if research and 
innovation are adequately tailored to the needs of end-users, such as disadvantaged local 
communities and marginalised workers, their impact on social cohesion can become positive 
(Cozzens et al., 2007).  
 
Human capital 
 
Different views also exist on whether employment and social exclusion are influenced by human 
capital and education. The dominant view is that the stock of human capital has both direct and 
indirect effects on employment. The direct effects stem from the greater employability of workers 
with higher human capital in markets that demand skills, as in the European case. The indirect 
effects are related to the positive externalities human capital generates. Highly-educated 
individuals attract other human capital (Berry & Glaeser, 2005) and this external effect produces 
an increase in employment, especially in areas endowed with higher shares of highly-skilled 
(Glaeser et al., 1995; Simon, 1998).  
Education also fosters participation in the labour market and social mobility for the poorest in 
society. Winters (2013) finds that human capital concentration determines higher employment, 
through increases in labour market participation. This is particularly true for less-skilled workers. 
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Additional external effects of higher education rates are decreases in criminal activity (Lochner 
& Moretti, 2004) and increases in civic participation (Milligan et al., 2004) and quality of life 
(Shapiro, 2006). All of these externalities facilitate labour market inclusion.  
By contrast, opponents of the human capital model believe that labour market participation and 
individual earnings depend more on the personal ability and less on educational attainments (see 
Sparkes, 1999).   
 
Government quality 
 
Finally, social exclusion and employment outcomes are influenced by institutional quality. 
Strengthening institutional and administrative capacity, reducing the administrative burden, and 
improving the quality of legislation can have beneficial effects on labour demand, wages, and 
employment (Knack, 1999).  
Well-functioning institutions are regarded as a precondition for the promotion of effective social 
development policies, in line with Europe 2020 goals (European Commission, 2015). Lack of 
accountability and corruption distort resource allocation, incentivising investment in capital-
intensive projects at the expense of social expenditure (Gupta et al., 2002). Good governance 
additionally contributes to social welfare in cases where governments are more trustworthy, 
impartial, and less corrupt (Rothstein et al., 2012). Government quality is also positively related 
to welfare spending (Rothstein et al., 2012) and helps reduce income inequalities (Knack, 1999). 
There may also be an indirect effect of government quality on labour market participation, through 
access to sanitation and health care or schooling. The socially excluded have less access to public 
services and good government may facilitate a more equal delivery of such services (Lewis, 
2006). 
While most empirical studies on the role of institutions are performed at the national level, social 
spending increasingly depends on regional governments and their quality (Deacon et al., 2007). 
The key role of regional and local government institutions for limiting social exclusion has been 
theoretically postulated – sub-national governments are essential to uncover local bottlenecks 
perpetuating social exclusion and design bottom-up policies accordingly (Barca et al., 2012) – but 
no empirical evidence has yet attempted to confirm it. 
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4. Research on employment generation and social 
inclusion in EU regions  
 
The dynamics of employment and unemployment in Europe have been analysed in a large number 
of studies. Less research, however, has been carried out at the regional level. Regions are 
nevertheless important, both because in the multi-level governance framework of the EU labour 
market policy has traditionally been decentralised (Scarpetta, 1996) and because an increasing 
share of economic resources are devoted to generating employment in regions of Europe, through 
Cohesion Policy interventions, European and national employment schemes, and other European, 
national, and local policies.  
The main interest of research on employment in EU regions has been to test convergence theories 
and assess how change in economic structure and sectoral specialisation affects regional 
employment (e.g. Martin & Tyler, 2000; Marelli, 2004), or to link unemployment to increasing 
regional polarisation (Martin & Tyler, 2000; Overman & Puga, 2002; Cosci & Sabato, 2007). The 
determinants of long-term unemployment in European regions have, by contrast, attracted much 
less attention (e.g. Bornhorst & Commander, 2006; Perugini & Signorelli, 2007). There is no 
research making a connection between unemployment and existing economic development 
conditions of the kind analysed in this paper. Similarly, there is no evidence about how labour 
market determinants affect employment at different levels of skill composition: high-skilled vs. 
low-skilled employment. Consequently, we know little about how vulnerable workers with low 
levels of education and training are conditioned by structural economic and labour market factors. 
Despite a growing interest on the study of social cohesion in the EU (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2002; 
Atkinson, 2009), the analysis of which policy measures and which conditions are more effective 
for the promotion of inclusive regional employment remains underexplored. 
Our work examines how the four different development axes associated with European regional 
interventions affect employment promotion in EU regions and contribute to social 
inclusion/exclusion, long-term unemployment, and to changes in labour market disparities. In 
order to test the effect of growth determinants on labour market outcomes, we develop empirical 
models of employment and long-term unemployment change, including traditional labour market 
determinants as controls. The most often used set of explanatory factors for explaining change in 
employment concerns regional industrial structure (e.g. Martin and Tyler, 2000). Other works 
have explained differences in employment growth intensity by looking at labour market 
governance and institutions (Dunford, 1995; Nickell & Layard, 1999; Perugini & Signorelli, 
2007; Huber, 2013), such as differences in unionisation rates and unemployment benefits. These 
factors are however generally set nationally (Nickell et al., 2005). The existing literature has also 
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devoted great attention to Okun’s (1970) law: i.e. the relationship between the change in 
employment/unemployment and GDP growth. Okun considered the direction of causality as 
running from (un)employment to economic growth, however most estimates of the Okun 
coefficient look at the inverse relationship (Prachowny, 1993). Finally, some empirical models 
(e.g. Perugini & Signorelli, 2007) are completed by other variables describing the structure of the 
regional labour market (labour market flexibility, proportion of of employees). 
 
5. Employment, unemployment, and social exclusion: 
key facts 
 
Over the past 15 years the composition of EU employment has changed significantly. One of the 
most striking changes has occurred in the share of employed people with high- versus low-skills. 
As shown in the left-hand graph of Figure 1, in 1999 less than two in ten workers held a higher 
education degree. By 2012 the proportion had increased by 50%, to about three in ten.48 Low-
skilled employment has followed an opposing trend: starting from a relatively high value in 1999 
(over 30% of the total workforce holding less than primary/lower secondary level of education 
degree), in 2012 only 20% of those in employment had left school without formal qualifications. 
Overall, employment in the EU has followed a strong upskilling process.  
However, the change in the composition of employment has been associated with an important 
variation in unemployment by skills-type (European Commission, 2013). Unemployment for 
medium-skilled and high-skilled changed only marginally from 1999 onwards. Jobs for the low-
skilled, by contrast, have declined, causing unemployment rates for this group to shoot up from 
12% (2001) to 18% (2012) (right-hand graph, Figure 1). Simultaneously, the percentage of long-
term unemployed as share of total unemployment remained stable until 2006, dropped to its 
lowest level in 200949 and then started to rise until 2012 (Appendix A1).  
                                                          
48 In this paper we use the definitions of levels of education adopted by the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS), which are 
based on UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).  
49 While the share of unemployed being long-term unemployed reached the lowest level in 2009, the long-term 
unemployment rate, as a result of the crisis, grew considerably in that very year. Hence, the long-term unemployment 
rate reflects to a greater extent the immediate shock of the crisis than the share of unemployed being long-term 
unemployed. Since 2009, however, both variables have co-evolved in a similar way, rising moderately between 2009 
and 2012. Both indicators are correlated at 75% during the period of analysis, Because of the one-off shock provoked 
by the crisis in the long-term unemployment rate, we have preferred to use the share of unemployed being long-term 
unemployed as an indicator that is less affected by the immediate short-term shock linked to the beginning of the crisis. 
In any case, in order to assess the robustness of the results, we resort to the long-term unemployment rate as an 
alternative to the share of unemployed being long-term unemployed in the GMM analysis presented in Table 4. 
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Figure 1 
Percentage of employed and unemployment rate by level of qualification in the EU 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration with Eurostat data. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of long-term unemployment50 in EU regions. The 
highest long-term unemployment is found in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany, and Eastern 
Europe, particularly in Slovakia. While all regions of the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) and many 
regions of Germany managed to reduce the proportion of long-term unemployed between 1999 
and 2012, in Eastern Europe only some regions of Poland, Romania, and Hungary, have seen 
long-term unemployment decrease. The share of the long-term unemployed has risen in Northern 
Italy, Northeastern France, Ireland, Central and Eastern Spain, and the UK. The crisis has 
aggravated the long-lasting skills mismatch by expanding the pool of highly educated workers 
driven towards less skilled jobs, consequently displacing the low-skilled into long-term 
unemployment51 (Livanos & Núñez, 2012).  
Long-term and low-skilled unemployed represent those at a higher risk of marginalisation and 
persistent exclusion. Low-skilled workers are more likely to become long-term unemployed when 
losing their jobs (European Commission, 2013) and long periods of inactivity lead to skill loss 
(Pissarides, 1992; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998). Therefore, the recent growth in long-term 
unemployment is related to the increase in low-skilled unemployment. Especially since the 
beginning of the crisis, the share of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion has continued 
to rise, making European targets on poverty and social exclusion difficult to meet (European 
                                                          
50 Long-term unemployed are defined by Eurostat as those individuals unemployed for 12 months or more. 
Unemployment refers to the population of jobseekers aged 15 to 74 who are available to start work within the next two 
weeks and who have actively sought employment at some time during the last four weeks. 
51 When the labour market adjusts to negative shocks by pushing skilled people towards lower level occupations, this 
progressively leads to a concentration of unemployment among the least qualified groups (Reder, 1964). This 
involuntary exclusion from employment is of persistent nature, and highly spatially concentrated. A recovery in the 
labour demand may be insufficient to fully revert the process, making labour market policy intervention necessary 
(Gordon, 2006).  
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Commission, 2013; Frazier & Marlier, 2013). Similar trajectories are visible in other areas, such 
as jobless households and the proportion of people facing material deprivation (Social Protection 
Committee, 2013). Put together, these trends suggest increases in the number of people requiring 
welfare support. The challenge for the EU thus goes beyond bringing unemployment back to the 
pre-crisis levels, and includes unwinding the cumulative social effects determined by the rise in 
long-term unemployment. In order to identify what policies are needed to revert these trends and 
to recognise the areas at a higher risk, it is necessary to first understand what are the factors behind 
change in social exclusion in Europe.  
 
Figure 2 
Long term-unemployment level and change in EU regions, 1999-2012 
 
Source: own elaboration with Eurostat data. 
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A first descriptive picture is derived from plotting the regional data on people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion from Eurostat Regio, available from 2005 to 2012 for a limited number of EU 
regions (Figure 3).52 
 
Figure 3 
Scatterplot correlations: economic growth and social exclusion;  
employment by skill-level and social exclusion 
  
  
Source: authors’ own elaboration with Eurostat data. 
The top quadrants of Figure 3 show that economic growth and employment creation are associated 
with a reduction in social exclusion during this period. De-composing employment growth into 
high-skilled and low-skilled adds nuance to the social exclusion picture. The relationship between 
changes in low-skilled employment and in social exclusion is negative and significant, suggesting 
that employment conditions for the poorest have improved in regions witnessing the lowest 
reduction in low-skilled employment (Figure 3, bottom left quadrant). Increases in high-skilled 
employment, instead, are not associated with a reduction in people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (Figure 3, bottom right quadrant). We investigate more thoroughly the determinants of 
change in social exclusion in the next section. 
 
                                                          
52 The variable is available at the regional level only for Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, Ireland, Spain, 
Romania, Sweden, and Slovakia. 
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6. Models and data 
 
This section aims to identify the local endowments (human capital, innovation, infrastructure, 
quality of government) contributing to the generation of employment, high-skilled employment, 
low-skilled employment, and to the reduction of long-term unemployment. The models allow 
assessing the employment/unemployment long-term performance of different EU regions on the 
basis of specific economic characteristics.  
Two versions of the models are estimated. The first employs classic panel techniques – fixed 
effects and random effects – while the second is structured as a dynamic panel AR(1) model, 
minimising endogeneity issues by employing Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
techniques. 
The models, for region i at time t, are as follows: 
 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝/𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                             (1) 
∆ 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝/𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (2) 
 
And: 
 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝/𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (3) 
∆ 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝/𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (4) 
Where: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is divided into ∆ 𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡 , ∆ ℎ𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡 and ∆ 𝑙𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡, meaning that, in total, four dependent variables 
are considered. 
∆ 𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the annual change in employment as a share of regional population, a proxy for total 
employment generation. 
∆ ℎ𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡  and ∆ 𝑙𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡 are respectively: the annual change of those in employment with tertiary 
level of education (ISCED 5-6) as a share of the regional population, a proxy for the generation 
of jobs for workers with high qualifications; and the annual change of those employed with less 
than primary/lower secondary level of education (ISCED 0-2), as a share of the regional 
population, a proxy for the variation low-skilled employment. 53 An increase in low-skilled 
employment is assumed to correspond to a more inclusive labour market and to a decrease in the 
proportion of the regional population facing poverty or social exclusion;  
                                                          
53 An alternative version of these variables standardise them by economically active population rather than by total 
residents. Adopting this different standardisation does not significantly alter the estimation results. 
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∆ 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡 is the annual change of long-term unemployment. As discussed above, a long period of 
unemployment often results in the marginalisation of workers and in skills loss and demotivation. 
The longer the duration of unemployment, the greater the risk of social exclusion, understood as 
the inability to afford material goods, services and housing, combined with the reduction of social 
contacts (European Commission, 2010). Long-term unemployment is used by the EU as one of 
its basic indicator of labour market exclusion (Atkinson et al., 2002). However, this indicator 
suffers a profound one-off shock in 2009 as a result of the crisis which is likely to affect the 
viability of the econometric analysis. We therefore resort to the use of long-term unemployment 
as a percentage of total unemployment – the ‘incidence’ of long-term unemployment, according 
to the European Commission (2014a) – as our main long-term unemployment proxy. We test the 
robustness of the results by using the long-term unemployment rate as an alternative dependent 
variable in the GMM models. 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡−1 are the lagged levels of employment and long-term unemployment, 
respectively. 
The four growth determinants are measured as follows: 
Human capital: percentage of total students in higher education (ISCED levels 5-6). This variable 
differs from the usual educational attainment proxy for human capital – the proportion of 
employed people holding university degrees (Nehru et al., 1993) – which cannot be used, as it is 
the dependent variable in one of the models. The drawback of using university students is that not 
all graduates will contribute to increase the stock of highly-qualified employable individuals in a 
region, as graduates are highly mobile (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Human capital proxies 
based on school enrolment (ratio between individuals of school age and students enrolled in 
educational institutions) are widely used in national level analyses (e.g. Barro, 1991). We 
therefore assume that a strong correlation exists between the capacity of a region to attract 
university students and the accumulation of talented individuals. 
Innovation capacity: patent applications per million inhabitants in the region, available until 2010. 
Patents are an imperfect proxy for innovative performance (Griliches, 1990), as not all inventions 
are patented and patenting propensity differs across sectors. Nonetheless, for want of better 
alternatives, this is the most frequently used variable (Acs et al., 2002), including the majority of 
studies assessing innovation performance at the regional level in the EU (e.g. Bottazzi & Peri, 
2003). 
Transport infrastructure: kilometres of roads per squared kilometre. This is a widespread measure 
of transport infrastructure density54 (e.g. Crescenzi & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Del Bo & Florio, 
                                                          
54 Using a different normalisation, e.g. kilometres of roads divided by thousand inhabitants, leaves our econometric 
results essentially unaltered (regression results available upon request). 
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2012). This variable is chosen over other available transport proxies (km of motorways only or 
of railways) because it gives a better representation of the transport network in a region. 
Quality of government institutions: EU Quality of Government (QoG) Index, calculated as a 
combination of the Regional QoG index developed by the QoG Institute of the University of 
Gothenburg and the World Bank Global Governance Indicators (WBGI). This variable was 
produced by Charron et al. (2014) by extending the Regional QoG over time. Due to the way in 
which it is calculated, this variable indicates the capacity of regions to equally provide key public 
services to all citizens. The index has already been employed as a proxy for regional institutions 
in the literature (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015).  
The model is completed by a set of control variables selected on the basis of existing empirical 
works analysing employment and unemployment determinants.  
First, we account for Okun’s law and for the economic cycle by controlling for the natural 
logarithm of the annual change of regional per capita GDP. A positive correlation with 
employment generation and a negative association with long-term unemployment change are 
expected.  
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents a vector of labour market variables. To control for labour market institutions, the 
model includes union density, available at the national level. While there are a variety of views 
about how unions shape labour market outcomes, the dominant position suggests that stronger 
unions are associated with  higher wages for the unskilled (Faini, 1999; Koeniger et al., 2007) and 
with higher unemployment (Nickell, 1997). Following the majority of analyses looking at the 
evolution of employment in EU regions, the models control for industrial structure (e.g. Martin 
& Tyler, 2000; Marelli et al., 2012), by including the share of employment in agriculture and 
fisheries and industry.55 Finally, models on regional unemployment normally consider a number 
of characteristics of the labour force structure. Perugini and Signorelli (2007) include the share of 
employees and part-time workers – the latter as a proxy for labour flexibility. The percentage of 
unemployed in long-term unemployment is included as a control in models 1 and 3. 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for collinearity is reported in Appendix A5. 
𝜑𝑖  and 𝜏𝑡 represent region and time dummies, respectively. 
All dependent and independent variables and their sources are presented in Appendix A2. The 
variables’ descriptive statistics and the correlation among the variables of interest are displayed 
in Appendix A3 and A4, respectively. 
                                                          
55 Eurostat provides data on regional employment in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sector. The three variables are 
collinear when included simultaneously in the model. We therefore choose primary and secondary sector employment 
(excluding services) for reasons of data availability. 
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The analysis considers all EU regions for which data are available and comprises a panel of 168 
NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions56 from 18 countries for the 1999-2010 period.  
For all regressions, standard errors are clustered at NUTS level (NUTS1 or NUTS2 depending on 
the geographical level at which variables are measured).  
 
7. Estimation results – employment generation 
 
The first three models focus on employment generation. In these models the four growth 
determinants – human capital, innovation, infrastructure, and government quality – are linked to 
annual change in employment to identify what drives job creation in EU regions. The increase of 
high-skilled employment has different social implications with respect to changes in low-skilled 
employment. While the former is a process following the structural transformation of the EU 
labour market, the latter is closely connected with social inclusion trends. For this reason, the 
results of the model assessing the effect of growth factors on low-skilled employment are 
interpreted as an indication of how labour market inclusion may be affected by the specific 
conditions of a region. 
The results of model (1) are displayed in Tables 1, 2, 3. We begin with a parsimonious 
specification including change in per capita GDP as the only control variable and excluding region 
dummies in a random effects (RE) model (columns (1), (5), (9)). The fixed effects (FE) version 
of this specification is shown in columns (2), (6), (10), where we test for systematic differences 
between the two models with a Hausman test. Columns (3), (7), (11) report the results with labour 
market controls. For the latter specifications, the Hausman test reports a systematic difference in 
the variables’ coefficients and we only report the preferred fixed effects results. Finally, the results 
of the GMM57 version of the model are depicted in columns (4), (8), (12). In all GMM estimations, 
first-order lags are excluded as instruments. The Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions 
reports a p-value indicating that instruments as a group are exogenous.  
                                                          
56 In our choice of geographical level for regions, we follow Crescenzi & Rodriguez-Pose (2012) and Crescenzi et al. 
(2016) in selecting the regional units by country which are more meaningful in terms of institutional and governance 
features. This implies NUTS2 regions for Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. NUTS1 are used for Belgium, Germany, and 
the UK.  
57 We opt for GMM-system (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) over GMM-difference because the 
lagged levels of our variables are likely to be weak instruments for first-differences of endogenous variables. 
Instruments are collapsed in order to avoid issues of instrument ‘proliferation’ (Roodman, 2009). As the Arellano-Bond 
autoregressive test reports first-order lags as endogenous, they are excluded as instruments. Alternative versions of 
GMM estimations demonstrate that the results are not sensitive to the introduction of further restrictions on the set of 
instruments used, for example by excluding lower-order time lags (regression tables available upon request). 
  
- 166 - 
 
In the case of change in total employment, the first specification shows that employment rose in 
regions with a higher stock of human capital and good government institutions. Transport 
infrastructure endowment is negatively and marginally significantly correlated with employment 
growth. The inclusion of fixed effects does not alter the significance of human capital, while 
innovative capacity becomes positive and significant, and government quality is no longer 
significant. These results remain unchanged when labour market controls are included. Therefore, 
the main findings of this model are that a larger share of highly-educated population and a 
strengthened innovative capacity have favoured employment generation in EU regions, a result 
that can be explained by the upskilling process in the composition of employment.  
 
Table 1 
Employment change and growth determinants 
Dep. Variable: Change in employment  
RE FE FE GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Human capital  
0.000135*** 0.000950*** 0.00103*** 0.000939** 
(4.44e-05) (0.000233) (0.000244) (0.000368) 
Innovation 
-2.97e-06 3.04e-05** 3.08e-05** 3.02e-05* 
(2.29e-06) (1.34e-05) (1.24e-05) (1.73e-05) 
Transport infrastructure  
-0.000222* -0.00278 -0.00308 -0.00187 
(0.000127) (0.00190) (0.00217) (0.00174) 
Government quality  
0.000772*** 0.00206* 0.000539 0.00102 
(0.000177) (0.00126) (0.00132) (0.00107) 
Change of log of per capita GDP 
0.0218** 0.0425*** 0.0775*** 0.0796*** 
(0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0211) 
Union density 
  2.83e-05 0.000134 
  (0.000248) (0.000155) 
Share of employees  
  -0.00760 0.0314 
  (0.0244) (0.0289) 
Share of part-time workers 
  -0.0165 0.0366 
  (0.0252) (0.0256) 
Share of unemployed people being 
long term unemployed 
  8.26e-05* -0.000140** 
  (4.68e-05) (6.53e-05) 
Share of people employed in the 
primary sector 
  -0.0189 -0.0243 
  (0.0416) (0.0378) 
Share of people employed in the 
industry sector 
  0.0186 0.0690* 
  (0.0261) (0.0394) 
Lagged employment change 
   -0.195*** 
   (0.0429) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies  ✓ ✓  
Observations  1,742 1,742 1,593 1,593 
R-squared 0.189 0.201 0.466  
EU regions 168 168 157 157 
Hausman FE/RE (p>χ2)  55.1 (0.000) 34.4 (0.044)  
Instruments    151 
AR(1) test (p-value)    -7.56 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p-value)    -1.19 (0.235) 
AR(3) test (p-value)    -0.56 (0.575) 
AR(4) test (p-value)    -0.05 (0.962) 
Hansen test (p-value)    147.2 (0.096) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Collapsed instruments in GMM estimations. 
Second-order and higher order lags used as instruments. 
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Regarding our control variables, an increase in per capita GDP is positively correlated with 
employment generation, in line with Okun’s law. The only significant labour market variables are 
the share of people in manufacturing (positively associated with employment creation in the 
GMM estimate) and the share of unemployed being long-term unemployed, taking the expected 
negative coefficient in the GMM model.58 
In sum, the more successful regions in job generation are those accumulating more qualified 
individuals and with greater innovation potential. This result is consistent with the fact that in the 
European ‘knowledge economy’ the ‘winners’ have been regions investing in skills and making 
a better use of the available human resources to maintain the competitiveness of their production 
structure and their local labour market. 
Switching to the variation of those in employment holding higher education degrees as the 
dependent variable (Table 2), the first specification (column (5)) indicates that high-skilled 
employment has grown more in regions with a skilled workforce and with more efficient public 
institutions. However, government quality is no longer significant in the fixed effects estimation. 
The sign and significance of human capital is, by contrast, robust to the inclusion of all controls. 
High-skilled employment increased more in regions with a highly-educated population. This 
provides evidence that EU regions feature self-reinforcing spatial concentrations of human 
capital, i.e. high-skilled jobs increase where skills are already clustered. The inclusion of region 
dummies uncovers a negative effect on high-skilled employment growth in regions where 
transport infrastructure is more developed.59 However, the coefficient is insignificant in the GMM 
model. Innovation capacity, marginally significant in the RE model, turns positive but 
insignificant with region fixed effects. Regarding the controls, a larger share of long-term 
unemployed has a negative effect on high-skilled jobs creation (column (7)), while the only labour 
market variable remaining significant across specifications is manufacturing employment.  
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Models (1) and (3) are also estimated using the long-term unemployment rate as control variable instead of the share 
of unemployed being long-term unemployed. All the main results remain unchanged. The long-term unemployment 
rate is negative and significantly correlated with employment growth. These regression results are available upon 
request.  
59 This result may be explained by the fact that better road connections may represent an opportunity for skilled workers 
to move away from relatively less competitive regions towards more dynamic areas. Although estimates in Table A6.1 
show that the coefficient of transport infrastructure is negative and significant among core, not peripheral regions, a 
further sub-division of regions among different income levels demonstrates that the negative coefficient is mainly 
driven by regions with intermediate income, while in the richest EU regions a better transportation contributes 
positively to the dynamics of high-skilled jobs.  
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Table 2  
High-skilled employment change and growth determinants 
Dep. Variable: Change in high-skilled employment 
RE FE FE GMM 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Human capital  
0.000118*** 0.000347** 0.000567*** 0.000517*** 
(2.19e-05) (0.000137) (9.94e-05) (0.000185) 
Innovation 
-3.88e-06* 1.24e-05 6.39e-06 2.47e-05** 
(1.98e-06) (1.10e-05) (8.34e-06) (1.11e-05) 
Transport infrastructure  
0.000135 -0.00321*** -0.00325*** -0.000813 
(0.000111) (0.000744) (0.000993) (0.00123) 
Government quality  
0.000278*** 0.000553 0.000173 0.000227 
(7.47e-05) (0.000404) (0.000512) (0.000717) 
Change of log of per capita GDP 
0.0112*** 0.00985** 0.0216*** 0.0355*** 
(0.00377) (0.00458) (0.00590) (0.0115) 
Union density 
  -0.000119 -3.69e-05 
  (9.29e-05) (9.58e-05) 
Share of employees  
  0.0125 0.00321 
  (0.0132) (0.0225) 
Share of part-time workers 
  0.00681 -0.0142 
  (0.0101) (0.0138) 
Share of unemployed people being 
long-term unemployed 
  -1.81e-05 -0.000108** 
  (2.44e-05) (4.57e-05) 
Share of people employed in the 
primary sector 
  -0.0319** -0.0161 
  (0.0160) (0.0254) 
Share of people employed in the 
industry sector 
  -0.0471*** -0.101*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0249) 
Lagged high-skilled employment 
   -0.0627 
   (0.0521) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies  ✓ ✓  
Observations  1,720 1,720 1,593 1,593 
R-squared 0.037 0.044 0.074  
EU regions 166 166 157 157 
Hausman FE/RE (p>χ2)  13.3 (0.582) 41.3 (0.005)  
Instruments    141 
AR(1) test (p-value)    -7.51 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p-value)    -0.93 (0.352) 
AR(3) test (p-value)    -0.67 (0.503) 
AR(4) test (p-value)    -1.08 (0.281) 
Hansen test (p-value)    129.2 (0.208) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Collapsed instruments in GMM estimations. 
Second-order and higher order lags used as instruments. 
 
In the third version of model (1), the dependent variable is change in low-skilled employment 
(Table 3). Regions experiencing more significant increases (or less pronounced decreases) in 
employment of less-qualified workers are those with poverty and social exclusion problems.  
The relationship between local factors and low-skilled employment generation differs from the 
specifications describing the dynamics of total employment and high-skilled employment. Unlike 
in previous versions of the model, the positive and significant coefficient of government quality 
is robust to the inclusion of all control variables and to changes in estimation method (Table 3, 
columns (10)-(12)). Regions with higher government quality have more successfully tackled 
declines in employment for the low-skilled.  
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Table 3  
Low-skilled employment change and growth determinants 
Dep. Variable: Change in low-skilled employment 
RE FE FE GMM 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
Human capital  
7.13e-05*** 0.000350*** 0.000154 1.91e-05 
(2.35e-05) (0.000105) (0.000113) (0.000136) 
Innovation 
1.37e-06 2.12e-06 6.90e-06 -3.96e-08 
(1.53e-06) (8.66e-06) (8.51e-06) (9.51e-06) 
Transport infrastructure  
2.50e-05 -3.60e-06 -0.000142 -0.000214 
(7.19e-05) (0.00123) (0.00113) (0.000717) 
Government quality  
0.000327*** 0.00224*** 0.00152** 0.00122** 
(0.000118) (0.000517) (0.000597) (0.000520) 
Change of log of per capita GDP 
0.00666 0.0166*** 0.0360*** 0.0529*** 
(0.00619) (0.00636) (0.00694) (0.0123) 
Union density 
  -1.73e-05 -0.000111* 
  (9.90e-05) (6.53e-05) 
Share of employees  
  -0.0318* -0.0612*** 
  (0.0170) (0.0153) 
Share of part-time workers 
  -0.0157 0.0141 
  (0.0121) (0.0110) 
Share of unemployed people being 
long-term unemployed 
  -3.19e-05 2.91e-05 
  (2.56e-05) (3.78e-05) 
Share of people employed in the 
primary sector 
  0.0465** -0.0590*** 
  (0.0221) (0.0200) 
Share of people employed in the 
industry sector 
  0.0377*** 0.00356 
  (0.0137) (0.0173) 
Lagged low-skilled employment 
   -0.0538*** 
   (0.0132) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies  ✓ ✓  
Observations  1,742 1,742 1,593 1,593 
R-squared 0.072 0.083 0.129  
EU regions 168 168 157 157 
Hausman FE/RE (p>χ2)  32.7 (0.005) 51.3 (0.000)  
Instruments    141 
AR(1) test (p-value)    -7.59 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p-value)    -1.01 (0.312) 
AR(3) test (p-value)    0.85 (0.395) 
AR(4) test (p-value)    -0.07 (0.948) 
Hansen test (p-value)    130.8 (0.181) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Collapsed instruments in GMM estimations. 
Second-order and higher order lags used as instruments. 
 
 
Of the other economic growth determinants, only human capital displays a significant coefficient, 
which becomes insignificant in the GMM model. Of the control variables, regional GDP growth 
is positive and significant in all specifications, while a higher share of workers is negatively 
associated with low-skilled employment generation. New jobs for the low-skilled have been 
created in regions with higher shares of industrial employment, indicating that the association 
between manufacturing employment and job creation of column (3) in Table 1, mainly relates to 
low-skilled jobs. Agricultural employment is associated with lower high-skilled employment 
change in the GMM estimation. The coefficient of union density is negative and significant in 
column (12), meaning that a strong presence of trade unions is not enough to stem the low-skilled 
job haemorrhage. An increase in high-skilled employment is connected with a decrease in low-
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skilled employment. The labour market upskilling process works at the expense of individuals 
with fewer opportunities to adapt to new professions, who are pushed out of employment by 
overqualified workers.  
The results of the analysis also confirm a strong relationship linking government quality and 
corruption with inequality (Mauro, 1998; Gupta et al., 2002; Rothstein, 2011). Efficient public 
institutions may provide greater support for disadvantaged workers, by, for example, setting up 
effective labour market re-insertion schemes targeting those in highest need, delivering effective 
public policies and services to all citizens, or curbing corruption. 
 
Employment generation in core and peripheral regions 
 
Do the results vary depending on the level of development of EU regions? To address this 
question, we sub-divide the full sample into core and peripheral regions according to the European 
Commission classification for the 2007-2013 Cohesion Policy programming period. Peripheral 
regions are those with a per capita GDP below 75% of the EU average and receiving larger shares 
of Structural Funds. Core regions are all remaining regions. The three versions of models (1) and 
(3) are estimated for the sub-samples of core and peripheral regions both with FE and GMM 
methods.60 
The results are presented in Appendix A6 (Table A6.1). Columns (1) to (4) refer to the model 
analysing the determinants of total employment generation. The estimates indicate that the key 
finding of Table 1 – human capital endowment as a driver of employment growth – applies 
particularly to less developed regions, while in richer regions employment has grown the most in 
more technologically advanced and innovative areas. The positive correlation between the stock 
of highly qualified individuals and high-skilled employment generation of Table 2 is principally 
driven by the most developed regions. The human capital coefficient in columns (5) and (6) (core 
regions) of Table A6.1 is positive and significant and displays a larger magnitude relative to 
columns (7) and (8) (peripheral regions). Government quality also has a different effect on low-
skilled employment generation in core and less developed regions. The positive effect of 
government institutions on the creation of jobs for the less skilled is mainly driven by the less 
developed subset (columns (11) and (12), Table A6.1), rather than by core regions (columns (9) 
and (10)). While the coefficient of government institutions is positive across all specifications, its 
magnitude and significance are higher in less developed regions. Hence, higher regional 
                                                          
60 As this empirical test is performed on reduced samples, in order to keep the number of instruments in the GMM 
model close to the number of groups (Roodman, 2009), only second to sixth-order lags in the estimations for core 
regions and second to fifth-order lags in the estimations for peripheral regions are considered. 
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government quality makes a difference for the promotion of labour market inclusion particularly 
in poorer areas, where the welfare system and social infrastructures are generally less developed 
and efficient.  
 
8. Estimation results - social exclusion 
 
Models (2) and (4) describe the relationship between different growth determinants and the 
evolution of long-term unemployment over the 1999-2010 period. Long-term unemployment is 
recognised by the European Commission as an indicator of labour market exclusion. Some 
countries have even set long-term unemployment targets in order to comply with the Europe 2020 
social inclusion objective.61 Therefore, the results of these models can be seen as a description of 
the dynamics of social exclusion in EU regions.  
The results are shown in Table 4. The model is estimated with the change in the share of 
unemployed being long-term unemployed as dependent variables and RE, FE and GMM 
methodologies. To test the robustness of the results, the GMM model is replicated with the change 
in the long-term unemployment rate as dependent variable (column (6)). 
In all different specifications and with both long-term unemployment proxies, human capital and 
government quality display significant and negative coefficients. Long-term unemployment has 
reduced in regions with a more educated population, possibly because of the employability of 
skilled workers. The finding confirms that, as suggested by the European Commission (2013), 
education is a major factor for avoiding long-term unemployment and limiting social exclusion. 
High government quality is also associated with lower long-term unemployment, further 
supporting the main results of the model with low-skilled employment as dependent variable. 
Regions with effective and accountable governments, where the provision of public services such 
as health care and education is of better quality, have been more able to establish measures to 
control long-term unemployment and social exclusion than regions with a weaker government 
quality.  
Reverting the persistent unemployment trends in Europe thus requires targeted measures to 
reform local labour markets, developed by effective government institutions. These may include 
labour supply (i.e. improving the employability of those out of work; promoting the upward 
                                                          
61 Germany has committed to a reduction in long-term unemployment of 320,000 individuals; Sweden has pledged 
to reduce long-term unemployment and long-term sick leave by 14% 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/targets_en.pdf). 
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mobility for those in employment) and demand-side measures (e.g. equal opportunity policies; 
encouraging social integration) (Gordon, 2006).  
Long-term unemployment and social exclusion are not affected by the extensiveness of regional 
transport networks, while the GMM model with long-term unemployment rate as dependent 
variable displays a positive and significant association between innovation capacity and long-
term unemployment change. Labour market exclusion has grown the most in regions with more 
developed innovation structures. The positive correlation between patents and social exclusion 
supports the idea that technological development affects most the less qualified workers, acting 
as a driver of labour market inequalities in Europe (Lee and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013).  
Turning to the control variables, as predicted by Okun’s law, there is a negative relationship 
between GDP growth and long-term unemployment. Long-term unemployment decreases as 
regional output increases and appears conditioned by the regional industrial structure. It has 
grown more in rural regions and less in manufacturing regions. However, the negative coefficient 
of industrial employment turns insignificant in the GMM models. Similarly, the positive link 
between the share of employees and long-term unemployment is no longer evident when 
endogeneity is minimised with the GMM. The specifications including change in high-skilled and 
low-skilled employment as regressors show that they both are connected with long-term 
unemployment reduction. 
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Table 4  
Long-term unemployment change and growth determinants 
Dep. Variable: Change in unemployed people being long-term unemployed 
Change in long-term 
unemployment rate 
RE FE FE GMM GMM 
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
Human capital  
-0.0943*** -0.636*** -0.550*** -0.824*** -0.188*** 
(0.0183) (0.0800) (0.0987) (0.200) (0.0506) 
Innovation 
0.00130 0.00585 0.00106 0.00140 0.00526** 
(0.000951) (0.00507) (0.00557) (0.0115) (0.00236) 
Transport infrastructure  
0.0315 0.000802 0.379 1.092 0.336 
(0.0376) (1.306) (1.382) (1.305) (0.228) 
Government quality 
-0.116** -1.497*** -0.933** -1.175** -0.264** 
(0.0587) (0.391) (0.444) (0.618) (0.126) 
Change of log of per capita GDP 
-13.70*** -14.84*** -17.28*** -37.10*** -4.477*** 
(3.818) (4.822) (5.879) (10.47) (1.574) 
Union density 
  -0.0159 0.101 0.0173 
  (0.0951) (0.0762) (0.0133) 
Share of employees  
  29.75** 9.611 -4.086 
  (13.76) (29.01) (4.580) 
Share of part-time workers 
  7.430 31.35 0.242 
  (9.636) (20.60) (3.911) 
Share of people employed in the primary sector 
  75.44*** 86.48*** 10.81** 
  (18.71) (27.01) (4.565) 
Share of people employed in the industry sector 
  -27.41** 22.91 0.0606 
  (11.94) (27.10) (5.684) 
Lagged unemployed people being LTU 
   -0.188***  
   (0.0479)  
Lagged LTU rate 
    -0.192*** 
    (0.0342) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies  ✓ ✓   
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,588 1,588 1,538 
R-squared 0.189 0.218 0.219   
EU regions 164 164 156 156 151 
Hausman FE/RE (p>χ2)  65.6 (0.000) 83.2 (0.000)   
Instruments    140 140 
AR(1) test (p-value)    -8.28 (0.000) -5.70 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p-value)    3.16 (0.002) 1.02 (0.309) 
AR(3) test (p-value)    -1.06 (0.287) -0.53 (0.594) 
AR(4) test (p-value)    0.44 (0.658) -0.64 (0.524) 
Hansen test (p-value)    130.2 (0.174) 132.5 (0.141) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Collapsed instruments in GMM estimations. Second-order and higher order lags used as instruments. 
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9. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In the coming years the EU will spend vast resources to revamp its economy and generate job 
opportunities in its depressed labour market. The funds will be invested in the hope of 
developing not just more competitive, but also more inclusive economies. In this paper we 
have examined the extent to which the pillars of the new growth strategies have indeed 
contributed to past employment generation and social inclusion in European regions. We 
identified four types of economic factors (infrastructure, human capital, innovation, 
government quality) and tested whether they are linked to regional employment growth, labour 
market disparities, and social exclusion.  
Over the past 15 years, the EU workforce has become both more specialised and more prone 
to risks of labour market exclusion. Our empirical findings suggest that the two elements that 
have been associated with faster employment growth are a relatively higher endowment of 
highly-skilled workers, mostly in less developed regions, and a stronger regional innovative 
performance, particularly in more advanced regions. Human capital has been at the heart of 
new job creation for the most skilled. A better capacity to absorb new workers, however, has 
not necessarily implied a decrease in the number of disadvantaged workers. The proportion of 
individuals in poverty or at risk of social exclusion has increased sharply since 2009. More 
inclusive societies will thus require the promotion of better opportunities for the low-skilled 
and the long-term unemployed. 
In this respect, the results of the analysis indicate that better and more efficient governments, 
able to provide high quality public services to all citizens, have helped reducing labour market 
marginalisation and stemmed the loss of low-skilled jobs. This is particularly true for the less 
developed regions of Europe, generally characterised by lower economic capacity and 
government quality. Unlike short-term unemployed and highly educated workers, whose job 
opportunities are less affected by recessions (Oreopoulos et al., 2012), low-skilled workers 
face a strong risk of permanent exclusion. Other things equal, a more favourable institutional 
environment can make the difference in ensuring that public policies facilitate job-market re-
entry.  
The empirical analysis also demonstrates that a good human capital base is vital to reduce 
long-term unemployment, and hence social exclusion. Upward mobility schemes or the 
matching of educational achievement to local job requirements can help in this respect 
(Nativel, 2002; Gordon, 2006). In order to better match labour supply and demand, education 
and training programmes should reflect the need for skills to a greater extent than they do now 
(Cedefop, 2015). Strengthening networks between schools and universities, on the one hand, 
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and the business environment, on the other, would contribute to addressing the skill mismatch. 
These interventions should be combined with measures targeting specifically those out of work 
(Gordon, 2006), such as employability programmes or policy initiatives generating new jobs 
for which the low-skilled have a comparative advantage. Conversely, investment strategies 
centred on technological development (e.g. R&D spending), by favouring the creation of high-
skilled jobs, may exacerbate the employment divide between the most equipped workers and 
those with fewer qualifications.  
More broadly, EU regions need to define comprehensive labour market strategies involving 
the largest possible number of stakeholders and dealing with wide-ranging issues, including 
the upskilling of the unemployed and socially excluded, the creation of vocational training 
programmes, and addressing skill mismatch problems (Cedefop, 2015). This general set of 
recommendations should be adapted to the needs and priorities of each specific context. 
While some of these measures are already included in EU programmes targeting employment 
and social exclusion, the financial resources allocated to this target may require revision to 
tackle low-skilled unemployment and social exclusion more effectively (Frazier & Marlier, 
2013).  
This study has demonstrated that not all areas of regional intervention affect labour market 
conditions in the same way. The generation of employment and the process of labour 
upskilling depend on different economic factors than the dynamics of long-term 
unemployment and social inclusion. The regional endowment of human capital is a positive 
element for growth, employment promotion and social inclusion, but it is unlikely that 
education investments alone will suffice to fulfil the inclusion objectives of the Europe 2020 
strategy. Especially in disadvantaged regions, characterised by weak governments and higher 
corruption, education policies should be coupled with institutional reforms, as improvements 
in governance are essential to put the socially excluded back in the employment track. The 
presence of adequate government institutions is a prerequisite for the success of any labour 
market policy.  
Interventions in this direction may help the regions worst affected by the economic crisis to 
adapt to the changes underway in the European labour market. The EU is facing the complex 
challenges of recovering from the worst recession in almost a century, while reaffirming its 
pivotal position in the global economy. While the most qualified workers may be sufficiently 
equipped to compete globally, the low-skilled are those whose employment opportunities are 
most threatened. The formulation of policies sensitive to the needs of the weakest workers 
would help to ensure the participation in the labour market of those in the workforce facing 
the higher risk of marginalisation, lightening the burden on the European welfare systems, and 
reducing economic and social disparities in Europe.  
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Appendix 
 
A1  Long-term unemployment trend in the EU 
 
Figure A1.1  
Evolution of long-term unemployment in the EU, 1999-2013 
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A2  Variables description 
 
Table A2.1  
Description of the variables 
Variable  
Source Definition 
Dependent variables   
Change in employment Eurostat - LFS 
Annual change of total employed people (aged 15 or over) divided by total regional 
population. 
Change in high-skilled 
employment 
Eurostat - LFS 
Annual change of the percentage of employed people (aged 15 or over) with 
completed higher education (first and second stage of tertiary education - ISCED-
97 levels 5 and 6) divided by total regional population. 
Change in low-skilled 
employment 
Eurostat - LFS 
Annual change of the percentage of employed people (aged 15 or over) with less 
than primary, primary and lower secondary level of education (ISCED-97 levels 0, 1 
and 2) divided by total regional population. 
Change in unemployed 
people being long-term 
unemployed 
Eurostat - LFS 
Annual change of long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as percentage of 
total unemployment. 
Change in long-term 
unemployment rate 
Eurostat - LFS 
Annual change of long-term unemployment (12 months or more) divided by 
economically active population. 
Growth determinants   
Human capital Eurostat 
Students at ISCED-97 levels 5-6 as percentage of all pupils and students aged 15-
24 at regional level. 
Innovation Eurostat Patent applications to the EPO per million of regional inhabitants. 
Transport infrastructure Eurostat Kilometres of motor-roads divided by squared kilometres of regional land. 
Government quality 
QoG Institute - 
WBGI 
Regional Quality of Government (QoG) Index elaborated by the QoG Institute at the 
University of Gothenburg, a survey-based index constructed around three main 
pillars: quality of education, public health care and law enforcement; impartiality in 
education, public health and legal protection; level of corruption in education, health 
care and the legal system. The index has been combined with the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (Charron et al., 2014). 
Control for Okun’s law   
Change of ln per capita GDP OECD 
Annual change of natural logarithm of regional Gross Domestic Product divided by 
regional population. 
Labour market controls   
Union density 
OECD - 
ILOSTAT 
Trade union density, calculated as the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade 
union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners. National 
level variable, all regions of a country are assigned the same value.   
Share of employees  Eurostat - LFS Number of employees divided by total regional employment. 
Share of part-time workers Eurostat - LFS Number of part-time workers divided by total regional employment. 
Share of people employed in 
the primary sector 
Eurostat - LFS 
Number of people employed in NACE categories A (Agriculture, forestry and fishing) 
and B (Mining and quarrying) divided by total regional population. 
Share of people employed in 
the industry sector 
Eurostat - LFS 
Number of people employed in NACE categories C (Manufacturing), D (Electricity, 
gas, steam and air conditioning supply), E (Construction) and F (Water supply; 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities) divided by total regional 
population. 
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A3  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A3.1  
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables    
Change in employment 1890 0.0018 0.013 
Change in high-skilled employment 1898 0.0035 0.007 
Change in low-skilled employment 1898 -0.0029 0.008 
Change in unemployed being LTU  1821 -0.397 6.27 
Change in LTU rate 1764 0.058 1.08 
Lagged dependent variables    
Lagged employment 1898 0.429 0.057 
Lagged high-skilled employment 1898 0.096 0.041 
Lagged low-skilled employment 1898 0.115 0.068 
Lagged unemployed being LTU  1827 39.04 14.06 
Lagged LTU rate 1772 3.862 3.187 
Growth determinants    
Human capital (share of university students) 1950 15.46 6.568 
Innovation (patent applications per million inhabitants) 2092 69.93 94.41 
Transport infrastructure (roads per squared km) 1956 1.373 1.474 
Government qualitya (QoG Index) 2088 6.992 1.989 
Okun’s law    
Change of ln per capita GDP 1898 0.044 0.047 
Labour market controls    
Union density 1966 25.416 15.663 
Share of employees  2064 0.822 0.086 
Share of part-time workers 2063 0.167 0.106 
Long-term unemployment as share of unemployment 1992 38.95 13.81 
Share of people employed in the primary sector 2064 0.071 0.086 
Share of people employed in the industry sector 2062 0.281 0.073 
Note: Quality of Government Index standardised between 0 (lowest-quality institutions) and 1 (highest-quality institutions). 
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A4  Correlation matrix 
 
Table A4.1  
Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * p<0.05 
 ∆ 𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡 ∆ ℎ𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡 ∆ 𝑙𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡 ∆ 𝑈 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡 ∆ 𝐿𝑇𝑈 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝/𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 𝐻𝐾𝑖,𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑖,𝑡 𝑄𝑜𝐺𝑖,𝑡  
∆ 𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡 1          
∆ ℎ𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡 0.308* 1         
∆ 𝑙𝑠𝐿𝑖,𝑡 0.501* -0.135* 1        
∆ 𝑈 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑇𝑈𝑖,𝑡 -0.184* -0.082* -0.106* 1       
∆ 𝐿𝑇𝑈 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.454* -0.121* -0.237* 0.643* 1      
∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝/𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 0.225* 0.067* 0.115* -0.050* -0.025* 1     
𝐻𝐾𝑖,𝑡 0.016 0.104* 0.027 -0.082* -0.073* 0.055* 1    
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 0.034 -0.021 0.056* -0.002 0.015 -0.115* 0.031 1   
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑖,𝑡 -0.011 0.036 0.021 0.003 0.026 -0.075* 0.056* 0.147* 1  
𝑄𝑜𝐺𝑖,𝑡 0.085* 0.016 0.060* -0.006 -0.042 -0.222* 0.252* 0.478* 0.172* 1 
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A5  Test for multicollinearity 
 
Table A5.1  
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Change in high-skilled employment 1.12 0.89 
Change in low-skilled employment 1.17 0.85 
Change of log of per capita GDP 2.02 0.49 
Union density 1.31 0.76 
Share of employees  2.75 0.36 
Share of part-time workers 2.89 0.35 
Share of unemployed people being long-term 
unemployed 
1.6 0.63 
Share of people employed in the primary sector 2.15 0.47 
Share of people employed in the industry sector 1.82 0.55 
Government quality 3.33 0.30 
Human capital 1.38 0.72 
Innovation 1.59 0.63 
Transport infrastructure 1.33 0.75 
year   
2001 2.12 0.47 
2002 2.23 0.45 
2003 2.35 0.43 
2004 2.2 0.45 
2005 2.23 0.45 
2006 2.21 0.45 
2007 2.24 0.45 
2008 2.4 0.42 
2009 3.08 0.32 
2010 2.27 0.44 
Mean VIF 2.08 
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A6  Employment generation by skill-type, core and peripheral regions  
Table A6.1  
Employment generation in core and peripheral regions 
 Dep. Variable: Change in employment Change in high-skilled employment Change in low-skilled employment 
 Core Periphery Core Periphery Core Periphery 
 FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Human capital  
-9.13e-05 0.000518 0.00117*** 0.00104* 0.000588*** 0.000586** 0.000347* 0.000151 0.000119 -4.34e-05 0.000266 -0.000173 
(0.000177) (0.000422) (0.000384) (0.000563) (0.000143) (0.000286) (0.000177) (0.000216) (0.000148) (0.000281) (0.000201) (0.000300) 
Innovation 
2.23e-05** 4.38e-05** -0.000101 -5.84e-05 4.79e-06 9.23e-06 3.99e-05 7.68e-05 5.33e-06 1.31e-05 1.60e-05 -3.87e-05 
(9.84e-06) (1.88e-05) (6.17e-05) (7.57e-05) (8.53e-06) (1.19e-05) (3.91e-05) (5.21e-05) (7.90e-06) (1.15e-05) (3.36e-05) (3.90e-05) 
Transport infrastructure  
-2.69e-05 -0.00162 -0.0461** -0.00347 -0.00375*** -0.00180 -0.00132 0.000960 -0.00187 -0.000884 0.00684 -0.000825 
(0.00193) (0.00251) (0.0186) (0.00591) (0.00129) (0.00237) (0.00679) (0.00194) (0.00124) (0.00160) (0.00888) (0.00183) 
Government quality 
-7.70e-05 0.00102 0.00487** 0.00176 0.000317 0.000104 -0.000398 -0.000436 0.000953 2.42e-07 0.00331** 0.00209*** 
(0.00122) (0.00131) (0.00231) (0.00128) (0.000656) (0.00105) (0.00114) (0.000841) (0.000763) (0.000764) (0.00130) (0.000702) 
Change of log of per 
capita GDP 
0.00998 -0.0351 0.0555*** 0.0932*** 0.0254*** 0.0741*** 0.0285*** 0.0338** 0.0411*** 0.0737*** 0.0305*** 0.00454 
(0.0105) (0.0326) (0.0143) (0.0343) (0.00904) (0.0226) (0.00766) (0.0163) (0.00984) (0.0222) (0.00883) (0.0146) 
Lagged employment 
 -0.254***  -0.131***         
 (0.0765)  (0.0480)         
Lagged high-skilled 
employment 
     -0.0513  -0.107**     
     (0.0470)  (0.0444)     
Lagged low-skilled 
employment 
         -0.0997***  -0.0292 
         (0.0334)  (0.0204) 
Labour market controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Observations  1,106 1,106 476 476 1,106 1,106 476 476 1,106 1,106 476 476 
R-squared 0.482  0.532  0.120  0.145  0.174  0.185  
EU regions 106 106 50 50 106 106 50 50 106 106 50 50 
Instruments  89  76  83  71  83  71 
AR(1) test (p-value)  -5.65 (0.000)  -4.00 (0.000)  -6.64 (0.000)  -4.42 (0.000)  -6.89 (0.000)  -3.79 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p-value)  -1.54 (0.124)  -1.82 (0.068)  -1.28 (0.199)  -1.03 (0.304)  -0.74 (0.462)  -2.43 (0.015) 
AR(3) test (p-value)  -0.69 (0.487)  0.89 (0.375)  1.04 (0.299)  0.37 (0.710)  0.66 (0.507)  1.02 (0.306) 
AR(4) test (p-value)  0.00 (0.997)  -0.04 (0.966)  -1.28 (0.202)  -0.32 (0.749)  -0.52 (0.601)  0.39 (0.695) 
Hansen test (p-value)  85.6 (0.037)  40.3 (0.860)  71.1 (0.135) 
 
 22.5 (0.999)  57.4 (0.531)  21.8 (0.999) 
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Collapsed instruments in GMM estimations. Second to sixth order lags used as instruments in columns (2), (6), (10); second 
to sixth order lags used as instruments in columns (4), (8), (12).
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Organised crime, captured politicians, and the 
allocation of public resources 
 
Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco 
 
 
Abstract 
What is the impact of organised crime on the public finances of local governments? This paper 
studies the consequences of collusion between members of criminal organisations and politicians 
in Italy. The ‘capturing’ of local government’s decision-making from organised crime is identified 
by exploiting a national law that allows the dissolution of municipal governments upon evidence 
of mafia ‘infiltration’, i.e. the collusion between public officials and members of organised crime. 
Newly-collected data on local public finances allow to investigate the consequences of this 
collusion on the spending decisions and the fiscal efficiency of local governments over the 1998-
2013 period. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrations significantly affect the 
proportion of resources allocated to key components of local capital expenditure. Municipal 
governments controlled by the mafia invest more for construction, and less for law enforcement. 
In addition, infiltrated governments collect fewer taxes for waste and garbage. The analysis also 
uncovers key elements of local elections associated with mafia-government collusions. In 
particular, regression discontinuity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur in 
governments controlled by right-wing parties.  
  
Keywords: organised crime, local public finances, collusion, government captures, Italy.  
JEL Classification: K42; H72; D72. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Organised crime is detrimental to the functioning of any democratic or economic system 
(Gambetta, 1993). Its presence produces institutional failures with the potential to influence key 
aspects of the legal economic activity, undermining the long run development of every society 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Pinotti, 2015). The strength of mafia groups, as well as their influence 
on the legal economy, relies on the diffused external complicity, i.e. an increasing close 
relationship between organised crime groups and public officials such as national or local 
politicians and public administrators (Dickie, 2005). Thanks to the development of such networks, 
organised crime has become highly pervasive and fully integrated into the everyday socio-
economic and political life of many countries in the world (Leonardi, 1995; Trigilia, 2001; Allum 
and Siebert, 2003).  
Yet, understanding the extent to which these dynamics condition the choices and activities of 
policy-makers is far from easy. What impact does the collusion between members of criminal 
organisations and politicians have on local public finances? In this paper, we tackle this question 
by investigating a particular aspect of organised crime activity: its ‘infiltration’ within local 
governments. Such infiltration occurs when criminal groups manage to ‘capture’ local politicians 
who in turn manipulate policy decisions in their favour. We study the case of Italy, country home 
to the first form of organised crime, by using a unique yearly municipal-level dataset for the three 
Italian regions where organised crime is most widespread and rooted: Calabria, Campania and 
Sicily.62 
In order to measure the presence of organised crime, we exploit the staggered enforcement of 
national law 164/1991, which allows for the dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence 
of collusion between elected officials and criminal organisations. The enforcement of this law 
within a given municipality at a specific point in time represents a sudden shock to both the local 
political establishment and the organised crime group, given that its occurrence and timing is 
solely determined at the national level and kept secret until its implementation.  
More specifically, we exploit the enforcement of this policy to identify and compare municipal 
governments with and without infiltration before and after such infiltration occurs. Differences-
in-differences estimates reveal that the influence of organised crime on local governments does 
                                                          
62 A focus on southern regions rather than on Italy as a whole has the advantage of restricting the sample to a relatively 
homogenous area in terms of unobservable elements such as culture or social capital, traditionally considered as highly 
diversified across this country (Putnam, 1993, Leonardi, 1995). 
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not affect the total level of public spending of municipalities, but does have consequences both 
for the allocation of public resources and the collection of fiscal revenues. In particular, infiltrated 
local governments modify capital expenditures in sectors that are strategic to the interests of 
organised crime. According to our estimates, infiltration leads to an increase in the share of total 
investments in construction and waste management, and to a decrease in the annual share of 
investment in police force. Moreover, infiltrated municipalities exhibit a lower ability to collect 
waste and garbage taxes. An extensive set of robustness tests confirm these findings. 
Our estimates could pick up some non-mafia related effects (e.g. low quality of politicians, 
unstable governments) or be determined by political characteristics of the municipal elections 
correlated with infiltrations. To address this issue, we perform a series of further tests, ensuring 
that our results are driven by mafia collusion and not by any of these potentially unobserved 
components. We identify a set of political characteristics of municipal elections with which the 
infiltration is correlated. Although descriptive, this exercise is noteworthy in that it uncovers a 
relationship between infiltrations and elections where there is just one candidate running for 
office, the mayor is running for her second and last term, and the right-wing party wins the 
election. Using our differences-in-differences setting, we show that none of these factors have an 
impact on public spending or on revenues collection.  
In the final part of the paper, we focus on the systematic correlation between collusion and 
elections won by right-wing parties, implementing a regression discontinuity design based on 
close elections. Our results show that the probability of infiltration increases when the right-wing 
party barely wins an election. However, closely elected right-wing governments are not 
systematically related to variations in public spending during infiltration periods. These results 
further corroborate our main hypothesis that the observed variations in public finances are due to 
collusion between organised crime and politicians as opposed to any other unobserved factors. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides the background, reviews the 
relevant literature, and describes the contribution of our work; section 3 focuses on the 
institutional setting used as a basis for the difference-in-differences analysis and discusses our 
identification strategy; section 4 discusses the data; section 5 presents the main results; section 6 
reports a set of robustness tests; section 7 extends the analysis by studying the relationship 
between infiltration and political factors and in particular the relationship between right-wing 
parties and infiltration; section 8 concludes. 
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2. Background and review of the literature 
 
According to recent estimates, the total combined annual revenue of the Italian mafias is €10.7 
billion, with the Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta being the most profitable organisations (Figure 
1). The main sources of revenue are illegal activities such as drug trafficking, extortions and 
corruption. These activities generate a turnover approximately equal to 1.6% of the Italian GDP.  
 
Figure 1 
Yearly earning (bn EUR) by mafia organisation 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration using Transcrime (2013) data. 
 
Since the 1970s, organised crime groups have become increasingly sophisticated and their 
business model has shifted from one based on extortion to one based on entrepreneurship 
(Gambetta, 1993; Lupo, 2004). The nature of the relationship between the mafia and the State has 
also changed. Rather than representing an enemy to fight, the government has instead become an 
opportunity to exploit. As Figure 2 shows, the result of this shift has been that a significant portion 
of the massive liquidity generated by illegal activities has been re-invested into the legal economy.  
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Figure 2  
Percentage of illegal profits of Italian mafias re-invested into the legal economy 
 
Source: Transcrime and Geo L.O.C. of the Financial Guard 
 
A very high share of criminal organisations’ profits thus come from public investments. Indeed, 
public finances are seen in the literature as potentially being severely affected by corruption and 
political collusion, both of which are practices commonly employed by the mafia. There is a 
substantial body of evidence emphasizing how these government failures impact the cost-
effectiveness of public investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1997; Cadot et al., 2006; Crescenzi et al., 2016) as well as the specific spending sectors in which 
governments decide to invest (Mauro, 1998; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Gupta et al., 2001; Rajkumar 
and Swaroop, 2008). However, no empirical evidence exists on whether and how government 
expenditures are conditioned by government captures being perpetrated specifically by criminal 
organisations.  
This topic has been overlooked also by the applied economics literature studying the effects of 
organised crime. Evidence has been produced to show that the mafia affects economic 
performance (Pinotti, 2015), firms’ productivity (Ganau and Rodriguez-Pose, 2017), foreign 
direct investments (Daniele and Marani, 2011) and the quality of governance (Allum and Siebert, 
2003; Pinotti and Stanig, 2017). A strand of this literature has examined the impact of mafia-
government linkages on political and electoral outcomes, finding that criminal organisations sell 
votes to the party expected to win the elections (De Feo and De Luca, 2013), and that violence is 
strategically used to influence elections and get captured politicians elected (Alesina et al., 2016). 
Buonanno et al. (2016) find a systematic correlation between the strength of Cosa Nostra and the 
proportion of votes for the main Italian conservative party.  
However, despite the growing scholarly interest in studying the consequences of mafia activities, 
the degree to which organised crime influences the allocation of public resources is unclear, 
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because empirical research investigating the rent-seeking behaviour of the mafia is almost non-
existent. Notable exceptions are the works of Barone and Narciso (2015), arguing that the 
presence of organised crime affects the distribution of national public funds to firms63, and of 
Olivieri and Sberna (2014), asserting that pre-electoral mafia violence inflates local public 
expenditures. However, none of these works focus on the impact of criminal infiltrations within 
local governments. Our paper contributes to the literature by performing the first empirical 
analysis on the effects of collusions between organised crime and local politicians. 
Our study adopts a novel method to measure mafia activities. The large majority of the above-
mentioned works have identified the presence and intensity of the mafia by employing proxies 
such as the number of mafia-related crimes, murders, and violent attacks (Alesina et al., 2016; 
Daniele and Marani, 2011; Olivieri and Sberna, 2014; Barone and Narciso, 2015), historical or 
geological indicators (Bandiera, 2003; Buonanno et al., 2015; Buonanno et al., 2016; Dimico et 
al., 2017; De Feo and De Luca, 2017), or artificial constructs for counterfactual analysis (Pinotti, 
2015). These measures aim to calculate the impact of organised crime in a broad sense, 
encompassing the whole range of possible actions perpetrated by such criminal groups. They do 
not, however, take into consideration the fact that organised crime in Italy has evolved over time, 
progressively reducing the use of violence and becoming increasingly integrated within the 
boundaries of democratic society (Cantone, 2010). While in conflict with the State, criminal 
organisations do not wish to displace the latter but rather to ‘infiltrate’ it, co-existing with it 
through the creation of a network based on mutual interests. Criminal organisations use violence 
only as a last resort when previous strategies have failed. Hence, the use of violence may reveal 
the extent, but not the real strength, of organised crime.  
The consequences of criminal activities that do not employ violence have yet to be empirically 
identified. By focusing on collusion between organised crime and politicians, we aim to shed light 
on this more silent but equally dangerous phenomenon, studying the strategy of mafia groups in 
capturing government resources. The national law we use to identify ‘infiltrations’ (law 164/1991) 
has previously been employed in the empirical literature (Acconcia et al., 2014; Daniele and Geys, 
2015, 2016; Galletta, 2016)64. Our approach differs, however, from previous studies in that we 
                                                          
63 Barone and Narciso (2015) analyse the role of organised crime in the allocation of national public subsidies to 
businesses in Sicily. Their results show that organised crime positively affects both the probability of obtaining funding 
and the amount of public funds received.  
64 Acconcia et al. (2014) exploit temporary contraction in public investment occurring in post-dissolution periods to 
obtain estimates of the fiscal multiplier for Italian provinces. Daniele and Geys (2015; 2016) provide an assessment of 
the impact of the 1991 law on different post-dissolution outcomes, such as elected politicians' levels of education and 
turnout at local elections. Galletta (2016) empirically investigates the presence of spillover effects resulting from the 
strengthening of law 164/1991. 
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aim to estimate the impact of organised crime infiltrations within local governments rather than 
evaluate the effect of the law. More specifically, our focus is on the period before the enforcement 
of the law, i.e. before the dissolution of mafia-infiltrated municipalities took place. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
 
Law 164/1991: dissolution of municipal governments for 
mafia infiltration 
 
The rise in mafia infiltrations within the local administrations throughout the 1980s led the Italian 
central government to introduce a set of tougher anti-mafia measures in the early 1990s.  In order 
to contrast the cases of collusion between local politicians and members of organised crime, a 
new law has been introduced in 1991, imposing the dissolution of a city council on evidence of 
‘mafia infiltration’ into the local government65 (D.L. 31/05/1991 n.164).  According to law 
164/1991, the national government can decree the dissolution of a municipal government “when 
evidence emerges regarding direct or indirect links between members of the local government 
and criminal organisations […] jeopardising the free determination of electoral bodies and the 
good functioning of municipal administrations”66. 
The dissolution of a local government requires a number of steps. First, a proposal for dissolution 
must be put forth by the provincial prefect, who has been informed by either the magistrates or 
the police of the risk of infiltration of a municipal government. The prefect then establishes a 
commission composed by the vice-prefect and officials of different law enforcement bodies 
(Polizia dello Stato, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza). The commission investigates over the 
activity of the government for a period between three and six months and produces a report, which 
is sent by the prefect to the Ministry of Interior. Any proposal for dissolution signed by the 
Minister must be approved by the cabinet of the National Government (Council of Ministers) and 
the President of the Republic before being implemented. Municipalities having their government 
                                                          
65 Some of the most common reasons for dissolving local governments using law 194/1991 have been: administrators 
or bureaucrats having affinity/kinships with mafia members or recurrent criminal records; construction permits awarded 
illegitimately due to bid rigging; severe cases of infringement of building regulations; absence of rigorous controls over 
the execution of public works; significant flaws in tax collection; cases of clientelism; illegal elections. 
66 http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2001/20010223/01A10530.htm 
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dissolved are those where mafia infiltration has been attested by the Italian judicial system and 
confirmed by multiple political institutions. Importantly, infiltrated municipalities are unaware 
that they are under investigation, as the process of dissolution is kept fully secret until its 
implementation. Once the investigation is concluded, both the members of the criminal 
organisation and the local politicians are arrested.  
Upon the removal of the infiltrated local administration, the central government appoints three 
non-elected, external commissioners, ruling the municipality for a period of 12 to 24 months and 
typically committed to make significant cuts to financial flows into public investment projects 
(Acconcia et al., 2014). After the end of the transition period, regular elections are held.  
According to law 164/1991, infiltration occurs when organised crime captures local politicians in 
order to manipulate policy decisions in their favour. This criminal strategy can be perpetrated in 
different ways. It can, for example, occur directly, as in the case of Pompei (in the province of 
Naples) where “the speaker of the municipal council has been identified as the main link between 
the local administration and the local mafia boss, who has also been arrested in the same 
investigation”67. Alternatively, it can occur through the contamination of the electoral 
competition. This was the case in Plati’ (in the province of Reggio Calabria), where “the party 
winning the electoral competition benefitted from electoral favours from the local mafia group, 
who was able to divert a large number of votes and aimed to maintain political control of the 
territory”68. Finally, infiltration can occur simply through the use of threats and intimidations. To 
this regard, Africo (in the province of Reggio Calabria) was dissolved because “the policy 
decisions of the municipal council were not made freely and without bias because local politicians 
were repeatedly intimidated and threatened by criminal organisations”69. 
                                                          
67 Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale) – Decree of the President of the Republic no. 133 of June 2001: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2001/20010223/01A10530.htm 
68 Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale) – Decree of the President of the Republic no. 119 of Marzo 2012: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2012/20120093/12A04237.htm 
69 Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale) – Decree of the President of the Republic: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.biz/atti/2014/20140194/14A06583.htm 
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Figure 3  
Geographical location of government dissolutions for mafia infiltration 
Italy 
 
Campania 
 
Calabria 
 
Sicily 
 
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior – maps are authors’ own elaboration. 
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Figure 4  
Number of dissolved municipal governments for mafia infiltration 
 
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the large majority (and in some years all) of dissolutions have occurred in 
the three regions subject of our study. Figure 4 illustrates the number of dissolved municipal 
governments for mafia infiltration from the introduction of the law until 2015. In total, there have 
been 258 cases of detected mafia infiltration into local governments over this period. 
That said, within these three regions, the geographical distribution of dissolution varies 
significantly. As shown in figure 3, detected cases of mafia infiltration tend to be clustered in 
several specific areas within these regions. In Campania, the large majority of dissolutions 
occurred in the north-west, particularly in the provinces of Caserta and Naples – the area where 
the Camorra is traditionally strongest. Similarly, in the region of Calabria most detected 
infiltrations were located in the south, in the provinces of Reggio Calabria and Vibo Valentia, 
where the ‘Ndrangheta is known to be centred. Finally, while dissolutions in Sicily are more 
widespread, the majority are concentrated in the province of Palermo, the heart of Cosa Nostra. 
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Identification Strategy 
 
We rely on law 164/1991 to identify cases of mafia infiltration within local governments of the 
municipalities in our sample regions. Our identification strategy is based on a difference-in-
differences (DiD) setting and exploits the time and geographical variation of dissolutions over 
time. The impact of criminal infiltrations is estimated by comparing municipal governments with 
and without infiltration before and after such infiltration is ended by the national government. We 
use the dissolution of a municipal government to identify our treatment period. For example, as 
shown in figure 5, the municipality of Casoria, in the province of Naples (Campania), held local 
elections in 2002. The elected government was later dissolved at the end of 2005 and 
commissioners took over until the following elections, at the beginning of 2008. Our treatment 
period thus ranges from the election in 2002 to the dissolution in 2005. This decision reflects our 
aim to identify the period of time during which organised crime was plausibly colluding with the 
local government. 
The control group is made of all non-dissolved governments and it comprises both municipalities 
that have never experienced dissolutions and municipalities that have experienced one or more 
dissolutions. In the example, all years before 2002 and after 2007 will make part of the control 
period. Due to the fact that external commissioners have specific duties regarding the 
administration of public finance, all years between the dissolution of a government and the 
subsequent elections are excluded from the sample. Therefore, in the case of Casoria the years 
2006 and 2007 are not considered in the estimations.  
 
Figure 5 
Definition of the treatment period 
Electoral history of the municipality of Casoria (Campania) 
 
 elections dissolution elections  
1991 2002 2005 2008 2013 
   infiltration commissioners    
 control treatment  control  
 
 
Unlike classic DiD strategies, our setting is based on a treatment period beginning at different 
points in time for the treated municipalities. This framework has the advantage that it allows 
restricting the full sample to those municipalities belonging to the treatment group at any point in 
time, i.e. those that have experienced at least one dissolution for mafia infiltration. In such a way, 
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it is possible to obtain a sample of arguably very similar municipalities, minimising unobservable 
heterogeneity. Performing this sample restriction is indeed important, because as seen in figure 3 
the geography of dissolutions displays significant concentrations in some provinces of the sample 
regions. An additional peculiarity of our setting is that the treatment period switches on and the 
off, i.e. municipalities remain infiltrated until the dissolution takes place.   
 
Threats to identification 
 
There are some potential concerns associated to our identification strategy. First, it might be that 
the application of law 164/1991 has been imperfect. Some municipalities may have been 
infiltrated but not dissolved because judicial authorities have not detected the collusion. Similarly, 
some dissolutions may have been done erroneously as there was no real infiltration. Infiltrated 
municipal governments that are not dissolved would indeed belong entirely to the control group, 
determining an attenuation bias to the empirical results. Similarly, periods of erroneously detected 
infiltration would instead belong to treated years, again biasing the estimated impact of 
infiltrations towards zero. This means that the point estimate of regression coefficients is likely 
to be larger (in absolute value) than the one observed.  
Another potential issue for our estimates could arise if the dissolution of municipal governments 
has been manipulated politically. In other words, it may be that the decision over which local 
governments to dissolve – or not to dissolve – is driven by political considerations. If, for example, 
the main party of the national government does not want to ‘lose’ the control of a local 
government ruled by the same party or an allied party of the same political coalition. This distorted 
use of law 164/1991 is, however, unlikely to happen for several reasons. First, the dissolution 
process is initiated and carried forward by the Italian Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate 
(Direzione Investigativa Antimafia), one of the most efficient investigative bodies of the Italian 
State.70 This is an organisation composed of highly trained and specialised individuals from the 
three main polices forces (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza), whose 
                                                          
70 The Anti-Mafia Investigation Department (DIA) was founded in 199. Its operations include preemptive 
investigations and judicial investigations. It investigates characteristics, objectives, and methods of the mafia as well 
as its domestic and international contacts.  
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experience is often valued and requested by other countries and institutions needing consults on 
the fight against organised crime71.  
In addition, the multiplicity of actors involved in the dissolution decision, from national MPs to 
the Minister and the Cabinet to the President of the Republic, makes any form of manipulation of 
the law improbable.72 In order, however, to provide as much evidence as possible, we perform a 
test to rule out the possibility of systematic political manipulations. If dissolutions were 
manipulated, we would expect to observe that the political colour of provincial and national 
governments is significantly associated to the political colour of dissolved municipal 
governments. As shown in Appendix A1, which refers to the restricted sample of dissolved 
municipalities in the 1998-2013 period, there is no statistically significant correlation between the 
colour of national or provincial governments and that of municipal governments. Indeed, given 
the political cost generated by a dissolution for the national government – e.g. high national media 
coverage and political competitors exploiting the latter by asking for the government’s resignation 
– it is extremely unlikely that the national government would strategically choose to dissolve 
municipal governments governed by opposing parties.  
Moreover, Italian local governments can also be dissolved for reasons unrelated to mafia 
infiltration (e.g. resignation of the mayor, resignation of more than 50% of council members etc.). 
Hence, for politicians wishing to undermine the stability of a given municipality ruled by an 
opposing party, such routes would certainly represent cheaper and easier options than trying to 
establish a false mafia case.  
A final potential issue with our empirical setting is that the definition of our treatment and control 
observations is based on the assumption that the entire period between the election of a local 
government and its dissolution consists of infiltration years. We test the validity of this 
assumption in the empirical analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
71 Some examples are the Italian Prosecutor Antonio Ingroia, responsible for significant investigation into the Sicilian 
mafia, who has been appointed Director of the United Nation – Central American country’s International Commission 
against Impunity (CICIG). 
72 The only case where the dissolution has not followed the normal legislative process is in the case of Fondi. The local 
prefect, together with the enforcement agencies, in 2009 proposed the dissolution of this municipality, but the Ministry 
of Interior opted for a political solution asking the municipality to proceed immediately with new elections without 
dissolving the government. The case of Fondi was covered by the Italian press and tv news for days, and no similar 
case has happened after that. Since the concern of the press and opposition parties was that the new elections were not 
sufficient to get rid of the criminal infiltration, this would constitute a downward bias in our setting.  
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4. Data and estimating equation 
 
Institutional setting of municipalities and data  
 
Local public spending and municipal revenues. Our primary data source is the Certificati 
Consuntivi database of the Italian Ministry of Interior, which contains yearly statistics on the 
public finance of Italian municipalities for a number of different spending categories. The full 
dataset is disaggregated into capital and current expenditures. These are further disaggregated into 
six specific spending categories reflecting the services and functions to which the resources have 
been allocated and spent and include: general administrative functions, social sectors, 
construction and waste management, transportation, public education and municipal police (see 
Appendix A2 for more details).  
This dataset is available for the 1998-2013 time period. Table 1 and Appendix A2 illustrate 
average per capita spending for the municipalities in our sample over this period. The resources 
spent by the municipalities amounts to a yearly average of €543 per inhabitant for capital 
expenditures (i.e. investments) and a yearly per capita average of €731 for current expenditures 
(i.e. salaries and services). Summing these two figures we obtain the average total spending per 
municipality, €1274 per inhabitant. As shown in Table 1, the spending sector to which the most 
annual resources are allocated is construction and waste management, which makes up 34% of 
the annual capital expenditures budget. Average spending for this component is €382 per year, 
€217 for the capital and €147 for the current expenditures. 
The same Certificati Consuntivi database of the Italian Ministry of Interior provides information 
on the revenues collected by municipal governments. Given the quasi-federal structure of the 
Italian State, municipalities are expected to maintain a certain level of independence and 
autonomy in collecting their own financial resources. Hence, local taxes represent an important 
source of income for municipalities73.  
We follow Drago et al. (2014), constructing a measure of efficiency in revenue collection 
calculated as the ratio between collected revenues and the total amount of forecasted revenues 
that the municipality should collect within the budget year. We focus on the two main local taxes, 
i.e. property tax and waste tax, and on total collected revenues (including all taxes and transfers). 
                                                          
73 Local fiscal revenues correspond on average to 52% of the entire budget for Italian municipalities (Daniele et al., 
2016). 
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As figure A2.2 shows, property tax and waste tax are the main source of income in the municipal 
fiscal budget. However, Table 1 indicates that municipalities in our sample do not collect all the 
expected fiscal revenues. In particular, the capacity to collect waste taxes is generally very low. 
Infiltrations. In order to measure the infiltration of organised crime within local governments, 
we identify all municipalities that experienced government dissolution due to mafia infiltration 
from 1991 to 2013, exploiting information on the date of the dissolution available from the 
Ministry of the Interior.  
Control variables. We exploit data on mafia-related homicides in each province and year of our 
sample from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). These data were collected by the 
Ministry of Interior and classified according to the Italian Penal Code. 
A number of municipal level time-varying characteristics are obtained from the 1991, 2001 and 
2011 ISTAT Censuses interpolated over time: unemployment rate, percentage of industry 
employment, percentage of agricultural employment, and percentage of tertiary education degree 
holders.   
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Total per capita spending (log) 
      
Total 21,156 6.974 0.555 2845 6.773 0.485 
Capital expenditures 21,156 5.488 1.327 2845 5.118 1.214 
Current expenditures 21,156 6.518 0.406 2845 6.429 0.396 
Capital expenditure component (share of total)      
Administration 21,037 0.152 0.217 2813 0.164 0.211 
Social sector 20,901 0.063 0.134 2789 0.056 0.124 
Construction and waste 
management 
21,137 0.342 0.292 2817 0.321 0.277 
Transports 21,090 0.232 0.242 2818 0.228 0.233 
Education 20,844 0.084 0.153 2799 0.106 0.166 
Municipal police 20,477 0.003 0.019 2751 0.007 0.026 
Current expenditure component (share of total)   
   
Administration 21,240 0.429 0.095 2842 0.400 0.093 
Social sector 21,243 0.073 0.058 2842 0.086 0.061 
Construction and waste 
management 
21,239 0.228 0.085 2842 0.269 0.090 
Transports 19,909 0.082 0.040 2664 0.068 0.036 
Education 18,557 0.083 0.041 2480 0.075 0.038 
Municipal police 21,239 0.059 0.027 2842 0.058 0.023 
Municipal revenues (collected/forecasted)         
Total revenues 17,596 0.573 0.192 2381 0.563 0.157 
Property tax 18,703 0.494 0.361 2524 0.477 0.425 
Waste tax 18,692 0.136 0.249 2524 0.101 0.198 
Control variables       
Percentage of agricultural 
employment 
21,594 4.592 3.382 2912 4.303 4.066 
Percentage of citizens holding 
tertiary education degrees 
21,594 6.060 2.620 2912 5.687 2.272 
Percentage of industry employment 21,594 6.489 2.128 2912 5.894 1.693 
Unemployment rate 21,594 7.609 2.518 2912 8.890 2.646 
Mafia-related homicides per 
inhabitant at province level  
21,600 0.0058 0.0082 2912 0.0095 0.0092 
Note: Full sample refers to all municipalities of Campania, Calabria and Sicily. Restricted sample refers to municipalities 
of these regions having experienced at least one government dissolution for mafia infiltration. The sum of the means of 
all capital or current expenditure components does not sum up to 1 due to the fact that there are some other minor 
spending components not considered in the analysis. 
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Estimating Equation 
 
The difference-in-differences setting is exploited to test whether mafia infiltrations have any 
impact on public finances in the local governments of Campania, Calabria and Sicily during the 
1998-2013 period. To this end, we compare municipal governments with and without infiltration 
before and after such infiltration is terminated by the national government. 
We estimate various versions of the following model: 
 
𝑦𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑚, 𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎𝑝,𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑚 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 (1) 
 
 
Where 𝑦𝑚,𝑡 can be 𝑃𝑆𝑚,𝑡+1 or 𝑇𝑚,𝑡. 
𝑃𝑆𝑚,𝑡+1 refers to public spending in municipality m at time t+1
74. This is either  ln
∑ 𝑃𝑆𝑚, 𝑡+1𝑐
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑚,𝑡
, the 
natural logarithm of total per capita spending committed by a municipal government; or 
𝑃𝑆𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡+1
∑ 𝑃𝑆𝑚, 𝑡+1𝑐
, 
the spending committed to component c as a share of total spending committed for the next 
financial year.  
𝑇𝑚,𝑡 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑚,𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑚,𝑡
  is the ratio between the collected tax and transfers and the amount of assessed 
revenues that the municipality should collect, a measure of government efficiency in collecting 
public resources. 
The key variable in the model is 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑚, 𝑡. This is a dummy taking value 1 from the year of the last 
regular election before the dissolution until the moment in which the municipal government was 
dissolved, and zero otherwise. Hence, the dummy takes value one in year t if in that year the 
municipality is ruled by a government later dissolved for mafia infiltration. 
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽 which captures the impact of the infiltration at time t on the public 
spending allocation at time t+1. 
As our main aim is to identify the effect of a specific activity from organised crime – the 
temporary infiltration into local governments on governments’ spending decisions – we need to 
make sure that the observed effect is driven by the mafia-politics collusion and not by 
                                                          
74 The time lead derives from the fact that our dependent variable is based on spending commitments, i.e. annual 
allocations to different spending categories defined at the end of a financial year for the following year by a municipal 
government. This allows reducing issues of reverse causation as our main variable of interest is measured at time t.  
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heterogeneity in the local organised crime power across municipalities. This issue is tackled in 
two ways. First, we test the results by restricting our sample to municipalities that have seen their 
government dissolved at least once, reducing unobservable differences in local conditions. 
Second, we include in the model a control variable, 𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎𝑝,𝑡, referring to mafia-related 
homicides and used as a proxy for the underlying strength of the mafia in the province of the 
municipality in year t.  
Vector 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 denotes a set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of municipalities in 
the sample regions.  
The model is completed by municipality dummy variables, controlling for time-invariant 
unobservables correlated with the timing of the infiltration (𝜑𝑚 ), and time fixed effects, 
controlling for year-specific shocks (𝜏𝑡). Finally, 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. Throughout 
the empirical analysis we cluster standard errors at the municipal level. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
Infiltration and overall level of spending 
 
We begin by presenting the estimates of the effect of mafia infiltration on total municipal spending 
(Table 2). In columns (1) and (2) we focus our attention to total spending per capita. The model 
is initially estimated for the full sample of 1350 municipalities from Calabria, Campania and 
Sicily (column (1)). In column (2) we restrict the sample to a group of more homogeneous 
municipalities – those 182 having experienced at least one government dissolution for mafia 
infiltration. In the following columns, we sub-divide total spending into total capital expenditures 
per capita (columns (3)-(4)) and total current expenditures per capita (columns (5)-(6)).  
The results displaying the coefficients of all control variables, shown in Table A5, indicate that 
when the sample is restricted to the 182 municipalities that have experienced dissolutions, the 
proxy for the underlying strength of the mafia is not significantly associated with total municipal 
spending75.  
                                                          
75 The pairwise correlation between infiltration dummy and 𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎𝑝,𝑡 variable, tested separately, is positive for the full 
sample and insignificant for the restricted sample of municipalities. This may imply that by restricting the sample to 
municipalities having experienced infiltration-related dissolutions, we have successfully managed to reduce 
heterogeneity in terms of mafia strength in the territory. Another interpretation may be that the decision of mafia groups 
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Throughout all different specifications, the coefficient of the infiltration dummies in Table 2 is 
not statistically significant. Hence, the results provide evidence that, other things equal, 
infiltration periods are not associated with significant variations in the total amount of local 
government expenditures, either for public investments (capital expenditures) or for services and 
maintenance (current expenditures).  
 
Table 2 
Effect of infiltration on total public spending 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total per capita spending 
Total p/c spending - 
capital expenditures 
Total p/c spending - 
current expenditures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inf -0.0223 -0.0066 -0.0796 -0.0729 0.0137 0.0139 
 
(0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0697) (0.0711) (0.0121) (0.0119) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Full sample ✓  ✓  ✓  
Restricted sample   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Observations 20,888 2582 20,888 2582 20,888 2582 
R-squared 0.510 0.522 0.353 0.347 0.713 0.556 
Municipalities 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Inf refers to infiltration dummy; Commissioning years 
excluded. Controls: mafia-related homicides, agricultural employment, industry employment, tertiary education degree holders, 
unemployment. Full sample: 1350 municipalities of Campania, Calabria and Sicily; restricted sample: municipalities having 
experienced at least one government dissolution for mafia infiltration. 
 
Our findings differ from those of Olivieri and Sberna (2014), reporting a positive relationship 
between pre-electoral mafia violence and total public investment in local municipalities of 
Southern Italy. The difference can be due to the fact that we do not focus on mafia violent attacks, 
but on mafia infiltration within politics. Accordingly, a possible explanation for our results is that 
the mafia, when infiltrated into local governments, is not interested in forcing a modification of 
overall aggregate spending. Indeed, if municipal governments were running constant budget 
deficits during infiltration periods, they would risk being commissioned by the central 
government for reasons of financial instability, thus leaving the mafia without reliable political 
connections in the local councils.76 Rather, a way to coercively condition the public finance of 
                                                          
to infiltrate within local governments is not directly related to the intensity of their violent activity (which is however 
measured at the province level). 
76 Article 244 of the Testo Unico Enti Locali (TUEL) foresees the possibility to declare municipalities non-solvent 
(dissesto finanziario) when it is incapable to provide the basic functions, services and public goods. 
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infiltrated governments may be to modify investment policy in those sectors that are strategic for 
protecting the interests of organised crime. We test this hypothesis in the following section. 
 
Infiltration and specific spending components 
 
We now break down total spending into different items of expenditure and test whether mafia 
infiltrations significantly affect the allocation of public resources in each components of 
governments’ budgets. 
The model is estimated both with capital and current expenditure components as dependent 
variables, each spending item being measured as a share of the total spending. Again, the model 
is estimated both for the full sample of municipalities and for the restricted sample of 
municipalities who have had their government dissolved at least once.  
The estimation results are shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
We begin with capital expenditures, i.e. investments (Table 3). We find that on average infiltrated 
municipalities spend more on construction and waste management (columns (5)-(6)) and less on 
municipal police (columns (11)-(12)). These results are consistent across both specifications, 
remaining significant and with similar magnitude. A first look at these results indicates that upon 
infiltration, organised crime’s main strategy is to bias the allocation of resources towards specific 
sectors rather than affect total spending.  
When we turn our attention to current spending (Table 4), the infiltration dummy is insignificantly 
correlated with most of the current spending components. The only significant effect is on 
municipal police.  
Why are the construction and police sectors the only two being affected by infiltrations? We 
provide an interpretation of the size of estimates and the meaning of these results below. 
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Table 3  
Effect of infiltration on capital expenditures by component 
 
Dependent variable: share of spending in the following component 
 
Administration Social sector 
Construction and waste 
management 
Transports Education Municipal police 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Inf -0.0115 -0.0146 -0.00494 -0.00674 0.0448** 0.0442** -0.0206 -0.0220 0.00633 0.00949 -0.00262** -0.00222* 
 
(0.0143) (0.0139) (0.00746) (0.00764) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.00126) (0.00118) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Full sample ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Restricted sample   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Observations 20,682 2554 20,551 2535 20,783 2559 20,735 2559 20,490 2541 20,126 2496 
R-squared 0.260 0.219 0.135 0.138 0.205 0.227 0.173 0.152 0.115 0.140 0.169 0.235 
Municipalities 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4  
Effect of infiltration on current expenditures by component 
 Dependent variable: share of spending in the following component 
 Administration Social sector 
Construction and waste 
management Transports Education Municipal police 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Inf -0.00538 -0.00623 -0.00163 -0.000277 0.00545 0.00530 -0.00105 -0.000947 0.000219 0.000599 -0.00256** -0.00217* 
 (0.00497) (0.00484) (0.00512) (0.00429) (0.00489) (0.00491) (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00168) (0.00174) (0.00130) (0.00123) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Full sample ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Restricted sample   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓   ✓ 
Observations 20,881 2579 20,884 2579 20,880 2579 19,582 2427 18,235 2242 20,880 2579 
R-squared 0.736 0.698 0.650 0.612 0.732 0.687 0.752 0.752 0.816 0.787 0.622 0.665 
Municipalities 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Construction and waste management. According to the estimates in Table 3, infiltrated 
governments increase investment spending for construction and waste management by an 
average of 4 percentage points per year. This is a large figure if we consider that functions related 
to constructions and waste management account for the largest part of the capital expenditures 
budget (Table 1). Moreover, this is an average annual effect that is distributed over the whole 
period a government is in charge. Municipal administrations can last up to five years, and the 
average infiltration period in our sample of municipalities is 2.7 years. Therefore, the additional 
resources these governments put up on this sector of investment during the period of infiltration 
are substantial. 
This particular spending item includes all expenses for urban planning, waste collection and the 
construction of new buildings, bridges, streets and highways.77 This represents a strategic sector 
for the interests of criminal organisations for many reasons.  
First, mafia groups need to find an outlet for all the resources obtained from their illegal traffics 
and the sector of constructions represents an easy and highly profitable option for money 
laundering. The technological and financial barriers to entry are relatively low, making this an 
ideal area for long-term investment. Second, this sector is associated with a set of activities which 
are deeply embedded into the local territory. Seizing the control of these activities is crucial for 
the mafia, in order to establish and expand the wide network of relationships which allow its 
survival and prospering. The construction of new buildings involves many agents: the political 
power in charge of awarding public work tenders, contractor enterprises responsible for 
delivering the project, and a labour pool carrying out the work. Organise crime groups may be 
involved at all levels of this chain, by exploiting the political connections they have in order to 
distort fair competition and rig public work bids at the advantage of the enterprises they control, 
or intend to favour. Moreover, access to privileged information on future bids and winning 
contractors allows the mafia to offer employment, therefore directly managing an important 
portion of the local labour market (Sciarrone, 2011).  
For the mafia, having political referents within local governments translates into the possibility 
of steering the outcomes of public work tenders and increasing the profits of affiliated firms. The 
more buildings to be constructed, the more contracts that will be awarded and the higher the 
potential gains for the criminal organisation (Lavezzi, 2008). Figure 6 shows the number of firms, 
                                                          
77 At the end of each fiscal year, local governments must approve plans for the financing of public works, set to be 
realised either within the same year or part of a three-year plan. Annual plans include all projects below 100,000 euros, 
while three-year plans are for projects above this figure. While yearly plans are binding, three-year plans can annually 
be updated with new projects. Urban planning interventions represent a key prerogative of local administrations, and 
regional or national level governments have little say over these kinds of policy initiatives. 
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disaggregated by business sector, confiscated by police due to collusion with organised crime. In 
line with the above estimates, the majority operate in the construction and waste management 
sector.  
The creation of collusive cartels between politicians, mafiosi, and entrepreneurs in the 
construction market not only causes distortions in the competition for public works, but also 
seriously inflates expenditures in this sector. 
 
Figure 6 
Mafia-controlled firms by sector
 
Source: Transcrime (2013). 
 
Municipal police. The second significant variation in the local public spending is on municipal 
police. A significant decrease is seen both for capital and for current expenditures in this sector.  
We find that during infiltration periods spending for police reduces by about 0.2 percentage 
points annually. While this might seem like a low figure, it should be compared to the average 
share of investment in local police forces made by governments in our sample. As shown in Table 
1, the proportion of capital expenditures allocated to this sector is about 0.3% of the total for the 
full sample of municipalities, and 0.7% for the municipalities who had their government 
dissolved at least once. Therefore, an average annual reduction of about 0.2 percentage points 
represents a considerable change. In practice, given that police expenditures are typically low, 
they are thus nearly absent in infiltration years.  
In turn, the significant reduction in spending on municipal police as part of current expenditures 
corresponds to a less radical change in budget decisions, given the share of current expenditures 
allocated to municipal police being 6% of the total (Table 1). 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Other
Social Services
Agricolture/fishing
Real Estate
Hotels and Restaurants
Retail Businesses
Construction/Waste Management
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And yet, if we add up the current and the capital expenditures effects, a clear pattern emerges 
indicating that infiltrated governments tend to refrain from making expenditures on local police 
forces. A reduction of resources directed towards law enforcement bodies such as the municipal 
police may directly benefit the criminal organisations, facilitating their illegal activities. Indeed, 
the local police are responsible for maintaining public order and security, a task shared with the 
national police (Polizia di Stato) and low-quality equipment may imply a lesser ability to fight 
crimes such as drug trafficking, usury and murders. Perhaps most importantly, local police are 
also responsible for so-called ‘administrative police’ functions, including surveillance over 
construction works and abidance with building regulations. Given that a lack of compliance with 
building regulations is one of the most frequent motivations for government dissolutions, 
allocating fewer resources to municipal police forces may also be one of the ways in which 
corrupt local politicians attempt to prevent dissolutions. 
Inclusion of time trends. In appendix A3, we replicate the analysis using capital expenditures 
for construction and for police, and current expenditures for police as dependent variables and 
perform a set of robustness tests. We gradually increase the number of controls and include linear 
time trends.  
The coefficient of the infiltration dummy is consistently significant and positively correlated with 
investment in construction across different specifications. The coefficient of capital expenditures 
for police also remains negative and strongly significant, while the result of current spending for 
municipal police is not robust to the inclusion of time trends. For this reason, we do not further 
test its robustness in the remaining of the paper. 
 
Infiltration and revenues collection 
 
We now turn to verifying whether infiltrations impact the ability of local governments to collect 
revenues. Three are the dependent variables considered: total revenues, property taxes and waste 
taxes. 
The results are presented in Table 5. The coefficient for total revenues is negative in columns (1) 
and (2) but insignificant, evidence that collected revenues do not modify during infiltration 
periods. No effect is found on property taxes either. 
Instead, the coefficients on waste tax (column (7) and (8)) are negative and significant. The effect 
is economically sizeable: according to our estimates, infiltrated municipalities collect 15% less 
taxes on waste and garbage compared to the average of non–treated municipalities. The result is 
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stable to the inclusion of our set of controls, to the restriction of the sample (column (8)), and to 
the inclusion of time trends (Appendix A3).  
The interpretation of this result is twofold. First, the direct or indirect presence of criminal 
organisations within the municipal government has an impact on the performance of the local 
government. Indeed, tax evasion generates significant losses and distortions in government 
revenues; the ability to efficiently enforce tax collection is one of the fundamental components 
of state capacity (Casaburi and Troiano, 2016). As shown in figure A5.1, waste tax represents 
32% of the municipal budget. Second, lower fiscal revenues in the waste sector may correspond 
to a precise strategy on the part of criminal organisations who aim to weaken the presence and 
reputation of the legal institutions in order to open up the possibility of substituting it through a 
system of provision of private favours (Trocchia, 2009). This result, together with the evidence 
on spending on construction and waste management uncovered in section 5.2, seems to confirm 
the well-known presence of criminal organisations within the waste management sector78. 
 
Table 5  
Effect of infiltration on local revenues collection 
 
Dependent variable: 
 Total revenues Property tax Waste tax 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inf -0.0127 -0.0123 0.00006 -0.0018 -0.0210** -0.0185** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.00912) (0.00961) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Full sample ✓  ✓  ✓  
Restricted sample  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Observations 18,464 2299 17,382 2169 17,103 2122 
R-squared 0.314 0.374 0.410 0.445 0.502 0.470 
Municipalities 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
                                                          
78 The connection between the waste hauling industry and organised crime dates back decades. In the U.S., Cosa 
Nostra has been part of New York's commercial sanitation system since at least the 1950s (personal trash is hauled by 
the city's Department of Sanitation). “Carters”, or trash haulers, have always been able to carve out and sell routes to 
one another, making the system vulnerable to strong-arm tactics. The Camorra is said to have controlled garbage in 
the city of Naples since the early 1980s. The poorly run system attracted worldwide attention when, back in 2008, 
uncollected garbage piled up on the city's streets for more than two weeks because, allegedly, the mafia had contributed 
to the closure of the dumps. 
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6. Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we present a selection of tests verifying the robustness of our design and our three 
main estimation results: a significant inflation of construction and waste management 
investments, a contraction of police investments, and a reduction of waste taxes during 
infiltration periods.  
Infiltration period beginning with elections. The starting assumption of our identification 
strategy is that the period of infiltration begins at the moment of the election of later-dissolved 
governments and ends with the dissolution. We test the validity of this assumption in Table 6, 
where we perform a placebo experiment on our restricted sample. If the significant variations in 
both public investments and revenues collection start in the period preceding infiltration, the 
decision to infiltrate a government might be taken as a result of these variations. This would 
occur if the criminal organisation were selecting municipalities where to extract rents on the basis 
of pre-determined variations in public expenditures or local taxes, made by governments with no 
links with organised crime. In this case, public spending decisions would be the cause, not the 
consequence, of organised crime infiltrations.  
Our placebo test verifies the behaviour of governments preceding those later dissolved for mafia 
infiltration. For each of our key outcome variables we introduce three dummy variables taking 
value 1 respectively one, two, and three years before the election of later-dissolved government. 
All years coded as ‘infiltration years’ – from election to dissolution – are excluded from the 
sample.  
We expect to find no significant correlation between pre-infiltration governments and any form 
of public spending or revenue collection distortion. Indeed, all the coefficients are insignificant, 
suggesting that the observed effects on public spending and revenue collection are significantly 
affected only after the election of later-dissolved governments.  
Although we cannot reject with full certainty the possibility that infiltrations begin before 
elections, the results of our placebo test seem suggest that elections represent turning points for 
infiltrations. As suggested by Dal Bo’ (2007), elections may constitute a ‘recruitment process’ 
whereby a new bargaining table between crime and politics is established and the ‘criminal 
interest groups’ can select the political counterparts that best suit their interests. 
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Table 6  
Robustness check – timing of the infiltration 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Public spending Revenues collection 
 
Construction and waste management Municipal police Waste tax 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 year before inf 0.0165   0.00127   0.00765   
 (0.0326) (0.00191) (0.0190) 
2 years before inf 0.0128   0.00133   0.00426  
 
 
(0.0231) 
  
(0.00257) 
  
(0.0154) 
 
3 years before inf 
 
0.0246   0.000458   0.0224 
   (0.0310) 
  
(0.0221) 
  
(0.0210) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2133 2133 2133 2072 2072 2072 1738 1738 1738 
R-squared 0.255 0.255 0.364 0.256 0.256 0.497 0.474 0.474 0.616 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates performed on restricted sample. All years coded as ‘infiltration years’ – from the election to the 
dissolution of municipal governments – are excluded from sample. 
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As an additional test that the main effects do not begin before elections we perform a Granger 
causality test (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), analysing the dynamic evolution over time of 
investments and tax collections determined by the infiltration. The results, displayed in Appendix 
A6, further corroborate the evidence that the significant change in construction investments, 
police investments, and waste tax collection, do not precede the election of infiltrated 
governments. 
Treatment correlated with outcome variable. Our results indicate that infiltrated local 
governments spend on average more on construction and waste management and less on 
municipal police. One concern, however, is that judicial investigators might choose to investigate 
precisely those municipalities that present anomalies in their balance sheets. If this is the case, the 
treatment would be correlated with the dependent variable, and the results would be biased.  
In order to tackle this issue, we reproduced our analysis excluding from the sample all those 
municipalities for which the main reason for dissolution was related to distortions in public 
finances79. The results, shown in table A7.1, are unaltered from the main specifications. Hence, 
we can safely dismiss the concern that our results were driven by selection into treatment bias.  
Placebo test: mafia-unrelated dissolutions. One concern related to the changes in the public 
spending of infiltrated governments is that, rather than being caused by the mafia, they might be 
driven by some inherent characteristics of dissolved local governments. These may include the 
degree of political instability, or the quality of politicians governing these local councils. In order 
to test for this, we exploit the fact that in Italy local governments can be dissolved for reasons 
unrelated to mafia infiltrations, including: failure to approve the financial budget, resignation of 
the mayor, resignation of more than 50% of the council members, vote of no confidence. These 
dissolutions are in fact relatively common in our sample and time-span – in the period from 1998 
to 2013 there were 463 cases of municipal government dissolutions unrelated to the mafia within 
the three regions of analysis. We use these dissolutions as proxies for unstable governments and 
for low quality of elected politicians, replicating the estimates of model (1) using as the main 
explanatory variable a dummy taking value 1 for all years in which governments later-dissolved 
for mafia-unrelated reasons were governing the municipalities80. If the results in section 5 were 
                                                          
79 In order to perform this test, we exploit official statements on the dissolutions produced by the Ministry of Interior. 
These documents contain descriptions of the final reasons motivating the dissolution, as well as the reasons why the 
investigation was initiated. We exclude from our sample all the municipalities for which the investigation started 
because of abnormal public expenditures and/or the reason for the dissolution was due to spending-related distortions.  
80 This type of dissolution is indubitably a bad outcome for a newly elected local government. When, in fact, the 
government is dissolved for non-mafia related reasons, the elected politicians cannot run again in the following election. 
Thus, they have every incentive to avoid this scenario.  
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driven by local government characteristics unrelated to the mafia - rather than by infiltrations - 
we would expect to obtain similar effects as those presented above.  
The results of this placebo test are shown in Appendix A8. We exclude all infiltrated governments 
and compare dissolved governments for mafia-unrelated reasons with other governments, before 
and after the dissolution takes place. We do so using the entire sample of municipalities from 
Calabria, Campania and Sicily from 1998 to 2013, controlling for time and municipality fixed 
effects, and all other controls. We obtain no statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that 
the observed differences between infiltrated and non-infiltrated governments are truly produced 
by the presence of the mafia. 
 
7. Organised crime and politics 
  
Our results have thus far revealed that collusion between criminal organisations and politicians 
has a significant impact on the allocation of public resources. Public finances can, however, be 
affected by a multiplicity of factors, the most intuitive and important of which is politics. Hence, 
a question is whether our results so far are truly driven by criminal infiltration or simply by some 
unobserved political characteristics of the local elections of infiltrated municipalities.  
In answering this question, this section investigates the empirical relationship between organised 
crime and politics. Consequently, not only we provide a crucial test for the validity of our results, 
but we also offer further insight into the infiltration phenomenon. 
 
Mafia infiltration and local electoral factors 
 
There are different political characteristics that might be associated with government capturing, 
one of which is electoral competition81. We assess whether mafia infiltration is related to the 
degree of electoral competition by exploiting the fact that there have been cases in which local 
elections in Southern Italy have been non-competitive, that is, only one candidate was potentially 
                                                          
81 Electoral competition may help giving rise to opposition parties that can inform the electorate about corruption or 
collusion (Schleiter and Voznaya, 2014) or, alternatively, more competitive elections may make it more difficult for 
voters to identify who is responsible for government policy and to coordinate in selecting the best politicians, hence 
increasing collusion (Lewis-Beck, 1988). 
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eligible as mayor because no other electoral lists were presented82. A lack of electoral competition 
may signal that the absence of political opposition within local councils facilitates the chances for 
the mafia to find valuable political referents, or it may imply that mafia pre-electoral intimidations 
limit the participation of other candidates.  
Another political element which may be associated with infiltration is the mandate limit of the 
incumbent mayors83. We look at the moment of their political office – first or second term as 
mayor – in which incumbents are more likely to engage in collusion behaviours. We exploit the 
fact that up until 2014 all mayors had a limit of maximum of two consecutive terms in office84 
and examine whether infiltration is associated with the fact that mayors have no possibility to be 
immediately re-elected.  
Finally, infiltrations may be systematically correlated with the political colour of governments. 
We explore this relationship by verifying if there is any political party recurrently forming 
collusive ties with organised crime. To test for that, we divide the political spectrum into three 
categories: left-wing parties, right-wing parties, and centre parties.  
In order to investigate whether any correlation exists between the political characteristics of 
municipal elections and cases of criminal infiltration we regress a set of political indicators on the 
Inf dummy85. We focus on the 182 municipalities that have experienced at least one dissolution 
for mafia infiltration between 1998 and 2013 and estimate the following linear probability model:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑚, 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑚, 𝑡  + 𝛾 𝑀𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑎𝑝,𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 +  𝜗 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑚 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 (2) 
  
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡is sub-divided into a set of variables referring to key political features of the 
local government, namely 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡, 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑚,𝑡. 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value one if the mayor governing the 
municipality at time t in municipality m was the only one candidate at the previous local elections, 
while past elections of the same municipality were competitive with multiple candidates. 
𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 is a dummy taking value one if the mayor is running for the last mandate and 
                                                          
82 In such cases, the only condition for elections to be valid is a voter turnout above 50%. 
83 Binding term limit tend to affect the behaviour of politicians (Besley and Case, 1995; List and Sturm, 2006) and may 
increase corruption and collusion cases (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). 
84 Even if this would allow mayors to run for a third term after a term break, third-term candidacies are rare. 
85 The analysis exploits the same dataset used in Section 3, augmented with data on election characteristics from the 
Historical Archive of Local Elections of the Italian Ministry of Interior. 
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has been in office for more than one term, and zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑚,𝑡 represents the 
political party that is ruling the government of municipality m at time t. It is sub-divided into three 
categories: Right party, Left party, Centre party86. Each of these is binary and takes value one if 
the party of that political side has won the previous elections and is ruling the municipality at time 
t.  Descriptive statistics of these variables are in Appendix A9.  
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 is a dummy variable controlling for the political colour of the national government at 
time t. It takes value one when coalitions led by left-wing parties are ruling the country.  
The model includes controls, fixed and year effects. We exclude from the sample all years in 
which municipal governments were commissioned, not just for mafia infiltration but also for other 
reasons. Table 7 summarises the results.  
 
Table 7  
Infiltration and political factors 
 Dependent variable: 
 Single Candidate Last Mandate Right Party Left Party Centre Party 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Inf 0.0474** 0.189*** 0.0942** -0.0682 0.0351  
(0.0194) (0.0506) (0.0516) (0.0464) (0.0327) 
National gov (Left) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2869 2869 2582 2582 2582 
R-squared 0.220 0.259 0.455 0.468 0.417 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Governments without a clear political 
colour (right, left, or centre) excluded from sample in columns (3)-(5). 
 
The coefficient of 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 is positive and significant in column (1). One 
interpretation of this finding is that due to mafia-government agreements, the mafia operates to 
reduce political competition, up to the point that only their preferred candidate is running for 
mayor. Alternatively, it may be that infiltrations are more likely to occur if the local council lacks 
any political group potentially contrasting the decisions of the government. Moving to column 
(2), the coefficient of the 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑡 dummy variable is positive and significant, 
suggesting that mayors in their last term in office are more likely to collude with organised crime. 
In columns (3) we look for a ‘partisanship effect’, i.e. a systematic relationship between 
                                                          
86 When estimating the model with 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑚,𝑡 variables, we have excluded the few governments whose 
administration cannot be classified among the three categories of parties.  
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infiltrations and some types of parties. The result of a positive and significant coefficient for the 
Right party dummy variable suggests that infiltrations are significantly correlated with the 
probability of having conservative local governments. 
 
Political factors and public finance in infiltrated municipalities 
 
All the political and electoral elements discussed so far may not only be correlated with 
infiltrations, but also with investment decisions of local governments87. Hence, for any uncovered 
correlation between political conditions and infiltration cases we test their correlation with key 
categories of local public finance.  
 
Table 8  
Political factors and key outcome variables 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public spending Revenues collection 
 Construction and waste management Municipal police Waste tax 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Last mandate 0.0098 
  0.0002   0.0100    
(0.0160)   (0.0013)   (0.0118)   
Single candidate -0.0686 
  -0.0012   -0.0199    
(0.0451)   (0.0025)   (0.0252)  
Centre party  -0.0453   0.0001   0.0018 
 
 
 (0.0301)   (0.00242)   (0.0288) 
Right party 
 
 -0.0178   -0.0002   -0.0195   
 (0.0179)   (0.00242)   (0.0137) 
Inf 0.0465*** 0.0512*** 0.0418*** -0.0025** -0.0024** -0.0027* -0.0227** -0.0193** -0.0161*  
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0088) (0.0085) (0.0095) 
National gov (Left) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2,778 2,778 2,408 2,717 2,717 2,351 2,302 2,302 2,005 
R-squared 0.227 0.228 0.236 0.235 0.235 0.239 0.451 0.451 0.465 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample of municipalities having 
experienced at least one government dissolution for mafia infiltration. 
 
                                                          
87 Local political conditions may influence the allocation of public expenditures (Johnston, 1977; Besley and Coate, 
1998). The expectations for and results of electoral contests may be drivers of the territorial allocation of public 
investments if, for example, incumbent governments allocate public resources with the aim of extracting the highest 
electoral benefits (Cadot et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2016), or if public investments are seen as a mean to reward 
voters for electoral support (Golden and Picci, 2008). While this is a possibility, there is substantial evidence suggesting 
that the distribution of public expenditures is not always influenced by pork-barrel politics or strategic electoral 
considerations (e.g. Larcinese et al., 2012; Luca and Rodriguez-Pose, 2015). 
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The results of model (4), displayed in Table 8, report no significant correlation between key 
political factors and the public finance components varying during infiltration periods. This 
suggests that, as hypothesised, the variations in public spending are not determined by any of the 
political elements linked with infiltrations.  
 
Partisanship and mafia infiltration 
 
The previous section uncovered a systematic correlation between criminal infiltrations and 
governments ruled by conservative parties. Although interesting, this result cannot be interpreted 
causally. The electoral victory of a right-wing candidate is plausibly correlated with a wide range 
of socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality. To give a more causal interpretation to the 
relationship between right-wing parties and infiltration, we implement a regression discontinuity 
design (RDD).  
We compare municipalities where right-wing candidates won local elections by a narrow margin 
to municipalities where right-wing candidates lost by a narrow margin. The underlying 
assumption is that municipalities where right-wing candidates won or lost by a narrow margin are 
similar across all characteristics, except for the ideological leaning of the incumbent politician. 
Table A10.1 in the Appendix provides evidence that key covariates (socio-economic variables, 
mafia strength, local election characteristics) are not significantly different in treatment and 
control groups used for the RDD88. 
Let 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 be the vote share of the right-leaning candidate minus the vote share of the non-right 
candidate, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 be the treatment dummy variable referring to electoral victories of right-wing 
parties, and Pr (𝐼𝑛𝑓)𝑚,𝑡 the probability of infiltration. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡= 1 if 𝑋𝑚,𝑡> 0 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡= 0 if 𝑋𝑚,𝑡< 0. 
We focus on the set of electoral races where 𝑋𝑚,𝑡 is lower than a bandwidth h
89, such that the 
outcome of those races can be considered as good as random. Our treatment effect is the average 
difference between Pr (𝐼𝑛𝑓)𝑚,𝑡 of a municipality where the right narrowly wins and Pr (𝐼𝑛𝑓)𝑚,𝑡 
of a municipality where the right is narrowly defeated. 
                                                          
88 As a robustness check, the RDD estimates are replicated comparing all the close electoral races where the right barely 
wins or loses against the left party only. The results are unchanged from the ones obtained when all non-right parties 
belong to the control group. Estimation results available upon request. 
89 We use Calonico et al.’s (2014) optimal bandwidth, which in our setting corresponds to 0.075, meaning that the 
sample is made of governments whose election was characterised by a difference in votes between the right-wing party 
and other parties below 7.5%. 
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We estimate the RDD both parametrically and non-parametrically, and using linear and quadratic 
polynomials. Table 9 reports our results, obtained with the full sample of municipalities from 
Campania, Calabria and Sicily. Columns (1) and (2) present the results when using a linear and 
quadratic functional forms, respectively. We remove assumptions of linearity in columns (3)-(5). 
In all cases, we find a positive and significant correlation, indicating that the probability of 
infiltration increases as right-wing parties win local elections by a small margin. 
 
Table 9  
Effect of right-wing close electoral victory on the probability of infiltration 
 Dep. variable: probability of infiltration 
 Non - parametric Parametric 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Right-wing winner 0.0751* 0.0846* 0.0722** 0.0722** 0.101* 
  (0.0399) (0.0524) (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0604) 
Bandwidth 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 
Polynomial Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic 
Observations 911 911 911 911 911 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Forcing variable coefficients not displayed. 
Column 1: rddrobust linear; column 2: rddrobust polynomial; column 3: linear regression with kernel weights; column 4: 
linear regression varying linear slopes; column 5: polynomial regression of order 2 with interaction with forcing variable. 
All the estimations use Calonico et al.’s (2014) bandwidth.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates these findings graphically, where observations are fitted with polynomials of 
order two and include confidence interval bands. A statistically significant increase in the number 
of infiltrated municipalities on the right-hand side of the threshold is evident.  
These findings complement well those of Buonanno et al. (2016) and Alesina et al. (2016), 
focusing on Italian national elections and reporting a systematic correlation between mafia-
plagued municipalities and the main right-wing party during a similar period of analysis.  
As shown in Appendix A10, the results remain significant as the bandwidth increases or decreases 
to elections where the margin of victory is as low as 4% (Figure A10.2), and the effect is 
statistically insignificant at placebo cutoffs (Figure A10.3). 
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Figure 7  
RDD – right-wing party victory and probability of infiltration 
 
Note: polynomial fit of order 2. vote share>0 refers to elections won by right-wing parties; vote share<0 refers to 
elections barely lost by right-wing parties.  
 
Partisanship and public finances 
 
Such a significant relationship between right-wing parties and probability of infiltration may 
imply that changes in public finances are not caused by mafia infiltrations but rather by right-
wing local governments. To rule out this concern, we replicate RDD estimates by using the key 
public finance components affected by infiltrations as dependent variables.  
Table 10 reports the results. The insignificant coefficients of right-wing parties reveal that the 
there is no statistically significant variation any of the three components in municipal 
governments ruled by right-wing parties that barely won the elections.  
 
Table 10  
Effect of right-wing close electoral victory on public finances 
 Dependent variable: 
 Construction and waste management Municipal police Waste tax 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Right-wing winner -0.0194 -0.0480 -0.0216 
  (0.0263) (0.0551) (0.0353) 
Bandwidth 0.0751 0.0751 0.0751 
Observations 620 620 620 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 8 reproduce the estimation results in graphical forms, providing evidence that no 
significant discontinuity around the threshold is present for the three public finance components.  
 
Figure 8  
RDD – right-wing party victory and current account spending components 
Construction and waste management 
 
 
Municipal police 
 
Waste tax 
 
Note: polynomial fit of order 2. vote share>0 refers to elections won by right-wing parties; vote share<0 refers to 
elections barely lost by right-wing parties.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Government captures distort the functioning of administrative systems. Illegal and secretive 
agreements between elected officials and colluding parties may alter the political process and 
condition the definition of public policies in the interests of citizens. In this paper, we have 
explored the impact of the collusion between organised crime and local politicians in Southern 
Italy. Our study is the first in the literature to empirically study the phenomenon of infiltration, 
analysing both the conditions that make collusions more likely and their possible consequences.  
The findings indicate that collusions between mafia and politics affect the allocation of public 
resources and the ability of local governments to collect fiscal revenues. Our analysis suggests 
that while the overall amount of financial resources invested by local governments remains 
unaltered, expenditures for specific components of municipal balance sheets vary significantly as 
a result of infiltrations. Infiltrated municipalities spend higher shares of resources in construction 
and waste management, reduce annual investment in municipal police forces, and are less efficient 
in collecting waste taxes. These results are robust to changes in specifications and to a series of 
robustness checks. 
Furthermore, we have identified a set of political characteristics of municipal elections that are 
correlated with infiltrations. We find that infiltrations are linked with the absence of competition 
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at local elections, as well as with mayors running for their second and last mandate. In addition, 
we have tested for a systematic correlation between infiltrated governments and political parties 
of a specific colour, uncovering that infiltrations are more likely to occur when governments are 
controlled by right-wing mayors. This may imply that during our period of analysis, 1998-2013, 
mafia groups had a preference for right-wing parties when looking for political referents.  
These findings shed light on the strategy of organised crime when it endeavours to take control 
of local politics and on the consequences of such meddling for local state capacity. Interestingly, 
influences on political choices perpetrated by organised crime seem to impact on public finances 
in a different way as compared to general forms of political interference (from any type of pressure 
group) as identified in the literature. While previous empirical studies on the capturing of political 
decision-making have found that the undue influence of powerful groups on politics (e.g. through 
corruption) determines a general inflation of public capital expenditures (Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1997), our analysis reveals that organise crime operates differently when infiltrated within local 
governments. Mafia infiltrations neither entail generalised inflations of public expenditures – 
which would increase the probability of mafia’s political trustees to be removed from power for 
financial instability reasons – nor do they seem to imply a conditioning of the current expenditures 
budget. Rather, local finances are modified only in the strategic sectors where the mafia has 
interests to protect. In particular, the largest influence on the municipal financial budget seems to 
involve a substantial diversion of investment funds towards the construction sector, which is 
considered crucial for mafia groups in order to reinforce their presence locally, protect their 
traffics, and further increase business profits (Gambetta, 1993; Sciarrone, 2011; Transcrime, 
2013)  
The fact that infiltrated governments are less likely to incur in financial mismanagement issues 
makes it more complicated to detect and remove them. As a consequence, in local territories where 
the presence of the mafia is more pervasive, efforts to ‘clean up’ legal institutions from politicians 
linked to criminal organisations must be considerable. The 164/1991 law has allowed to discover 
and put an end to hundreds of collusion cases, but the relative frequency of repeated dissolutions 
in the same municipality (sometimes after just a few years) demonstrates that more powerful 
legislative tools are needed to completely eradicate the phenomenon of political infiltrations. A 
strengthening of the law allowing mafia-related government dissolutions, under discussion in these 
years (Cantone, 2010), may prove helpful. However, this reform could be insufficient if not 
coupled with measures preventing any potential distortions to democratic competition at local 
elections. Equally important to limit the local power of mafia clans would be to guarantee public 
  
- 228 - 
 
services and employment opportunities in the small towns and urban neighbourhoods where 
organised crime currently has the upper hand. 
How harmful is a protracted mafia-capturing of political systems for the socio-economic 
development of local communities? This will depend on how detrimental for the economy are the 
distortions in public finances and political competition identified by our study. While we have 
briefly discussed the negative implications of such interferences (e.g. on the fair competition for 
public work tenders), our estimates do not calculate their precise welfare impact. We leave the 
task of quantifying the socio-economic effects of infiltrations to future research. 
To conclude, our analysis has unveiled the important distortionary effect that mafia infiltrations 
may have on politics and public policy choices. This study helps to gain a deeper understanding 
of such phenomenon and, possibly, aid in its prevention. 
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Appendix 
 
A1 Correlation between dissolved municipal governments 
and national or provincial governments, 1998-2013 
 
Table A1.1  
Municipal governments and national governments 
    National government 
no of dissolutions Municipal government Right Left 
67 Righta -0.108 0.061 
43 Leftb 0.139 -0.047 
6 Centrec -0.068 -0.011 
Note: no statistically significant coefficient. Right-wing national governments: Berlusconi 2001-2005 and Berlusconi 2008-
2011; Left-wing national governments: Prodi 1998, D’Alema 1999, Amato 2000, Prodi 2006-2007, Letta 2013; Centre 
national governments: Monti 2012. a / Right-wing municipal governments during infiltration period; b / Left-wing municipal 
governments during infiltration period; c / Municipal government ruled by a Centre party during infiltration period. 
 
Table A1.2  
Municipal governments and provincial governments 
Municipal 
government 
Province and provincial government 
Caserta Napoli Reggio Calabria Vibo Valentia Palermo 
Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left 
Righta -0.143 / 0.277 / 0.233 / N/A / -0.154 / 
Leftb / -0.149 / 0.194 / 0.143 / 0.239 / N/A 
Note: no statistically significant coefficient. None of these provinces had governments from the ‘Centre’ over the 1998-
2013 period. Vibo Valentia only had left-wing governments while Palermo only had right-wing governments. a / Right-wing 
municipal governments during infiltration period in given province. b / Left-wing municipal governments during infiltration 
period in given province.  
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A2  Municipal institutional setting and public spending 
  
Institutional setting. As of 2016, there were 8,010 municipalities in Italy, 1350 of which are 
found in the regions of analysis, varying considerably by area and population. The institutional 
setting of the municipalities is centred on the figure of the mayor, who heads the local government 
and leads along with the legislative body, the local council, and the executive body, the local 
giunta. The mayor and members of the council are elected together by resident citizens. The 
giunta is chaired by the mayor, who appoints its members. Elections of local councils are 
staggered over time and not held at the same time for all municipalities.  
Public spending components. The six key public spending categories of municipalities are: 
general administrative functions, social sectors, construction and waste management, 
transportation, public education and municipal police. 
(1) General functions of administration include all expenses related to the management of offices 
coordinating the internal activities of the municipality; (2) social sectors include all expenses for 
the provision of social services and the creation of infrastructure to that aim (kindergartens, 
retirement homes, rehab centres); (3) construction and waste management refers to all expenses 
for urban planning – adoption of construction plans and building regulations, maintenance and 
construction of all new buildings (all part of capital spending), waste collection and disposal 
(current spending); (4) transportation includes expenses to guarantee local public transportation, 
public lighting, provision of local road infrastructure; (5) public education includes all expenses 
for all education infrastructure, school maintenance and school transportation; (6) functions of 
local police include the acquisition and maintenance of goods and equipment, cars and office 
structures. 
One key responsibility of Italian municipalities is to tender and award public procurement 
contracts to the contractor companies in charge of carrying out the work.  
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Figure A2.1 
Current and capital expenditure allocations over time 
 
Source: own elaboration with Ministry of Interior data. 
 
Figure A2.2  
Proportion of fiscal revenues by type of tax, Italian municipalities 
 
Source: own elaboration with Ministry of Interior data.  
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A3 Robustness checks – time trends 
 
In Tables A3.1, Table A3.2, Table A3.3, and Table A3.4 we provide a series of robustness checks 
for our main results. In all estimations, the sample is restricted to the municipalities that 
experienced at least one dissolution.  
In the first column, a parsimonious specification is presented, including time fixed effects and no 
other controls. The second column adds mafia-proxy and municipal socio-economic factors as 
controls. In practice, the results in column (2) of table A3.1 – A3.4 replicate those in columns (6) 
and (12) of Table 3, column (22) of Table 4, and column (5) of Table 5. In the third column of 
Tables A3.1 – A3.4, we include a full set of linear time trends for each municipality, accounting 
for any previously omitted factors potentially affecting the temporal development of municipal 
governments and correlated with infiltrations. This specification reports a coefficient for the 
infiltration dummy of similar magnitude of those in the previous columns for both capital 
expenditures in construction and waste management and for municipal police. The result for waste 
taxes is also unaffected. However, the coefficient of current expenditures for municipal police 
turns insignificant. 
In column (4) of Tables A3.1-A3.4, we relax the assumption of infiltrations beginning with the 
election of later-dissolved governments, by including the infiltration dummy with a one year lag. 
This classifies infiltrations as if they initiated in the year after the elections, by introducing one 
additional lag between the moment of infiltration and the moment in which the financial resources 
were actually spent by local governments (the spending variable is measured at period t+1).  
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Table A3.1  
Effect of infiltration on capital expenditures in construction and waste management 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
Capital expenditures for Construction and waste management  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inf 
0.0469*** 0.0442** 0.0466**   
(0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0200) 
  
Lagged Inf    
0.0674*** 
   
(0.0249) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time trends     ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2559 2559 2559 2405 
R-squared 0.220 0.227 0.333 0.348 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged 
by one period.  
 
Table A3.2  
Effect of infiltration on capital expenditures in municipal police 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
Capital expenditures for municipal police  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inf 
-0.00277** -0.00222* -0.00467*   
(0.00125) (0.00118) (0.00242)   
Lagged Inf    
-0.00335* 
   
(0.00206) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time trends     ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2496 2496 2496 2412 
R-squared 0.230 0.235 0.419 0.431 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged 
by one period.  
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Table A3.3  
Effect of infiltration on current expenditures in municipal police 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
Current expenditures for municipal police  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inf 
-0.00301** -0.00217* -0.000757   
(0.00128) (0.00123) (0.00116)   
Lagged Inf    
-0.000756 
   
(0.00126) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time trends     ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2579 2579 2579 2415 
R-squared 0.658 0.665 0.775 0.784 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged 
by one period.  
 
 
Table A3.4  
Effect of infiltration on waste and garbage taxes 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
Waste tax collection  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inf 
-0.0201** -0.0185** -0.0173**   
(0.00928) (0.00961) (0.00816)   
Lagged Inf    
-0.0151* 
   
(0.00799) 
Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Time trends     ✓ ✓ 
Observations 2122 2122 2122 1981 
R-squared 0.454 0.470 0.645 0.652 
Municipalities 182 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lagged Inf is the infiltration dummy lagged 
by one period.  
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A4 Effect of infiltration on capital expenditure components 
by municipal population 
 
Our analysis has unveiled that mafia infiltrations modify the investment decisions of local 
governments. The impact of the mafia on public finance allocations is likely to vary according to 
some characteristics of the local context. In this appendix section we investigate whether the 
intensity of the effect depends on the size of the municipalities whose governments are infiltrated.  
We test this by sub-dividing the entire sample into municipalities with less than 2000 inhabitants, 
between 2000 and 5000 inhabitants, and above 5000 inhabitants, replicating the main estimates. 
As shown in Table A4.1 below, inflations in capital expenditures for construction and waste 
management are higher, the smaller the population of a municipality. The coefficient of the 
infiltration dummy is positive and significant for medium and small-size municipalities and the 
magnitude is larger for towns below 2000 inhabitants. One interpretation for this result is that 
small towns are where the power of the mafia can be more pervasive, due to the high control of 
territory it exercises and to the greater distance from the central State felt by the citizens. In the 
context of small localities where the presence of the mafia is more diffused, collusion is expected 
to lead to a stronger predatory behaviour – i.e., more public work tenders awarded to mafia-
controlled firms. 
By using the same sub-division by population size, we replicate the estimates adopting the share 
of municipal police spending as the dependent variable. In this case, the reduction of the 
investment share is larger in cities with greater than 5,000 inhabitants. This result can be explained 
by the fact that the investment budget for police forces managed by large cities is significantly 
larger than those of small towns. The mafia has more interest in limiting expenses for law 
enforcement where the latter can affect the productivity of police investigations.  
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Table A4.1  
Effect of infiltration on capital expenditure components by municipal population 
 Dep. Variable: Capital expenditures for construction and waste management Capital expenditures for municipal police 
 population: population: 
 below 2000 between 2000 and 5000 above 5000 below 2000 between 2000 and 5000 above 5000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inf 0.0951** 0.0795** 0.0199 0.00283 -0.00183 -0.00338** 
 (0.0425) (0.0331) (0.0219) (0.00259) (0.00180) (0.00168) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality 
dummies 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 6,817 6,514 7,447 6,564 6,299 7,258 
R-squared 0.193 0.222 0.234 0.139 0.157 0.175 
Municipalities 473 469 502 473 469 502 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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A5 Main results with coefficients of control variables 
 
Table A5.1  
Effect of infiltration on public expenditures and on revenues collection 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Total per capita spending 
Capital expenditures 
construction and waste 
management 
Capital expenditures 
municipal police 
Waste tax 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Inf 
-0.0223 -0.0066 0.0448** 0.0442** -0.00262** -0.00222* -0.0203** -0.0176* 
 
(0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.00126) (0.00118) (0.00908) (0.00951) 
Mafia homicides 1.150** -2.177 0.178 -0.858 -0.0246 -0.0428 0.309 -0.284 
 (0.536) (1.533) (0.368) (0.904) (0.0248) (0.0574) (0.213) (0.565) 
Agricultural employment 0.0152** 0.0189* 0.00332 0.0126 -0.000324** -0.00180*** -0.00257 -0.00248 
 (0.00611) (0.0105) (0.00312) (0.00882) (0.000150) (0.000581) (0.00283) (0.00445) 
Tertiary educated -0.0104 0.0315 0.00193 0.0423*** -0.000285 -0.00233* 0.00761** -0.00553 
 (0.0113) (0.0246) (0.00343) (0.0151) (0.000235) (0.00120) (0.00344) (0.0150) 
Industry employment -0.0100 -0.0167 0.00563 0.0120 -0.000151 -0.00103 0.00341 0.00594 
 (0.0105) (0.0340) (0.00517) (0.0162) (0.000274) (0.00163) (0.00499) (0.0105) 
Unemployment 0.00179 0.0213** -0.000988 0.00796 -0.000229* -0.000755 -0.000627 0.00193 
 (0.00434) (0.00919) (0.00270) (0.00874) (0.000124) (0.000785) (0.00204) (0.00361) 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Full sample ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Restricted sample  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Observations 20,888 2582 20,783 2559 20,126 2496 17,103 2122 
R-squared 0.510 0.522 0.205 0.227 0.169 0.235 0.521 0.472 
Municipalities 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 1350 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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A6 Granger causality test 
 
In order to perform the Granger causality test (Angrist and Pishke, 2008), a set of dummy 
variables is created for each year of the treatment period, i.e. the period from the governments’ 
election to their dissolution. Similar dummy variables are also constructed for pre-treatment years, 
while one additional dummy is created for the whole post-treatment period.  
Given that some municipalities have witnessed more than one government dissolutions, the post-
treatment period cannot be codified as continuous in these cases. As a result, all municipalities 
with more than one infiltrated government in the 1998-2013 period have been excluded from the 
sample for this test. In the case of municipalities having had government dissolutions occurring 
prior to 1998, the post-treatment dummy takes value 1 for the entire period of analysis. 
The following equation is estimated: 
𝑦𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜑𝑚 + 𝜏𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿−𝜏
𝑝
𝜏=0
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑚,𝑡−𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿+𝜏
𝑞
𝜏=1
𝐷𝑚,𝑡+𝑡 + 𝑋𝑚𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 
 
 
Where p represents the post-treatment effect and q represent the anticipatory effects.  
We re-estimate the model for the main dependent variables (investments for construction and 
waste management and for municipal police) by including the set of leads and lags dummies, 
controlling for fixed-time effects and municipality time trends.  
The evolution of municipal spending has been assessed up to 2 years before the election of an 
infiltrated government, during the period in which the infiltrated government was in charge, and 
in the post-dissolution years. Each point in the figures refers to the estimated coefficient for a 
given year.  
Figures A6.1- A6.3 show that there is no statistical difference in the pre-treatment trends of 
treatment and control groups in the years before the elections of infiltrated governments. Hence, 
we can discard the possibility that changes in local public finances (investments or revenues 
collection) ‘Granger-cause’ infiltrations. 
Interestingly, Figure A6.1 shows a jump in investment for construction and waste management in 
the first year after elections. This may be due to the fact that the second budget year is also the 
last one in which governments can promote three-year investment plans of public works (worth 
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more than 100,000 Euros) and hope to see the end of construction works while still in office. 
These medium-term investment initiatives are potentially very appealing for the mafia. 
 
Table A6.1 
Granger causality test - number of municipalities by year of government 
 Years of government before dissolution 
 1 or more 2 or more 3 or more 4 or more 5 
Municipalities 117 110 79 49 23 
 
Figure A6.1  
Granger causality test – Capital expenditures for construction and waste management 
 
Note: Granger causality test estimated with 2 leads and 2 lags. Municipalities dissolved more than once dropped from the 
sample. The estimates for each year include time and municipalities dummies, time trends, controls. 
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Figure A6.2  
Granger causality test – Capital expenditures for municipal police 
 
Note: Granger causality test estimated with 2 leads and 2 lags. Municipalities dissolved more than once dropped from the 
sample. The estimates for each year include time and municipalities dummies, time trends, controls. 
 
Figure A6.3  
Granger causality test – Waste and garbage tax 
 
Note: Granger causality test estimated with 2 leads and 2 lags. Municipalities dissolved more than once dropped from the 
sample. The estimates for each year include time and municipalities dummies, time trends, controls. 
  
-.
0
1
5
-.
0
1
-.
0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
.0
1
election1 prior2 prior 1 after 2 after after inf
pre/post-infiltration infiltration
Effect of Infiltration on Municipal police spending
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
election1 prior2 prior 1 after 2 after after inf
pre/post-infiltration infiltration period
Effect of infiltration on Waste tax
  
- 245 - 
 
A7 Robustness check – selection into treatment 
 
Table A7.1 
Dissolutions for reasons unrelated to public finances 
 
Dependent variable: 
  
Construction and waste 
management 
Municipal police Waste tax 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Inf 0.0492** -0.00267** -0.0172* 
 (0.0201) (0.00131) (0.0101) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 1452 1407 1190 
R-squared 0.335 0.239 0.500 
Municipalities 182 182 182 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All municipalities for which the reasons 
for dissolutions is related to distortions in the balance sheets excluded from sample. 
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A8 Placebo – mafia-unrelated dissolutions  
 
Table A8.1  
Mafia-unrelated dissolutions and total public spending 
 Total spending Total capital expenditures Total current expenditures 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Mafia-unrelated dissolutions -0.0316 -0.0930 -0.00563 
 (0.0290) (0.0734) (0.00671) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 18,306 18,307 18,308 
R-squared 0.500 0.347 0.735 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table A8.2  
Mafia-unrelated dissolutions and key outcome variables 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public spending components Revenues collection 
 Construction and 
waste management 
Municipal police Waste tax 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Mafia-unrelated dissolutions 0.00723 -0.000692 -0.00399 
 (0.00938) (0.00071) (0.00843) 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 18,218 17,624 14,981 
R-squared 0.292 0.227 0.259 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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A9 Descriptive statistics – political factors 
 
Table A9.1  
Descriptive statistics – political factors 
  All municipalities Infiltration years 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Single candidate 2869 0.023 0.149 437 0.059 0.237 
Last mandate 2869 0.203 0.402 437 0.327 0.470 
Left party 2869 0.320 0.467 437 0.316 0.465 
Centre party 2869 0.082 0.274 437 0.098 0.298 
Right party 2869 0.461 0.499 437 0.563 0.497 
Civic list 2869 0.510 0.500 437 0.584 0.494 
Note: All municipalities: municipalities of Campania, Calabria and Sicily having experienced at least one government 
dissolution for mafia infiltration. Infiltration years: years classified as infiltration for these municipalities. 
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A10 RDD tests  
 
Table A10.1  
Balance of covariates 
 
Dependent variable: 
  
Unemployment 
Industry 
employment  
Human 
capital 
Population 
Total 
spending 
Mafia-related 
homicides  
White 
ballots 
Turnout 
Non-valid 
ballots 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treatment vs. 
control 
-0.594 0.480 -0.0919 -0.269 -0.0195 5.45e-06 0.129 -2.397 0.8 
  (0.795) (0.551) (0.670) (0.364) (0.0263) (0.00233) (0.306) (2.428) (0.520) 
Observations 620 620 620 620 614 620 619 621 619 
 
McCrary test. Reliable RDD estimates need to make sure that there is no random sorting around 
the cutoff. If the density of 𝑋𝑚,𝑡for each municipality is continuous, then the marginal density of 
𝑋𝑚,𝑡 over the sub-sample of municipalities used for the RDD study should be continuous as well 
(McCrary, 2008). If, for examples, close races are disproportionally resolved in favour of right 
wing parties – e.g. via manipulation of electoral outcomes, electoral fraud, etc.– this would 
challenge the idea that the outcome of these electoral races is as good as random, and indicate 
some degree of sorting around the threshold.  
As shown in Table A10.2 and Figure A10.1, there is no statistically significant jump in the density 
of observations at the cutoff point for the RDD sample of close elections. 
While to a given extent mafia groups are indeed expected to manipulate electoral results by re-
directing voting to their preferred candidates, this test shows that this does not seem to be the case 
in our RDD sample. One possible reason may be that, if the mafia actively distorts electoral 
results, this is unlikely to bring to a victory of the preferred party by a small margin. Electoral 
manipulations normally come with abnormal numbers of non-valid or white ballots. As a 
descriptive indication that electoral manipulation is not occurring in the RDD sample, the average 
non-valid ballots in infiltrated municipalities won by the left is 4.4% whereas it is 3.8% when the 
right-wing party wins and the government is infiltrated. The number of white ballots is 
respectively 1.6% and 1.4%.  
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Table A10.2  
Test for sorting around cutoff 
 t P>|t| 
Conventional -0.9782 0.3280 
Bias-corrected -0.3842 0.7008 
Robust -0.3252 0.7450 
Bandiwth mserd 
Polynomial Quadratic 
Observations 594 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Figure A10.1  
Test for sorting around cutoff 
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Figure A10.2 
Robustness checks – Moving bandwidths 
 
Note: The line extends from the lower bound to the upper bound. 90% confidence interval. CCT: optimal bandwidth.   
 
Figure A10.3  
Robustness checks – point estimates at different cutoff points 
 
Note: The line extends from the lower bound to the upper bound. 90% confidence interval.   
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